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Abstract
Due to the open nature of the radio signal propagation medium, wireless communication
is inherently more vulnerable to various attacks than wired communication. Consequently,
communication security is always one of the critical concerns in wireless networks. Given that
the sophisticated adversaries may cover up their malicious behaviors through impersonation of
legitimate devices, reliable wireless authentication is becoming indispensable to prevent such
impersonation-based attacks through verification of the claimed identities of wireless devices.
Conventional wireless authentication is achieved above the physical layer using upper-layer
identities and key-based cryptography. As a result, user authenticity can even be validated for
the malicious attackers using compromised security key. Recently, many studies have proven
that wireless devices can be authenticated by exploiting unique physical-layer characteristics.
Compared to the key-based approach, the possession of such physical-layer characteristics is
directly associated with the transceiver’s unique radio-frequency hardware and corresponding
communication environment, which are extremely difficult to forge in practice. However, the
reliability of physical-layer authentication is not always high enough. Due to the popularity
of cooperative communications, effective implementation of physical-layer authentication in
wireless relay systems is urgently needed. On the other hand, the integration with existing
upper-layer authentication protocols still has many challenges, e.g., end-to-end authentication.
This dissertation is motivated to develop novel physical-layer authentication techniques in ad-
dressing the aforementioned challenges.
In achieving enhanced wireless authentication, we first specifically identify the technique
challenges in authenticating cooperative amplify-and-forward (AF) relay. Since AF relay only
works at the physical layer, all of the existing upper-layer authentication protocols are ineffec-
tive in identifying AF relay nodes. To solve this problem, a novel device fingerprint of AF relay
consisting of wireless channel gains and in-phase and quadrature imbalances (IQI) is proposed.
Using this device fingerprint, satisfactory authentication accuracy is achieved when the signal-
to-noise ratio is high enough. Besides, the optimal AF relay identification system is studied to
maximize the performance of identifying multiple AF relays in the low signal-to-noise regime
and small IQI. The optimal signals for quadrature amplitude modulation and phase shift keying
modulations are derived to defend against the repeated access attempts made by some attackers
ii
with specific IQIs.
Exploring effective authentication enhancement technique is another key objective of this
dissertation. Due to the fast variation of channel-based fingerprints as well as the limited range
of device-specific fingerprints, the performance of physical-layer authentication is not always
reliable. In light of this, the physical-layer authentication is enhanced in two aspects. On the
one hand, the device fingerprinting can be strengthened by considering multiple characteris-
tics. The proper characteristics selection strategy, measurement method and optimal weighted
combination of the selected characteristics are investigated. On the other hand, the accuracy of
fingerprint estimation and differentiation can be improved by exploiting diversity techniques.
To be specific, cooperative diversity in the form of involving multiple collaborative receivers
is used in differentiating both frequency-dependent and frequency-independent device finger-
prints. As a typical combining method of the space diversity techniques, the maximal-ratio
combining is also applied in the receiver side to combat the channel degeneration effect and
increase the fingerprint-to-noise ratio.
Given the inherent weaknesses of the widely utilized upper-layer authentication protocols,
it is straightforward to consider physical-layer authentication as an effective complement to re-
inforce existing authentication schemes. To this end, a cross-layer authentication is designed to
seamlessly integrate the physical-layer authentication with existing infrastructures and proto-
cols. The specific problems such as physical-layer key generation as well as the end-to-end au-
thentication in networks are investigated. In addition, the authentication complexity reduction
is also studied. Through prediction, pre-sharing and reusing the physical-layer information, the
authentication processing time can be significantly shortened.
Keywords: Wireless communications, physical-layer authentication, device identification, de-
vice fingerprinting, diversity, amplify-and-forward relaying, cross-layer authentication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Although the shared nature of radio propagations enables convenient “anywhere” wireless ac-
cess, it simultaneously introduces many security vulnerabilities to wireless systems. Compared
to wired communication systems, the broadcast signals in wireless networks are accessible to
both legitimate and illegitimate devices that are currently sharing the wireless medium. This
feature becomes the root of security threats in wireless communications and it can be exploited
for unauthorized access and even malicious attacks. Since the direct attacks are easy to detect,
the sophisticated attacker usually covers its vicious behaviors through impersonating a legiti-
mate entity. To clearly reveal this kind of attack scenario, Alice, Bob and Eve are introduced
according to the terminologies of communication security [1]. As shown in Fig.1.1, Alice and
Bob denote the intended wireless transmitter and receiver, respectively. Eve is the unautho-
rized attacker. Eve’s objective is try to impersonate Alice and deceive Bob into bellieving that
Bob is currently communicating with the legitimate Alice rather than Eve. Once the deceit is
successful, the communication between Bob and Eve will be leaked and exposed to various
malicious attacks.
In practice, authentication technique is used to protect the wireless systems from this kind
of impersonation-based attacks. The concept of authentication is defined as [2]
“Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing
access to resources in an information system.” — The Special Publication 800 series.
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Alice Bob
Eve
Figure 1.1: “Alice-Bob-Eve” attacking scenario.
In wireless systems, the objective of authentication is to verify the authenticity of the iden-
tities claimed by wireless devices. In the scenario of “Alice-Bob-Eve”, authentication tech-
nique can be used to detect the presence of Eve. If the presence of an attacker is confirmed,
the receiver is able to do some other actions for defending against Eve’s illegitimate access.
Therefore, wireless authentication is the primary task in protecting wireless communications.
Traditionally, authentication processing is accomplished above the physical layer through
checking the upper-layer identities of devices and using key-based cryptography. However, due
to the upper-layer identity is not directly associated with the stable hardware components of
devices, the sophisticated attacker can easily change its digital address to a legitimate one for
the sake of being identified as a legitimate device. Regarding the method of using key-based
cryptography, it inherently suffers from many problems in key management, high computa-
tional cost of encryption algorithms and intolerable communication delay in wireless systems
[3]. In light of this, the physical-layer authentication technique is emerging as a promising
complement to the upper-layer methods.
Different from upper-layer security schemes, physical-layer authentication utilizes some
unique physical-layer characteristics related to wireless transceivers to identify the signal trans-
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mitter. These characteristics are used as the device fingerprint of wireless transmitters. Con-
trary to upper-layer identity and key that can be possessed by any devices, the physical-layer
device fingerprint is directly associated with the unique hardware of wireless devices and com-
munication channel, which is extremely difficult to mimic. These characteristics can be typi-
cally classified into two types, which are the wireless link attribute and radio-frequency analog
front-end (RF-AFE) imperfection [4]. Specifically, the wireless channel reflects the unique
communication environment between the intended transmitter and receiver. The RF-AFE im-
perfection is a distinguishable hardware feature generated from the imperfect device fabrica-
tion. These physical-layer characteristics, which represent the identity of the communicating
transmitter, can automatically distort all transmitted signals. Also, the channel and RF-AFE
imperfection estimation and compensation techniques are equipped in most present receivers
so that the receiver can directly use these ready-made estimates for authentication without pos-
ing high hardware implementation cost or communication throughput reduction.
Although physical-layer authentication is drawing more research attention, many challeng-
ing issues remain for future works. We briefly summarize four main issues as follows.
First, the performance of current physical-layer authentication methods should be enhanced.
At present, many authentication schemes using various physical-layer characteristics, such as
channel state information (CSI) [5], received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [6], carrier fre-
quency offset (CFO) [7] and in-phase and quadrature-phase (I/Q) imbalance [8], have been
proposed. However, all these characteristics are not perfect device fingerprints. Regarding the
channel-based characteristics (e.g., CSI and RSSI), the most challenging issue is the timely
monitoring and updating of the wireless channel states. This authentication scheme relies on
checking the similarity of two continuous channel related attributes. In practice, the perfor-
mance is usually unsatisfactory in mobile and open outdoor scenarios. In mobile cases, the
channel states vary dramatically, resulting in high false alarm rates. In outdoor cases, as a
result of lacking multipath effect, the fingerprints cannot be clearly differentiated. The RF-
AFE imperfection-based device fingerprint usually has the problem of limited range. Since
the hardware imperfections are usually small values in practice, the accurate differentiation of
such delicate differences becomes the key point of obtaining high authentication performance.
In light of this, the physical-layer authentication enhancement techniques including better fin-
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gerprinting techniques and characteristic differentiation techniques are in high demand.
Second, the fast emerging 5th generation (5G) related techniques, such as millimeter wave
(mmWave) transmission, massive deployed small cells and vast heterogeneous devices, will po-
tentially engender urgent technical problems in current physical-layer authentication schemes.
For example, the authentication handover may become very frequently when mobile users are
transferring between the shrunken cells. Therefore, it is also important to survey the impacts
of the new physical-layer related techniques on the performance of authentication in 5G. Then,
researchers can further consider corresponding solutions to mitigate the negative impacts.
Third, effective physical-layer authentication solutions are urgently demanded in some spe-
cial scenarios, especially in wireless amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative relaying systems.
Specifically, AF relay nodes, also known as physical reflectors, only working in the physical-
layer. Due to this working feature, all of the existing well-defined upper-layer involved au-
thentication protocols cannot authenticate AF relays. Although the identification technique for
another commonly used decode-and-forward relaying strategy has been investigated in [9], to
the best knowledge of the author, there is no comprehensive work for the special case of AF re-
laying. Consequently, the applicable physical-layer fingerprinting techniques for the AF relay
system is worth studying.
Finally, the integration of physical-layer authentication techniques with existing upper-
layer authentication protocols and standardized wireless infrastructure is another significant
obstacle of applying this authentication technique into practice. Physical-layer authentication is
expected to work as an important complement to the existing upper-layer security schemes and
achieve better security performance. Therefore, it is valuable to study comprehensive cross-
layer technique which can effectively integrate physical-layer method with existing upper-layer
methods without causing any conflicts.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
• A comprehensive literature survey of current wireless authentication techniques is pre-
sented. Specifically, we survey traditional and physical-layer authentication methods and
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identify their weakness and strength, which points out the necessity of using physical-
layer authentication as a security enhancement. The main problems of current physical-
layer authentication are discussed, which includes low reliability, effective and conflict-
free integration with existing upper-layer security protocols and standard infrastructures,
and the new impacts due to the upcoming 5G communication related techniques.
• A novel wireless relay identification specifically for AF systems is proposed. Relay
identification is a useful technique to secure wireless cooperative systems. However,
the identification of AF relay nodes is more challenging since AF relay only works in
the physical layer, implying that all existing upper-layer identification protocols cannot
handle this special case. A comprehensive AF relay identification is proposed through
checking in-phase and quadrature imbalance (IQI) and wireless channel features. Satis-
factory identification accuracy is achieved in the case of multiple AF relays.
• An enhanced device fingerprinting technique is proposed. Given the fact that the authen-
tication performance using only one physical-layer characteristics is not always reliable,
we propose choosing multiple proper characteristics according to the real communica-
tion environment to generate more robust and applicable device fingerprints. Particularly,
RSSI and PER are first considered together to create enhanced device fingerprints. Then,
a general multi-characteristics-based fingerprinting method is investigated. Meanwhile,
the optimal weights are derived for combining the multiple characteristics. Using our
enhanced fingerprinting technique, the attacker detection probability can be significantly
increased compared to using only one characteristic.
• To improve the capability of differentiating the delicate difference between selected fin-
gerprints, enhanced device fingerprint observation and estimation methods are proposed
by exploiting diversity techniques. Precisely, the collaboration of multiple receivers
(i.e., multiuser diversity) is considered to process the both frequency-dependent and
frequency-independent IQI based device fingerprints and obtain higher detection prob-
ability than using one receiver. Additionally, maximal-ratio combining in a multiple
antennas enabled receiver (i.e., space diversity) is considered in improving the accuracy
of fingerprint estimation.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
• A seamless integration of the physical-layer and key-based upper-layer authentication
scheme is proposed. Given that physical-layer authentication is an important comple-
ment to existing key-based security schemes, the seamless integration technique is highly
demanded. A cross-layer authentication design using a physical-layer key generation is
proposed to achieve this goal. Furthermore, the authentication handover complexity can
be significantly reduced by using our physical-layer key generation, which is especially
valuable to the upcoming 5G communications.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, the literature survey regarding the fundamentals of traditional and physical-
layer authentication techniques is discussed. The common attack types in wireless systems are
reviewed. The current challenging issues and potential forthcoming problems in the wireless
authentication research area are identified.
In Chapter 3 and 4, we address the problem of identifying AF relay solely in physical layer.
Chapter 3 studies AF relay differentiation. According to the physical-layer working principle
of AF relay nodes, the joint Rx/Tx IQI and wireless channel factors are used to generate a novel
fingerprint to distinguish two AF relays nodes. The statistics of this fingerprint are analyzed and
exploited in a hypothesis testing to verify the claimed identity of the current communicating
AF relay node.
Chapter 4 aims at investigating the optimal design for AF relay identification. Given that
RF-AFE imperfection estimation and compensation are basics for improving reception quality
in most of receivers, we propose directly making use of these LS estimation results for fin-
gerprinting AF relay nodes. The effective identification algorithm is designed to distinguish
the malicious AF relay from multiple legitimate relays. The optimal signals are derived for
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and phase shift keying (PSK) modulations for the
sake of maximizing the capability of identifying and tracking the malicious relays with spe-
cific steady-state imperfection values. More robust suboptimal solutions are also proposed
whose identification performance is sufficiently close to the optimal designs.
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Chapters 5 and 6 focus on enhancing the current physical-layer authentication performance.
Chapter 5 investigates the combination of multiple physical-layer characteristics to generate en-
hanced wireless device fingerprints. An 802.11 wireless WiFi device authentication is first pro-
posed using two specific attributes, which are RSSI and PER. Then, a more general scheme us-
ing a weighted combination of multiple RF-AFE imperfections is studied. The optimal weights
for the best detection performance are also discussed in this chapter.
Diversity techniques including multiuser and space diversities are exploited as another ef-
fective method to improve the reliability of physical-layer authentication in Chapter 6. Through
involving in multiple receivers, two collaborative authentication schemes (distributed scheme
and centralized scheme) are proposed. On the other hand, the maximal-ratio combining tech-
nique is considered in a receiver equipping with multiple antennas to improve the estimation
accuracy of the device fingerprints.
Chapter 7 focuses on the cross-layer authentication system design. Given the advantages
of using physical-layer technique, the effective integration method of combining multi-layer
methods are discussed. A novel physical-layer key using physical-layer attributes is proposed
as an example to achieve this seamless integration. Furthermore, the complexity reduction of
the authentication procedure is investigated through using our physical-layer key.
In Chapter 8, the conclusions and future works are presented.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
Wireless transmission makes “anytime” and “anywhere” communication a reality. However, it
also induces more vulnerabilities in wireless systems, as the electromagnetic waves propagated
in an open transmission medium can be easily heard by unintended adversaries. Thus, the
authentication technique becomes a necessity to detect wireless adversaries. In this chapter,
the traditional and physical-layer authentication schemes are surveyed in terms of working
fundamentals, related works and current technically challenging issues. The requirements of
the cross-layer authentication system are also discussed in details. The motivation of this
chapter is to familiarize the readers with the wireless authentication-related issues and lay the
foundation for the rest of the dissertation.
2.1 Traditional Wireless Authentication Techniques
In conventional wireless systems, the security issues of authentication, confidentiality and in-
tegrity are handled above the physical layer by mainly relying on upper-layer identity verifica-
tion and key-based cryptography.
Regarding the upper-layer identity, the most commonly employed identity for authentica-
tion purpose is the media access control (MAC) address. For example, IEEE 802.15.4 protocol
based wireless systems can define a device’s digital address in the MAC sublayer, which is
laid over the physical layer. In an IEEE 802.15.4 network, the MAC address of devices can
be inserted in the MAC header of the message packet in the packet encapsulating procedure.
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Since MAC address is network-wide unique, the intended packet receiver can verify the MAC
address of the transmitter to prevent unauthorized access.
However, this kind of authentication scheme is vulnerable to identity-based attacks. Here,
we introduce two easily launched and harmful identity-based attacks, the spoofing attack [6]
and the Sybil attack [10]. The spoofing attacker can mimic the identity of another device. For
instance, when a spoofing attacker changes its MAC identity to an authorized one, this attacker
has a high chance of bypassing the MAC address verification mechanism. In identity-based
Sybil attacks, an attacker can create multiple faked identities and present as multiple devices.
As a result of a successful Sybil attack, the routing performance can be significantly degraded
since the deceived entity thinks multiple nodes rather than one node are utilized to create an
optimal routing. Above all, identity-based attacks are based on changing the upper-layer iden-
tity. Since upper-layer identity, typically a string of numbers, can be easily revised, this kind
of attack can be conveniently launched again and again but hard to completely eradicate by
upper-layer identity verification schemes.
Key-based cryptography is another widely used upper-layer security technique. Fig.2.1
shows the basic working principle of encryption in protecting wireless communication security.
Alice first uses key K to encrypt message M1 into codeword C. Then, C is decrypted by Bob
to generate M2. Ideally, it is expected that M1 = M2 if Bob knows K. Eve cannot decrypt the
C without the knowledge of K. The authenticity of Alice can be verified at Bob by checking
the decryption results. For example, if Bob can obtain some secret information only shared
between Alice and Bob from the decryption, the current transmitter could be identified as
Alice. Generally, there are two basic encryption types, the symmetric key and asymmetric key.
Symmetric key algorithm is a class of algorithms that uses the same key for both the encryp-
tion of plaintext and the decryption of ciphertext. In this algorithm, the key must be secretly
shared among the authorized entities. Once the key is leaked, the communication security can-
not be guaranteed. Regarding asymmetric key algorithm, the term “asymmetric” means the
use of different keys to perform the encryption and decryption as contrasted with “symmetric”
cryptography, which relies on the same key to perform both. Precisely, asymmetric key cryp-
tography requires two separate keys, one is private and the other one is public. The private
key is used to decrypt ciphertext or to create a digital signature and it is kept in Alice, whereas
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Figure 2.1: Block digram of encryption-based security.
the public key is used to encrypt plaintext or to verify a digital signature and it is available for
anyone. In the context of authentication, it is assumed that Alice writes a message for Bob and
signs it by encrypting the message using her private key. In order to verify that the message
was originally sent from Alice, Bob decrypts it using the public key. On the premise that only
Alice owns the private key, the decrypted readable message means that it is Alice who wrote
this message.
Although cryptography is an effective method to defend against identity-based attacks, its
application in wireless systems still has many limitations. Five main limitations are summa-
rized as follows.
• Secure and timely symmetric key sharing in highly dynamic and large-scale networks
comprised of a large number of mobile and heterogeneous devices is becoming a chal-
lenging task. More importantly, key management in such complex networks may require
multiple hops transmission and involve many entities, as a result of which secure key
exchange is hard to guarantee.
• Asymmetric key algorithms usually have a high computational cost. The effectiveness
of cryptographic scheme is based upon the computational infeasibility of cracking the
encryption algorithm within a short time duration, as a result of which it is termed as
computational security. In fact, the actual wireless nodes are normally featured as small-
power devices and severely constrained in computation and storage capability for eco-
2.2. Physical-Layer Authentication Techniques 11
nomic reasons. Therefore, the utilization of high complexity encryption algorithms in
such wireless devices can result in long latency, which is intolerable for delay-sensitive
communications.
• Upper-layer cryptography-based authentication is not suitable for all wireless device au-
thentication cases. In practice, there are some wireless devices, such as AF relay nodes,
only work in the physical layer. In this case, the complex cryptography is ineffective.
• Some new vulnerabilities may be introduced into the implementation of cryptographic
systems. For example, the improper reuse of some random parameters or forgetting to
destroy plaintext could be exploited by attackers to break the whole system [11].
• The premise that it is computationally infeasible to break the digital key is still mathe-
matically unproven [3]. With the rapid growth of the processing power of attackers, the
time spent on cracking a digital security key could be shortened remarkably. Once the
digital key is obtained by an attacker, the cryptographic system is broken.
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that both upper-layer identity verification and
cryptography-based authentication schemes have severe problems when applied in wireless
systems. The root of these problems is that the upper-layer information is not directly associ-
ated with the devices so that it can be easily modified. Given the fact that any user, including
the attacker, who possesses the digital address or key can be identified as legitimate, the de-
tection of this attacker is extremely difficult. Therefore, it is valuable to explore stable and
unique physical-layer characteristics to generate device fingerprint and investigate correspond-
ing physical-layer authentication techniques.
2.2 Physical-Layer Authentication Techniques
In this section, the physical-layer authentication techniques are reviewed in terms of RF finger-
printing types, authentication model, related works and the related challenging issues.
Physical-layer security technique was pioneered by Shannon in 1948 [12]. Shannon pro-
posed the basic principle of information-theoretic security, and discussed perfect secrecy in a
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noiseless model using the concept of mutual information as
I(M; C) = 0 (2.1)
where M and C denote the original message and codeword, respectively. Equation (2.1) implies
that an eavesdropper cannot obtain any information about M even if it has the knowledge of C.
Thus, the best strategy to recover the original message M is to guess its value randomly. Sub-
sequently, the wiretap channel model was introduced and exploited by Wyner in [13]. Wyner
showed that when a wiretapper’s (i.e., eavesdropper’s) channel is a degraded version of the
main channel (Alice-Bob channel), Alice and Bob can exchange perfectly secure messages at
a non-zero rate in the presence of the wiretapper.
However, the information-theoretic security mainly concentrates on securing the confiden-
tiality of wireless communications through preventing passive eavesdropping/wiretapping. In
practice, potential attackers may not always keep “silent” (i.e., passive eavesdropping), but
also can actively launch malicious attacks on the legitimate devices located within their cov-
erage at any time. Sophisticated adversaries can even impersonate another legitimate device
(e.g., Alice) to disguise its identity. As a result, the adversary can freely eavesdrop the data
transmission between Alice and Bob without being detected. Even worse, the adversary can
directly communicate with Bob to corrupt the communication performance of Bob since Bob
is beguiled into thinking he is currently communicating with Alice.
Physical-layer authentication is emerging to fight against active impersonation attackers. In
1984, Simmons considered the active eavesdropper and studied the authentication theory under
noiseless channel [14]. The case of authentication over noisy channel is investigated in [15].
Furthermore, hypothesis testing model is considered in authentication theory by Maurer in
[16]. Thanks to Maurer’s work, hypothesis testing became a common approach in the authen-
tication technique to effectively differentiate legitimate and illegitimate transceivers. Based on
the aforementioned theoretic fundamentals, many physical-layer authentication schemes are
proposed by exploiting the physical-layer characteristics as device fingerprint. Same as the
biological fingerprint of human beings, the basic idea of physical-layer device fingerprinting
is using some transmission-associated physical-layer attributes to uniquely represent the wire-
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less transmitter’s identity. Given that such attributes play the important role of fingerprinting
wireless devices, a comprehensive review of their categories is given in the next subsection.
2.2.1 Device Fingerprinting Types
As early as the 1960s, the U.S. military applied specific emitter identification (SEI), a device-
specific fingerprinting technique, to detect enemy radars [17]. After that, extensive research
efforts were made to explore more applicable physical-layer characteristics for identifying
wireless transceivers. In view of the significance of device fingerprinting, it is necessary to
review the device fingerprinting types.
In light of our purpose is distinguishing the wireless devices, the eligible characteristics
should reflect the differences between different devices. From the practice perspective, the
characteristics selected as the device fingerprints should have the following features: 1) unique,
2) accessible and 3) unforgeable.
The requirement of unique is to guarantee that the selected physical-layer characteristics
are distinguishable from device to device. This requirement can be further classified as locally
unique and globally unique. To be specific, the locally unique mainly ensures the fingerprint
is unique within the scope of a network. Globally unique is stronger than locally unique, as
its name implies, which means that the device fingerprint is distinguishable in any network
comprised of a larger number of heterogeneous devices.
The accessible feature means that the eligible device fingerprint can be extracted at a
low expense by the entity that needs to perform the authentication. For instance, the radio-
frequency component related characteristics are good choices as these characteristics can au-
tomatically tag their effects to the transmitted signals. These distorted signals can be thereby
treated as the carrier of the transmitter’s fingerprint. In this case, the receiver is able to con-
veniently extract the information of unique RF related characteristics through analyzing the
received signals. In fact, most of the current receivers are equipped with the function to es-
timate and compensate the RF impairment from the signal, which can potentially reduce the
authentication implementation cost.
The unforgeable feature concentrates on the safety of the used device fingerprint. Ideally,
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Figure 2.2: Classifications of physical-layer device fingerprints and some examples.
it is expected that the used device fingerprint cannot be forged at all. Similar to computational
security, the 100% safety of using a device fingerprint is extremely hard to guarantee in prac-
tice. The feasible requirement seeks to make sure the adversary cannot perfectly mimic the
device fingerprint and the procedure of mimicking should cause a significantly high cost. For
example, the time consumed on imitating a similar enough fingerprint is much longer than the
time of an authentication session.
Based on present physical-layer authentication researches, many transmission related char-
acteristics qualify for fingerprinting wireless devices. Typically, these characteristics can be
classified into two categories [4, 18]: wireless channel based fingerprint and RF-AFE imper-
fection based fingerprint. Fig.2.2 shows the classification and some typical examples. In the
following, we describe both fingerprinting techniques and discuss their problems.
Wireless Channel-Based Fingerprint
The wireless transmission link can offer some unique physical layer attributes between a
pair of directly communicating transmitter and receiver. Given that the geographic position of
a device is unique, the transmitted signal will be affected by the unique environmental factors
corresponding to the transmitter. In practice, such factors include path loss, multi-path and
shadowing during wireless propagation. By assuming the wireless channel status experienced
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of existing channel based and RF-AFE imperfection based physical-
layer authentication techniques.
by the transmitted signals cannot be controlled by any devices, the wireless channel related
information is robust for uniquely identifying the transceiver pair (transmitter-receiver). Two
typical examples of the wireless channel based fingerprint are channel state information (CSI)
and received signal strength (RSS).
In wireless communications, CSI refers to the channel properties of a communication link.
This information describes how a signal propagates from the transmitter to the receiver and
represents the combined effect of, for example, scattering, fading and power decay with dis-
tance. In practice, the spatial diversity and temporal property randomizes the radio channel
between a transmitter and a receiver, which are deployed in two locations. Furthermore, in a
rich multi-path indoor environment, the adversary-receiver channel states have been proved to
be significantly different from the legitimate transmitter-receiver channel states if this adver-
sary is locating in a wavelength away from the legitimate transmitter [19].
RSS is a common metric that can be conveniently read by the receiver from the received
packets. It is a sensitive reflection of the transmission power, the distance between transmitter
and receiver and current communication environment. In the “Alice-Bob-Eve” scenario, the
failure to exactly mimic Alice’s transmission power will give raise to a different RSS readings
at Bob. Even if the transmission power of Eve is the same as that of Alice, the observed RSS
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at Bob is always different. It is because the transmitted signals are inevitably further distorted
by complex communication environment factors, which are out of Eve’s control. Since RSS is
an important metric for evaluating the receiving sensitivity of antenna and signal quality, RSS
information is available in most of the current communication platforms. Therefore, it is easy
to make use of RSS readings for implementing authentication systems. Some works are taking
the advantages of using RSS to detect the malicious attackers such as proposed in [6, 20].
Although the randomness and fast variation features of the channel make the channel-based
fingerprint unforgeable, this also results in many impractical limitations. In this fingerprinting
approach, the receiver has to continuously estimate channel related attributes and compare
them with the previous estimates before these attributes become temporally and spatially un-
correlated. If the difference between the compared estimates is larger than a reasonable value,
the current transmitter will be claimed as an attacker. Therefore, delays in the monitoring and
estimating of attributes will result in severe authentication errors, for instance, legitimate de-
vices will be detected as attackers by mistake. Unfortunately, the updating of attributes can
be interrupted in most sleep mode enabled networks such as IEEE 802.15.4 networks. As a
result, the first authentication cannot be performed since there is no previous fingerprint for
comparison. It thereby has to rely on extra techniques, such as encryption, to solve this prob-
lem [21]. We call this the first-time authentication problem. In practice, timely updating of the
channel states becomes a challenge in highly dynamic environments (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle
communications), environments without rich multipath (e.g., open outdoor communications)
and sleep mode enabled networks (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4 networks). Consequently, these factors
limit the development of wireless channel-based authentication in practical applications.
RF-AFE Imperfection-Based Fingerprints
RF-AFE imperfection-based fingerprint, also known as device-specific fingerprint, refers
to the non-idealities from the analog components in the RF chain. As shown in Fig.2.4, the
conventional RF chain mainly consists of analog-to-digital (A/D) and digital-to-analog (D/A)
converters, power amplifier, mixer, local oscillator and low-pass filter. Generally at the trans-
mitter side, the modulated digital signal is converted to an analog signal. Then, frequency
lower than a certain cutoff is filtered out. After that, the signal is up-converted to a high fre-
quency and amplified before being emitted to the wireless channel. At the receiver side, the
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opposite processes are performed to recover the signals in the digital domain. Unfortunately,
due to imperfect circuit manufacturing, the fabricated analog components are not ideal. To
reduce the manufacturing costs, the manufacturer usually produces circuit components accord-
ing to a criterion called tolerance/accuracy. This criterion indicates the maximal error ranges
of the corresponding property values. In practice, the circuit components within the tolerance
can meet most of the performance requirements. For example, a 2×103 ohm resistor with 5%
tolerance means a dynamic error as high as 100 ohm.
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Figure 2.4: RF front-end block diagram for transmitter and receiver.
Given that fabrication variations are not completely predictable and controllable [22], such
RF-AFE imperfections generated in fabrications are distinct in different devices. Furthermore,
the experimental results in [23] show that the RF-AFE imperfections of the devices with the
same product model are still distinguishable. Another important feature of RF-AFE imperfec-
tion is that the imperfection information can be automatically tagged in any transmitted signal.
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This can reduce the additional cost of generating fingerprints and make the fingerprints accessi-
ble at the receiver. Further, this imperfection is hard to mimic since the hardware-level changes,
especially in well-fabricated devices, are excessively difficult. Thus, many RF-AFE imperfec-
tions are exploited for physical-layer authentication. The in-phase and quadrature imbalance
(IQI) and clock skew are presented as two typical examples in the following.
IQI mainly refers to amplitude and phase mismatches between in-phase (I) and quadrature
(Q) branches in a transceiver’s signal processing [22]. Ideally, the analog components in both
I and Q branches would have exactly the same performance characteristics, but this rarely hap-
pens in practice. The impairment of the local oscillator (LO) will cause frequency-independent
(FI) IQI, which implies unequal gains as well as a not exact 90◦ phase shift between the I and
Q (I/Q) branches. The impacts of amplitude mismatch and phase-shift mismatch on 4-QAM
constellations in the I and Q plane are illustrated in Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6, respectively. As one
of the typical I/Q signal processing architecture based implementations, the direct conversion
(also called the zero intermediate frequency) transceiver inherently suffers more from IQI [24].
In practice, the presence of IQI is especially pronounced in most of the orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless communication systems. In addition, it is also
acknowledged that IQI may become more severe and device-specific in multiple antennas sce-
narios and millimeter wave transmission [67]. Consequently, IQI can be a good choice of
fingerprint to identify wireless transceivers, such as reported in [25, 26, 27].
The basis of clock skew fingerprinting is that achieving exact synchronization of two clocks
built in two different wireless devices is impossible. In fact, the most important part of clocks
is the crystal oscillator, which is able to create an electrical signal with specific frequency.
Although the frequency of the created signals is accurate enough to meet most of the applica-
tion requirements, the minor error still exists due to the imperfect fabrication factor. Besides,
another important factor is that the crystal oscillator will unavoidably age, which degenerates
the frequency accuracy of the generated signal. For example, if a crystal oscillator has an ac-
curacy of 20 ppm (parts-per-million, 10−6), which is typical for customer electronics, and the
expected carrier frequency is 5GHz, a frequency offset up to 100KHz may exist. Due to the in-
dividual difference, the clock skew is unique in different wireless transceivers and can be used
as a device fingerprint. For example in [28], the clock skew is used in detecting the presence
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Figure 2.5: 4QAM constellation with amplitude imbalance.
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Figure 2.6: 4QAM constellation with phase imbalance.
of unauthorized access point devices. Similar to IQI, the clock offset is an inherent property
that already exists in wireless devices, thereby requiring no additional equipment to produce it.
However, the defect is that its measurement is generally based on the reports of a time stamp,
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which is easy to intercept and mimic. Furthermore, the clock offset is not as stable as IQI in
the mobile scenario due to the Doppler effect.
It is worth noting that there is another manmade hardware fingerprint which is called phys-
ical unclonable function (PUF). PUF is a physical entity embodied in a physical structure. It
works based on the unique device signatures that can be generated by specially designed com-
plex integrated circuit (IC) [29, 30]. Take delay PUF for an instance, the physical signature of
wireless devices can be yielded from the random variations in the delays of the specific part
of circuits (e.g., wires and transistors). This means that if the same input is given to different
PUFs, the corresponding delays of the outputs are different. Therefore, the PUF can implement
the challenge-response authentication, where the challenge refers to the input of the PUF and
the response is the corresponding output. The main disadvantage of using PUF is the high cost,
as it always requires additional IC to produce the unclonable characteristic. Furthermore, these
ICs have to be different from device to device for insuring their uniqueness.
In summary, the RF-AFE imperfection shows great advantages in providing stable and vast
characteristics for device authentication compared with the wireless channel based fingerprint-
ing method. Moreover, the RF-AFE imperfection is directly associated with the authentication
target (i.e., wireless transmitter), rather than the communication environment. Thus, RF-AFE
imperfection based device fingerprinting is more simply and effective. However, the main
problem of this fingerprinting technique is that the distinction of the selected hardware-level
imperfection between different devices is usually small. In practice, its observation and estima-
tion would be further corrupted by noise and interference. All of these factors can degenerate
the device differentiation accuracy.
2.2.2 Physical-Layer Authentications Related Techniques
It is fact that the physical layer is able to provide sufficient characteristics for authentication
purpose. The corresponding characteristic processing technique is another key point that could
significantly influence the authentication performance. This subsection focuses on introducing
the authentication related techniques.
Authentication Model
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As above-mentioned, physical-layer fingerprints can be classified into wireless channel-
based and RF-AFE imperfection-based types. Correspondingly, two basic authentication mod-
els for the two fingerprinting types are shown in Fig.2.7 .
Fig. 2.7(a) considers the case of using RF-AFE imperfection-based fingerprint. In this
case, the signal S is tagged with the unique and unclonable hardware-level characteristic of
Alice to create the authentication message AM. Bob should check the authentication tag from
the received AM to verify the identity of the sender. It is worth mentioning that this fingerprint
tagging usually can be accomplished without sacrificing data throughput. This is because the
signal is inevitably and automatically distorted by RF-AFE imperfection, and we are interested
in using the distortion information rather than the data contents for device authentication. As a
contrary example, the authentication using watermarking [31, 32] generally requires additional
bits to carry the authentication tag instead of carrying data, thereby the data throughput is
penalized.
In Fig. 2.7(b), the transmitted signals are randomly affected by the communication environ-
ment rather than by Alice, and become unique as a result. These randomized channel-related
attributes in the transmitted signals are assumed to be known only by the authorized Alice and
Bob. Consequently, Bob can verify the sender’s identity by checking these attributes.
Hypothesis Testing
In the authentication procedure, one major concern is deciding whether the current trans-
mitter is legitimate Alice or illegitimate Eve. Herein, the hypothesis testing technique is intro-
duced to model this decision step.
Hypothesis testing in the authentication theory is first proposed by Maurer in [16]. After
this work, the binary hypothesis testing became a well-accepted model to determine the true
identity of signal transmitter. Binary hypothesis testing has two hypotheses, the null hypothesis
H0 and the alternative hypothesisH1. This can be mathematically represented as
 H0 : f belongs to AliceH1 : f belongs to Eve , (2.2)
whereH0 denotes that the current examined fingerprint f belongs to Alice, whileH1 means f
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Figure 2.7: Physical-layer authentication models using (a) RF-AFE imperfection-based and (b)
wireless channel-based fingerprinting techniques.
is the fingerprint of Eve, implying an illegitimate attacker is detected.
However, it is possible to make incorrect decisions when judging the origin of device fin-
gerprints. Wrong decisions may produce two types of errors, type I error and type II error. A
type I error is also termed as a false alarm, and it refers to the incorrect rejection of a true null
hypothesis. In authentication scenario, it means claiming Eve as the transmitter when Alice is
the actual transmitter. A type II error is the failure to reject an alternative hypothesis which is
also called a miss detection. In authentication, the accuracy of hypothesis testing results is very
important. For example, once the miss detection error is made, the attacker can consequently
obtain the authorized access to the network, which can likely result in severe information leak-
age and data throughput decrease.
Neyman-Pearson Lemma
Neyman-Pearson lemma can be generally used to decide H0 and H1 in the hypothesis
testing. Neyman-Pearson lemma can be given as [33, eq. 3.3]:
To maximize PD for a given PFA = α, decideH1 if
L(x) =
p(x;H1)
p(x;H0) > T, (2.3)
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Figure 2.8: Decision regions by adjusting threshold in a binary hypothesis testing.
where the threshold T can be calculated from
PFA =
∫
{x:L(x)>T }
p(x;H0)dx = α. (2.4)
Here, PFA is the false alarm probability, and PD denotes the detection probability. In (2.3), the
function L(x) is termed as the likelihood ratio since it indicates for each value of x the likelihood
of H1 divided by the likelihood of H0. In Fig.2.8, the hypothesis testing with the decision
regions and threshold described in Neyman-Pearson lemma is illustrated as an example.
It is noteworthy that this Neyman-Pearson lemma-based test is called likelihood ratio test
(LRT). In engineering practice, LRT is a widely used tool for deciding the true hypothesis. LRT
is very useful in wireless authentication sinceH1 is a dangerous case which means the existence
of an attacker in the current communication system. Therefore, the feature of maximizing the
detection probability can meet the requirement of improving the capability of detecting the
potential attackers.
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2.2.3 Related Works
Thanks to the contributions of many research pioneers, the physical-layer authentication tech-
nique experienced a period of rapid development.
Starting with the wiretap channel model proposed by Wyner, researchers started to con-
sider security techniques to protect wireless communications from malicious wiretapping in the
physical layer. In the preliminary stage of physical-layer security investigation, the researchers
concentrated on the theoretical analysis of passive wiretapping. In [14, 34], the authors dis-
cussed the presence of active eavesdroppers which gives rise to the demand of physical-layer
authentication. Some authentication methods using additional bits to carry authentication tag
were proposed. In [31], the embedded watermark based authentication system is analyzed and
designed. The author of [35] proposed a stealthy physical-layer authentication tagging method
that also occupies some payload to carry the authentication tags. Motivated by the working
principles of encryption, some studies have tried to design light-weight and stealthy coding
in the physical layer for authentication. For example, a continuous physical-layer authentica-
tion technique using time-varying transmission parameters was investigated based on a novel
adaptive OFDM system [36], where the novel adaptive OFDM system was proposed in [37].
In this authentication scheme, a precoded cyclic prefix (PCP) is used to replace general cyclic
prefix to enhance the authentication accuracy. It is assumed that only legitimate users can suc-
cessfully decode the PCP sequence in order to obtain necessary parameters for decoding the
OFDM data.
In recent years, many researchers have proposed physical-layer authentication schemes
through exploiting the unique transmission characteristics (i.e., wireless channel-based finger-
prints and RF-AFE imperfection-based fingerprints). Based on Maurer’s work about authen-
tication theory and hypothesis testing, the wireless channel states can be used to model the
legitimate and illegitimate transmitters in a binary hypothesis testing. To be specific, in Xiao’s
studies [19, 38, 39], channel multipath related physical-layer authentication systems were de-
signed for a static scenario, a mobile terminal scenario and the frequency-selective Rayleigh
channel case, respectively. In [40], Liu studied both the channel amplitude and the multi-path
delay dimensions of channel impulse response (CIR) to mitigate the negative impacts of the
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noise and channel estimation errors. In [41], three CIR-based authentication schemes are pro-
posed to enhance the authentication reliability. As another important channel related attribute,
RSS is also widely studied in many researches to detect, localize and identify wireless trans-
mitters [6, 20, 42]. In [20], the RSS is used to distinguish identity-based attackers in wireless
sensor networks. Further, in [6], both detection and localization techniques of identity-based
attacker are considered. The author in [42] applied RSS readings in authentication and local-
ization in wireless local area networks.
To overcome the aforementioned impractical problems of using channel based fingerprint-
ing, many research efforts have been made in exploiting more available RF-AFE imperfection
based fingerprinting. In [43] and [7], wireless authentication using constant and time-varying
CFO is proposed, respectively. The author of [4] considered imperfect input/output charac-
teristics of the digital-to-analog converter and the power amplifier as device fingerprints. The
IQI is also widely investigated in [44, 45, 26, 8, 27]. To be specific, the IQI in terms of I/Q
origin offset, amplitude imbalance and phase imbalance is reported as device-specific charac-
teristics in [44, 45]. In [26], the amount of active wireless users in a network is counted by
checking the IQI feature. In [27], the multiple collaborative receivers are used to detect both
frequency-dependent and independent IQIs. The author of [8] proposed using joint receiving
and transmitting IQI to identify amplify-and-forward relay nodes.
2.3 Problems and Challenging Issues in Current Wireless
Authentication
In this section, the problems as well as challenging issues in current physical-layer authenti-
cation schemes and corresponding cross-layer authentication implementations are presented.
Also, the feasible methods for solving these challenges are briefly introduced. The detailed
solutions will be presented in the following chapters of this dissertation.
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2.3.1 Implementation Limitations in Cooperative Wireless Systems
Wireless relaying is commonly utilized in communication networks to increase the communi-
cation coverage, system throughput as well as prolong the battery life. However, as a draw-
back of this approach, involving relay nodes can potentially introduces new security threats
and challenges to the wireless systems. A sophisticated malicious relay can be selected for
signal forwarding with a higher chance through impersonating an authorized relay and pre-
tending to be the best one compared with other relays [9]. Once this impersonation succeeds,
the communications between the deceived entities are exposed to various attacks launched by
malicious relay, e.g., ghost-and-leech attack [52] or denial of service attack [9, 53]. As sum-
marized in [54], a malicious relay node can send source node the faked helper ready-to-send
control packet to block the source-destination link establishment via the legitimate relays. In
general, malicious relay nodes can initiate cooperative relay and then avoid it or use on-off be-
havior in transmission to slow down the communications. Even worse, the deceived terminals
can even be viciously de-authorized and de-associated from the network [55]. Therefore, the
relay identification process is emerging to become an inevitable part of the cooperative relaying
systems to detect the unauthorized access attempts made by malicious relays. Especially, relay
authentication is highly demanded in the scenarios where multiple trusted relays are required
to cooperate in order to provide physical-layer security, e.g., to prevent the eavesdroppers from
overhearing [56, 57].
Based on the strategies of relaying, the two typical relay protocols are amplify-and-forward
(AF) and decode-and-forward (DF). In AF relay protocol, the amplified version of received
signal is retransmitted whereas in the DF relay protocol, the received signal is first decoded
and the estimated signal is then forwarded toward the destination. Although a cross-layer DF
relay identification has been investigated in [9], AF relay identification is a more challenging
issue mainly because the AF relay only works in physical-layer without applying any content
modifications on the forwarded signals. This implies that all existing upper-layer identification
methods are not applicable to the AF relaying case. In light of this, it is necessary to go down to
the physical layer and explore some device-specific characteristics for fingerprinting AF relays.
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2.3.2 Low Reliability Problem of Physical-Layer Authentication
Although the effectiveness of identifying wireless devices in the physical layer has been proved,
its performance sometimes suffers from low reliability problem. As discussed above, both
wireless channel-based fingerprinting and RF-AFE imperfection-based fingerprinting have their
own shortcomings. Due to the dramatic variation of channel, the corresponding channel based
fingerprint is featured as time-varying. This feature requires very frequent fingerprint estima-
tion and comparison in practice. Failure to do so will significantly increase the unwelcome
false alarm probability. The limited ranges of RF-AFE imperfection may result in two similar
device-specific fingerprints, which are hard to differentiate. Even worse, with the consideration
of noise corruption at the receiving procedure, the accurate fingerprint detection and differen-
tiation will become extremely challenging. For these reasons, physical-layer authentication
performance is not always reliable.
Two aspects can be considered to enhance physical-layer authentication performance. First,
the device fingerprinting technique can be improved using multiple physical-layer character-
istics. The basic idea is to involve multiple different characteristics in fingerprint generation
in order to mitigate the inherent shortcomings of using only one characteristic. The choice of
physical-layer characteristics for authentication depends upon the specific application scenar-
ios. For instance, the stable RF-AFE imperfections are proper choices in mobile communica-
tions; the wireless channel based characteristics can work well in indoor static scenarios. In
practice, researchers can even consider the combination of both channel-based and RF-AFE
imperfection based characteristics since it is an extremely low possibility that an attacker can
occasionally experience the same communication channel and own the nearly identical RF-
AFE imperfections at the same time. Besides, the way of implementing the combination can
be optimized to achieve the best authentication performance. For example, different weights
can be set for each selected attributes according to their reliability; the authenticity decision
can be made either separately or integrally based on the multiple selected characteristics. Sec-
ond, the fingerprint estimation and detection methods can be enhanced. As an example, re-
ceiver diversity is an effective means to combat wireless fading, and raise channel capacity
through increasing the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). Given that the estimated characteristic can
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be treated as a desired signal, we believe the desired signal detection can be improved through
using diversity technique. In a cooperative system, the source usually covers multiple relays for
optimal relay selection, which facilitates the collaborative authentication strategy. For instance,
many relays may receive the authentication signal from the same source due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium. Thus, multiple relays making use of cooperative observations
can authenticate the transmitter together to achieve improved authenticity decision accuracy.
2.3.3 Challenges in Cross-Layer Authentication Implementation
It is well acknowledged that physical-layer authentication is complementary to the traditional
upper-layer authentication schemes. Therefore, the effective cross-layer authentication design
with the goal of enlarging the application scope and improving authentication performance is
emerging as an urgent research topic in recent years.
According to the open systems interconnection (OSI) model [46], the 7 layers (from bottom
to top) are the physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, session layer, pre-
sentation layer and application layer. Each layer has its own functionality and corresponding
security vulnerabilities. For instance, in the data link layer (also known as the MAC layer),
the multiple devices can be managed to access a shared transmission medium using chan-
nel access control mechanisms such as carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA). In each device, the network interface controller with a MAC address is usually
built in. MAC address can be used for authentication when granting or denying access to
the devices. However, MAC address spoofing and theft are usual attacks in this layer. In the
network layer, the Internet Protocol (IP) address is a numerical label assigned to each device
of a global network. Similarly, attackers can focus on spoofing and hijacking the IP address
to crack the routing. Since these addresses are also digital bits, they are usually encrypted
together with the transmitted data in the payload of each layer in the cryptographic security
mechanisms. Generally, multiple authentication techniques in different layers are used at the
same time, including MAC layer authentication [47], network layer authentication [48] and
transport layer authentication [49]. For example, the cipher block chaining message authenti-
cation code (CBC-MAC), which is a common message authentication code, is applied in the
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MAC layer in IEEE 802.15.4 enabled networks [50].
Given the fact that most of the current networks rely on the upper-layer cryptography for
authentication, the first problem of the cross-layer authentication design is the seamless inte-
gration of physical-layer and upper-layer authentication schemes. The point of this cross-layer
system implementation is that the physical-layer technique should be utilized by the existing
upper-layer method to enhance the authentication performance rather than evoking conflicts.
Another potential obstacle of the practical integration development is the end-to-end au-
thentication extension. In large-scale wireless networks, the authentication and key exchange
are often required between two devices that are not directly linked. But most of the current
physical-layer authentications are confined to device-to-device authentication as they rely on
the characteristics obtained from the directly received signals. Consequently, this method is
hard to be used in network-wide end-to-end authentication.
Finally, the increasing implementation complexity is also an important problem of cross-
layer authentication, especially in the 5G communication era. It is predictable that three timely
challenges will correspondingly emerge.
Compatibility
In 5G, the devices need to be equipped with multiple radio access technologies (RTAs). A
specific example is that the 5G-enabled devices ought to be backward compatible to support
legacy 3G and 4G devices. Moreover, some functions of layers may be redefined, for example,
the handoffs may no longer exist in layer 3 anymore [51]. Hence, correctly determining the
authenticity of various devices operating in diverse upper-layer protocols will be more difficult.
Hence, it is worth finding more ubiquitous physical-layer characteristics and process them to
become suitable for different upper-layers’ authentication processing.
Cellular link establishment in mmWave communications
To authenticate a user, the link should be established first between the user and base station
(BS) or access point (AP). Currently, security-oriented beamforming, a directional technique,
is widely used in wireless devices to enlarge transmit/receive gain in a certain direction. Since
the highly direction-sensitive beams are hard to align in mmWave communications [51], it can
be foreseen that the authentication handover for a mobile user equipped with the beamforming
technique may not be completed due to the unsuccessful link acquisition. Another feature of 5G
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is the adoption of millimeter level wave transmission to increase communication throughput.
However, the mmWave cellular link establishment will be confronted with alignment difficulty.
Authentication handover latency
In 5G, the mobile users will be frequently moving from different base stations or access
points covered cells, which results in frequent authentication handover processes. Tradition-
ally, the authentication handover is based on specially designed cryptographic keys and multi-
ple handshakes. In practice, the authentication handover has to involve multiple entities includ-
ing users, APs, BSs and servers. The communications between those entities with complicated
encryption algorithm are usually time-consuming. Therefore, the latency caused by a large
number of handover processes will become an inevitable problem in 5G.
In brief, these new compatibility, mmWave link acquisition and latency problems of authen-
tication handover primarily result from the gradual increase in complexity of the communica-
tion conditions in 5G. Therefore, the physical-layer authentication technique is also expected to
overcome these challenging issues, such as through simplifying the authentication procedure.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the traditional wireless authentication techniques, in terms of upper-layer iden-
tity verification and key-based cryptography, are first reviewed. The limitations of these two
typically used methods are discussed. Specifically, the former one is vulnerable to identity-
based attacks such as address spoofing, while the later one has many key management related
problems and suffers from the computational cost of the key algorithm. It is important to note
that one special AF relay scenario is pointed out since the upper-layer authentication methods
cannot handle this case. A comprehensive survey of the present physical-layer authentica-
tion is then presented in the order of reviewing the device fingerprints, related techniques and
state-of-the-art works. Finally, the problems and challenging issues of the present physical-
layer authentication are discussed. Specifically, the inherent low reliability problem caused
by either the fast variation of channel or the limited range of device-specific characteristics
is revealed. The urgent challenging issues in cross-layer authentication implementation are
also presented. Consequently, the physical-layer AF relay identification, effective reliability
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enhancement techniques and cross-layer design, which are the main concerns of the rest of this
dissertation, are critical for the development of physical-layer authentication.
Chapter 3
Physical-Layer AF Relay Differentiation
Technique
In this chapter, we start from the working principle of AF relay and consequently propose a
novel AF relay fingerprint through analyzing the relayed signals at the destination node side for
differentiating AF relay nodes. This differentiation technique is applied into the authentication
application and show accepted authentication accuracy in our study.
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the differentiation of AF relay nodes is a special issue as all ex-
isting upper-layer approaches are ineffective. Therefore, physical-layer method is necessary
in authenticating AF relay in order to protect the security of cooperative wireless communica-
tions. Besides security aspect, the applications of relay differentiation can also be extended to
wireless device localization and tracing [58, 59].
To distinguish AF relays in physical-layer, the primary point is finding appropriate physical-
layer characteristics for fingerprinting AF relays. According to the AF relay’s working princi-
ples, the received signals of AF relay should be down-converted from passband to baseband,
amplified at the baseband, and then up-converted to passband for re-transmission. This is
mainly because AF relays, specifically half-duplex relays, must buffer the received signals be-
fore emitting them through RF front-end for the purpose of synchronization [60, 61]. Since
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the buffering operation can only be efficiently accomplished in digital domain and the high
frequency passband signal is hard to digitally process, the signal down conversion becomes es-
sential to the buffering operation [62]. Due to the down and up conversion operations at the RF
components of AF relay, the relayed signals inevitably suffer from more several RF distortions
than the signals transmitted by the regular transmitters. Consequently, RF-AFE imperfections
are suitable for fingerprinting AF relay nodes.
In-phase and quadrature imbalance (IQI) is one of the most typical RF-AFE imperfections
at AF relay nodes. The IQI can result in different deformations to constellation diagram in I/Q
modulation systems. The impacts of IQI to the signal modulation performance of AF relaying
system are widely analyzed in details in [63, 64, 65, 66]. In the perspective of authentication,
IQI also has been studied for fingerprinting wireless devices by many authors [44, 45, 26, 8].
In [44, 45], the I/Q gain and phase-shift imbalances are reported as applicable features for
device identification. Besides, the former one further experimentally validates the identification
performance in the scenario of multiple 802.11n multiple-input multiple-output transmitters.
In [26], the IQI distinctions of different devices is used to count the number of devices in a
network, and it has shown satisfactory performance when the IQI is high enough.
In practice, the received signal at destination is affected by the device-specific IQI of AF
relay as well as the unique channel gain between the relay and destination. Therefore, it is
valuable to extract these unique effects through analyzing the received signal to identify AF
relay nodes. In this chapter, a novel physical-layer relay differentiation scheme is proposed for
authenticating the wireless AF relay nodes. We first study the unique joint Rx/Tx IQI nature
of AF-based relay nodes and derive the AF relay fingerprint at destination node using IQI and
channel related parameters. A two-parameter hypothesis testing is then adopted to differentiate
the relay nodes based on this fingerprint. In order to maximize the capability of detecting minor
difference between the IQI device fingerprints, the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) for
classical linear model is adopted to the hypothesis decision algorithm. Finally, the performance
of the proposed authentication scheme are validated by numerical simulations. It is shown
that by using the GLRT for classical linear model, our scheme outperforms a previous work,
introduced in [26], in deciding true hypothesis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the system
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Figure 3.1: Rx/Tx IQI model of AF relay.
model with IQI in AF relay. In Section 3.3, the IQI and channel gain-based device fingerprint
of AF relay is analyzed and validated. Also, a two-parameter hypothesis testing model for relay
differentiation is presented. In Section 3.4, the authentication method is proposed. Section 3.5
presents the numerical assessment results. Finally, this chapter is concluded in Section 3.6.
Notations: (·)∗ and (·)T denote complex conjugate and transpose operators, respectively.
Bold lowercase letters denote vectors. For vector a, the nth element is denoted by a[n]. <{x}
and ={x} denote the real and imaginary part of x, respectively.
3.2 System Model
A dual-hop AF relay system consisting of one source node (S), one destination node (D), and
multiple relay nodes (R) is considered. The downlink communication S→R→D is considered
here and it is assumed that D is outside of the communication coverage of S, i.e., there is no
S→D direct link. Further, each node works with single antenna and the relays are half-duplex
working in two phases. In the first phase, S transmits signals to a selected R. In the second
phase, the selected R amplifies the received signal and retransmits it to D. Also, it is supposed
that there are malicious relays existing among the multiple relay nodes claiming as legitimate
ones. Hence, it is required for D to be able to authenticate R by analyzing the received signals.
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As shown in Fig.3.1 and similar to [61], one AF relay is modeled as one receive component
with Rx IQI, one amplifier with gain a, and one transmit component with Tx IQI. Also, the
asymmetrical IQI model [63] is used, in which the in-phase (I) branch is assumed ideal, while
the quadrature-phase (Q) branch is modeled with IQI. In this system model, we only consider
the IQI of R. Further, the frequency-independent IQI caused by the LO of relay nodes is con-
sidered in our analysis as it plays the more dominant role than the frequency-dependent IQI in
practice [68].
In the front-end of the receiving component, the time domain passband input xp is down-
converted by an imperfect local-oscillator (LO) and distorted by frequency-independent IQI,
where the representation of xp(t) can be given by
xp(t) = xI(t) cos(ωt) − xQ(t) sin(ωt) = <{x(t)e jωt}, (3.1)
where x(t) is the equivalent baseband with xI(t) and xQ(t) denote the I and Q component of
x(t). In this model, the signal of Q branch is affected by receiving gain imbalance αrx and
phase shift imbalance θrx as −xp(t)(1+αrx) sin(ωt +θrx). Substituting for (3.1), omitting the 2ωt
items (filtered by the following low-pass filter), and after multiplying by 2 for mathematical
simplicity, the baseband signals representation of I and Q branches are given by
xd,I(t) = xI(t), (3.2a)
xd,Q(t) = (1 + αrx)xQ(t) cos θrx − (1 + αrx)xI(t) sin θrx. (3.2b)
Accordingly, the output of the receiving component xd(t) is given by
xd(t) = xd,I(t) + jxd,Q(t) (3.3)
= µrxx(t) + νrxx∗(t)
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where µrx and νrx are defined as
µrx =
1
2
[1 + (1 + αrx)e− jθrx], (3.4)
νrx =
1
2
[1 − (1 + αrx)e jθrx] = 1 − µ∗rx . (3.5)
In the amplifier, xd(t) is multiplied by the amplification gain a to generate
xa(t) = axd(t) = xa,I(t) + jxa,Q(t), (3.6)
where xa,I(t) and xa,Q(t) denote its I and Q components, respectively. An IQI-free amplifier with
known fixed amplitude gain a is assumed. After that, in the transmitter component, the signals
are up-converted by an imperfect LO with the gain imbalance αtx and phase shift imbalance θtx.
Hence, the passband signal yp(t) is forwarded towards the destination, and it can be represented
as
yp(t) = axa,I(t) cos(ωt) − axa,Q(t)(1 + αtx) sin(ωt + θtx) (3.7)
= <{y(t)e jωt}.
Herein, y(t) denotes the baseband equivalent signals and is expressed as
y(t) = −axa,Q(t)(1 + αtx) sin θtx + axa,I(t) + jaxa,Q(t)(1 + αtx) cos θtx (3.8)
=
a
2
[(1 + (1 + αtx)e jθtx)(xa,I(t) + jxa,Q(t)) + (1 − (1 + αtx)e jθtx)(xa,I(t) − jxa,Q(t))]
= aµtxxa(t) + aνtxx∗a(t),
where
µtx =
1
2
[1 + (1 + αtx)e jθtx], (3.9)
νtx =
1
2
[1 − (1 + αtx)e jθtx] = 1 − µtx. (3.10)
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It is noteworthy that the baseband domain is considered in rest of this chapter for analysis
simplicity. Using (3.3) and (3.8), and after rearrangements, we get
y(t) = ax(t)(µtxµrx + νtxν∗rx) + ax
∗(t)(µtxνrx + νtxµ∗rx). (3.11)
Then, the signal y(t) passes through the R→D wireless channel towards the destination.
Since the key concern of this study is to investigate the authentication technique and its en-
hancement, the wireless channel is simplified as additive white Gaussian noise flat fading and
it is assumed that the channel is perfectly estimated. Accordingly, the discrete expression of
the received signal at destination is given by
y[n] = a
[
x[n](µtxµrx + νtxν∗rx) + x
∗
[n](µtxνrx + νtxµ
∗
rx)
]
h[n] + w[n], (3.12)
where h[n] denotes the channel gain; while {w[n]} ∼ CN(0, σ20) denote the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of the complex additive white Gaussian noise.
3.3 Two-Parameter Hypothesis Testing
In this section, the received signal y[n] is analyzed to derive the joint Rx/Tx IQI dependent
device fingerprint of relay node. Then, this fingerprint is used to model a two-parameter hy-
pothesis testing for further AF relay differentiation.
As shown in (3.11), the IQI contributes to both the desired signal x and the image signal
component x∗. In order to reveal the different relays’ unique IQI impact on signals, the 4-QAM
constellation pattern with the presence of Rx/Tx IQI is shown in Fig.3.2.
The constellation patterns in Fig.3.2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) are generated from four different
relays with different IQI quantities. The ideal symbols are {e− j 34pi, e j 34pi, e− j 14pi, e j 14pi}. As shown in
this figure, the IQI in relays leads to the deformation of constellation pattern compared to the
ideal IQI-free case. Moreover, it is shown that this deformation is unique for every individual
relay due to their different IQI parameters. In addition, as a hardware-level feature, IQI is stable
once the device is fabricated. Consequently, the device-specific IQI is eligible to be used as
device fingerprint of AF relay node.
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Figure 3.2: IQI distorted 4-QAM constellation patterns of 4 AF relays with a = 1 and (a)
(αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (0.03, 5o, 0.03, 5o); (b) (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (−0.03,−5o,−0.03,−5o); (c)
(αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (0.05, 3o,−0.05,−3o); (d) (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (0.04,−3o,−0.05, 2o).
Since the unique IQI quantity rather than the content of signal is used for authentication, we
are able to use the known training signals x[n] to generate device fingerprint. Substituting for
µrx, νrx, µtx, and νrx from (3.4), (3.5), (3.9), and (3.10) into (3.12), and subtracting ah[n]x[n] from
both sides, the eq.(3.13) can be derived. Assuming that the current measurement at destination
consists of N observations, the fingerprint can be obtained as
f = m + wm + j(k + wk) (3.14)
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f[n] = y[n] − ah[n]x[n]
= 2a[(={x[n]} − 2={x[n]µrx})(<{h[n]}={µtx} + ={h[n]}<{µtx}) + ={h[n]}={x[n]µrx}]︸                                                                                                 ︷︷                                                                                                 ︸
m
+<{w[n]}︸  ︷︷  ︸
wm
(3.13)
+ j 2a[(={x[n]} − 2={x[n]µrx})(={h[n]}={µtx} − <{h[n]}<{µtx}) −<{h[n]}={x[n]µrx}]︸                                                                                                  ︷︷                                                                                                  ︸
k
+ j={w[n]}︸  ︷︷  ︸
wk
where the N × 1 vector f denotes N estimated fingerprints based on the corresponding obser-
vations.
In order to verify if the cooperating relay is legitimate, we compare its fingerprint with
the validated fingerprints in the database using hypothesis testing. In practice, once one relay
passes the verification procedure through the upper layers and joins the network, this relay is
added to the validated relay set. The destination node obtains its IQI parameters and stores
them in the database. f0 = m0 + jk0 is defined as one validated device fingerprint calculated by
destination node. Therefore, when an f is estimated as given by (3.14), it is compared with f0
as
f − f0 = ∆m + wm + j(∆k + wk) (3.15)
= c + jd,
where ∆m = m −m0, ∆k = k − k0, c = <{f} − <{f0}, d = ={f} − ={f0}.
The binary hypothesis testing is used to decide whether the two compared fingerprints, f
and f0, are from the same relay or not. H0 denotes the hypothesis that f and f0 belong to the
same relay. In this case, ∆m[i] = 0 and ∆k[i] = 0. While the alternative hypothesisH1 is defined
as f and f0 belong to two different relay nodes which implies that at least one of ∆m[i] and ∆k[i]
is not zero. Hence, the two parameters (∆m[i] and ∆k[i]) can be used to model the hypothesis
testing as
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
H0 : ∆m[i] = ∆k[i] = 0
H1 : ∆m2[i] + ∆k2[i] , 0
. (3.16)
Under hypothesis assumptionsH0 andH1 , {c[i]} and {d[i]} are two sets of Gaussian random
variables. In this case, c[i], d[i] ∼ N(0, σ2) under H0, where σ2 = σ
2
0
2 ; while c[i] ∼ N(∆m[i], σ2)
and d[i] ∼ N(∆k[i], σ2) under H1. Consequently, the device fingerprint can be separated into
two parameters and used in a two-parameter hypothesis testing.
3.4 AF Relay Authentication Method
In this section, differentiation method is explored to accurately decide the true hypothesis (H0
orH1). Consider that making wrong decision is possible, the false alarm (FA) and miss detec-
tion (MD) as two error types are defined according to the terminologies in detection theory. In
our case, the errors cannot be completely prevented mainly because our estimated fingerprints
are inevitably corrupted by noises. Therefore, it is a crucial challenge to make the accurate
hypothesis decision with the presence of noises.
For presentation simplicity, three probabilities are first defined: PFA, the probability of FA;
PMD, the probability of MD; PD, the probability of correctly detecting H1. In engineering
practice, a required acceptable PFA is usually set as the threshold in advance, and then the
hypothesis testing is performed according to this threshold. Therefore, the objective can be
modeled as maximizing the capability of finding the minor difference between among IQI
fingerprints. If the difference exceeds the PFA determined threshold,H1 is claimed; otherwise,
H0 is decided.
To achieve this objective, the likelihood ratio test (LRT) is used to deal with the hypothesis
decision problem. According to the Neyman-Pearson lemma [33], LRT is able to maximize PD
within a required PFA. In order to apply LRT, three 2N × 1 vectors are composed as
a = [c[1] d[1] c[2] d[2] · · · c[N] d[N]]T
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b = [∆m[1] ∆k[1] ∆m[2] ∆k[2] · · ·∆m[N] ∆k[N]]T
w = [wm[1] wk[1] wm[2] wk[2] · · ·wm[N] wk[N]]T .
Accordingly, we can obtain
a = b + w. (3.17)
In this case, the hypothesis testing model is equivalent to

H0 : b = 0
H1 : b , 0
. (3.18)
Since w consists of i.i.d. zero mean Gaussian random variables, the likelihood function of
a can be given by
p(a; b) =
1
(2piσ2)N
exp
[
− (a − b)
T (a − b)
2σ2
]
. (3.19)
The LRT can be performed to decideH1 as
G(a; b) =
p(a; bH1)
p(a; bH0)
> T, (3.20)
where bH0 and bH1 denote the corresponding b underH0 andH1, respectively. T is the thresh-
old corresponding to the maximum tolerable false alarm probability, PFA.
Since vector b is unavailable to the destination node, the LRT cannot be performed. The
GLRT for classical linear model (GLRTL) is adopted to deal with this problem. In GLRTL,
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of b is utilized to perform (3.20) as
G(a; bˆ) =
p(a; bˆH1)
p(a; bˆH0)
> T, (3.21)
where bˆH0 and bˆH1 denote the MLE of b underH0 andH1, respectively.
Under H1, the only constraint for b is to exclude the set satisfying b = 0. Therefore, bˆ
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(unconstrained MLE of b) can be derived by solving two partial derivative equations as
∂ ln p(a; bˆ)
∂bˆ[i]
= 0, (3.22a)
∂ ln p(a; bˆ)
∂bˆ2[i]
< 0. (3.22b)
In this case, the result of second order partial derivative in (3.22b) is − 1
σ2
, which is always less
than zero. While (3.22a) equivalents to bˆ = a. In light of that the probability of a random
variable to be a certain value is zero, it can be safely concluded that bˆH1 = a. While underH0,
it is clear that bˆH0 = 0.
After taking the logarithm of both sides of (3.21), and substituting bˆH0 , bˆH1 and (3.19), we
can obtain
2 ln G(a; bˆ) (3.23)
= − [(a − bˆH1)
T (a − bˆH1) − (a − bˆH0)T (a − bˆH0)]
σ2
=
bˆTH1bˆH1
σ2
=
aT a
σ2
> 2 ln T = T ′.
The distribution of a
σ
can be given by
a
σ
∼

N(0, i), under H0
N(
bH1
σ
, i), under H1
, (3.24)
where i denotes the vector satisfying i[n] = 1. Given that the sum of squares of normal random
variables follows different chi-squared distributions, the distributions of A under H0 and H1
can be respectively given as
A =
aT a
σ2
∼

χ22N , under H0
χ22N(ρ), under H1
, (3.25)
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where χ22N is the central chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom; while χ
2
2N(ρ)
denotes the non-central chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom and non-centrality
parameter ρ. In this case, the non-centrality parameter is defined as
ρ =
bTH1bH1
σ2
.
Accordingly, the probability density function (PDF) of A underH0 can be given by
pH0(A) =
AN−1e−
1
2 A
2NΓ(N)
, (3.26)
where Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
ux−1e−udu is the Gamma function. Additionally, the PDF of A under H1 is
given by
pH1(A) =
1
2
(
A
ρ
)
N−1
2 e−
1
2 (A+ρ)IN−1(
√
Aρ), (3.27)
where IN−1(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with order N − 1.
Hence, the false alarm rate is calculated as
PFA = P{A > T ′|H0}
=
∫ +∞
T ′
pH0(A)dA = Qχ2N (T
′), (3.28)
where Qχ22N (·) is the right-tail probability for χ22N random process.
Given the fact that 2N is an even number and according to [69, eq. 26.4.5], the Qχ22N (T
′)
can be expressed as
Qχ22N (T
′) = e−
T ′
2
N−1∑
i=0
(
T ′
2
)i 1
i!
. (3.29)
In practice, T ′ is obtained by inverting (3.29) according to the required PFA as T ′ = Q−1χ22N
(PFA).
Eventually, PD can be analytically computed as
PD =
∫ +∞
T ′
pH1(A)dA. (3.30)
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The probability of MD can be calculated as
PMD = 1 − PD. (3.31)
Now we are able to decide whether or not the identity of current relay is the same with the
compared validated one.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, the performance of the proposed IQI based AF relay authentication scheme
is evaluated in orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) communication system.
An OFDM system is considered with 4-QAM modulation, 32 sub-carriers, and cyclic prefix
with a length of 6. Also, the amplifier gain is a = 1. The simulation results are based on 105
independent realizations of the system.
The analytical PD in (3.30) is compared with the simulation results in Fig.3.3. In this com-
parison, we set the current AF relay with IQI parameter as (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (0.05, 2o, 0.05, 2o).
While, the validated relay’s IQI is (−0.04,−5o,−0.04,−5o). It can be seen that the simulation
results can perfectly match the expected analytical results. The corresponding threshold T ′
declines with the growth of PFA as expected. In addition, it can be seen that the detection
probability remains above 98% under SNR=15 dB, while significantly decreases when SNR
becomes 13 dB. The drop is caused by the unstable channel factor in the fingerprint.
The performance of authentication scheme in detecting the illegitimate relay among several
legitimate relays is evaluated in Fig.3.4. Here, four validated relays are set with IQI parameters
(−0.05, 2o,−0.05, 2o), (0.04,−2o, 0.04,−2o), (0.03, 3o,−0.02,−3o) and (−0.01,−5o,−0.01,−5o).
Besides, one illegitimate relay is assumed to have IQI (0.04,−4o,−0.05, 3o). Fig.3.4 shows PD
in terms of PFA for this simulation setup. As expected, the capability of detectingH1 is increas-
ing with the required false alarm rate varying from 0.01 to 0.1, and the higher signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at destination results in the higher detection probability. For instance, it is ob-
served that the overall PD is higher than 98.3% and 99.932% when the SNR is 22 dB and 24
dB, respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Simulation vs. Analytical results of PD, and the corresponding threshold.
In Fig.3.5, the performance of our Rx/Tx IQI GLRTL hypothesis decision algorithm is
compared with the previous introduced Tx IQI hypothesis testing based work in [26] which can
be referred to as distance test (DT) method. In DT, one Tx IQI based parameter is estimated
as device fingerprint, and it follows complex Gaussian distribution which can be treated as
equivalent to f given by (3.14). Then, this parameter is averaged to decrease the variance. After
that, the distance between the averaged parameter µˆk and the validated parameter is calculated.
Finally, the hypothesis testing is carried out by comparing this distance with a PFA dependent
threshold.
In this simulation, f is processed using DT, and then its PD is compared with our GLRTL
approach to evaluate their hypothesis decision accuracy. The same simulation setups as used
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Figure 3.4: PD vs. PFA under 4 validated AF relay nodes and 1 illegitimate AF relay node.
for Fig.3.4 are employed. Fig.3.5 shows the results for both approaches. It can be seen that
our proposed authentication scheme reveals significant enhancement in terms of the detection
capability compare to the DT method. Therefore, our GLRTL is more effective than DT and
it can be used to further improve the work in [26]. Additionally, it is noticed that DT method
requires relatively large IQI quantities (amplitude and phase imbalances are up to 0.3 and 15o
in [26]) to achieve the satisfying hypothesis decision performance. While, it is shown that our
authentication can differentiate AF relays even with delicate IQI distinctions.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, a novel relay authentication scheme is proposed through exploiting Rx/Tx IQI
in AF relay and the unique channel gains between relay and destination nodes. To be precise,
the IQI-based device fingerprints were derived by analyzing the distorted signals at destination
node. A two-parameter hypothesis testing model is then developed to determine whether the
current AF relay is the same with the compared legitimate AF relay. To achieve satisfying
performance in deciding the true hypothesis, a GLRTL based authentication method is pro-
posed. The performance assessment results validated our derived formulas, and showed high
authentication accuracy both in H0 and H1. In addition, our GLRTL method showed signifi-
cant improvement in differentiating delicate IQI differences compared to another existing DT
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method. Due to the proposed AF relay authentication system essentially depends upon a binary
hypothesis testing, only one AF relay is considered in the authentication procedure. However,
the malicious relay can use Sybil attack to claim multiple faked identities. Further, the practical
wireless cooperative system usually consists of multiple relay nodes. Therefore, more advance
AF relay identification with the consideration of the presence of multiple relays is still needed.
Partial works of this chapter can be found in my published research paper [8].
Chapter 4
Optimal Wireless AF Relay Identification
System
In Chapter 3, two AF relay nodes can be differentiated by examining the IQI and wireless
channel related attributes. However, the practical cooperative relaying systems usually com-
prise more than one selectable relay nodes. Further, due to the time-varying channel factor
is involved in the fingerprint generation, the reliability of differentiation performance is de-
teriorated if channel is fast varying. To address these shortcomings, the optimal AF relay
identification system is investigated in this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
It has been proved that the AF relay can only be differentiated in physical-layer. Recall Chapter
3, a new device fingerprint comprised of IQI and channel gain is generated at the destination
node for the AF relay authentication. However, since the wireless channels are time-varying,
the performance of this method is degraded especially in the low SNR regime with small IQI.
To improve the authentication performance, more stable device fingerprinting is demanded.
As studied in [70], wireless devices inevitably suffer from RF-AFE imperfections due to
the imperfect hardware fabrications. Since RF-AFE imperfection is unique and distinct from
device to device, it can be used to identify wireless transmitters in physical layer [18, 4]. As
shown in [23], the RF-AFE imperfections of devices of the same product model are still distin-
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guishable. These results demonstrate that, with more powerful device fingerprinting technique,
the AF relay can be uniquely identified from multiple AF relay nodes even the RF-AFE imper-
fections are minor.
In this chapter, an optimal AF relay identification technique using IQI, a typical RF im-
perfection, is investigated. Given that IQI estimation and compensation are basics in most
receivers for improving reception performance, a novel relay identification is proposed, which
directly makes use of the ready-made IQI estimates at the receiver side. There are two direct
advantages of using this approach. On the one hand, its implementation can become practical
and simple since it can be widely utilized in most existing wireless devices and the extra IQI
and channel-based fingerprint generation is no longer needed. On the other hand, the reliability
performance can be improved as the channel variation effect is removed from fingerprint. In
summary, the main contributions of this chapter are as follows.
• A new AF relay IQI fingerprinting method is proposed which directly uses the commonly
available least square (LS) estimation of joint Rx/Tx IQI of an AF relay at the receiver
(destination). Compared to the previous work of the authors in [26], this new method is
more stable and no extra fingerprint generation is needed.
• The dynamic ranges of the joint Rx/Tx IQI fingerprint and the signal-to-IQI-distortion
ratio are derived for the realistic ranges of the amplitude and phase shift imbalances.
These ranges give insight into identifying the main technical strengths and limitations of
the IQI-based AF relay identification. These results can be generally used in other AF
relay IQI-related studies as well.
• An effective IQI-based AF relay identification protocol is introduced to identify a relay
among a group of relays with minor IQIs. Since the small IQI measurements are cor-
rupted by noise in practice, differentiating the relays becomes a challenging problem.
Hence, a GLRT-based hypothesis testing is first used to maximize the detection proba-
bility for a given false alarm rate in differentiating two relays. Then, an identification
algorithm using this differentiation method is designed. Numerical results demonstrate
that the introduced algorithm outperforms the authors’ previous method [26] and an-
other possible identification method based on the work in [8] in terms of distinguishing
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delicate IQI-fingerprint differences with a higher correct identification rate.
• Optimal training signals for quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and phase-shift
keying (PSK) modulations are designed aiming at maximizing the capability of detecting
an AF relay with specific IQI values. Furthermore, more robust suboptimal solutions are
proposed whose identification performances are sufficiently close to the optimal designs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the system
model with joint Rx/Tx IQI of AF relays. In Section 4.3, the joint Rx/Tx IQI-based finger-
print of AF relay is analyzed. The relay differentiation method by verifying IQI fingerprint is
presented in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, the relay identification algorithm for multiple relays
scenario is given. In Section 4.6, the optimal and suboptimal signal designs are presented.
Section 4.7 presents the numerical results and discussions. Finally, this chapter is concluded in
Section 4.8.
Notations: (·)∗, E[·], |·| and (·)T (·)H denote conjugate, expectation, absolute value, transpose
and conjugate transpose operations, respectively. Bold lowercase and uppercase letter denotes
vector and matrix, respectively. For vector a, we use ak to denote its kth element. I denotes
unit matrix. det(A) denotes the determinant of matrix A. <{x} and ={x} denote real part and
imaginary part of x, respectively.
4.2 System Model
In this section, the overall AF relay identification system model using the LS estimation of IQI
is presented.
In an AF relay, all signal processing is accomplished in the physical layer. To be specific,
the in-band received signal is down-converted, amplified, up-converted and finally forwarded
towards the destination node [60, 61]1. An AF relay can thereby be modeled as the cascade of
a receiving component, an amplification factor and a transmission component [61, 63, 64, 71],
as shown in Fig.3.1.
1In AF relay, the received passband signals should be first down-converted in order to be buffered in baseband.
Then, the buffered signals are up-converted for transmission.
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Based on the results in (3.11), we are able to rewrite y(t) in terms of the input signal x(t) as
y(t) = g1x(t) + g2x∗(t), (4.1)
where g1 , a(µtxµrx + νtxν∗rx) and g2 , a(µtxνrx + νtxµ
∗
rx) are joint Rx/Tx IQI parameters. For
simplicity, all of the following analyses are done in the baseband domain.
As shown in Fig.4.1, we consider a dual-hop AF relay system consisting of one source node
(S), one destination node (D), and U legitimate AF relay nodes Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . ,U, as well as an
illegitimate AF relay attacker (A). All source, relays and destination nodes are single antenna
and operate in half-duplex mode. This means that the signal transmission is performed in
two phases. In the first phase, S transmits signal towards the relays. In the second phase, a
selected relay retransmits the amplified signal towards D. D is assumed to be far apart from
S so that there is no direct link between them. It is further assumed that the S–Ri and Ri–D
channels experience independent slow fading so that the channel fading gains hSR and hRD are
independent and fixed during every sample observation [35]. Also, it is assumed that D has the
knowledge of channel information. The complex zero-mean additive white Gaussian noises
nSR and nRD with variances σ2SR and σ
2
RD are considered for the two phases, respectively. As
shown in Fig.4.2, the received signals at the destination are sampled and processed for IQI
estimation, compensation and relay identification. Similar to [63], it is assumed that S and D
are IQI-free and focus on the IQI caused by the AF relays.
The IQI estimation is usually carried out using training signals so that the same training sig-
nals are used in our identification system. In the first phase, N training signals are transmitted
from S to the selected relay Ri. At Ri, the kth received signal can be represented as
xi,k = skhSRi + nSRi,k, (4.2)
where sk is the k-th transmitted signal and has the transmission power P = E[s∗k sk], k =
1, 2, · · · ,N. For simplicity in representation, the subscript i is omitted in the following.
In the second phase, using (4.1) and (4.2), the received Rx/Tx IQI distorted signals at D
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can be represented as
rk = g1hSRhRDsk + g2h∗SRhRDs
∗
k + nk, (4.3)
where nk = g1hRDnSRk + g2hRDkn∗SRk + nRDk and its variance is given by σ
2 = σ2RD + σ
2
SR(|g1|2 +
|g2|2)|hRD|2.
As illustrated in Fig.4.2, the LS estimator, as a typical IQI estimator[26][68][72], is em-
ployed at the destination to estimate the IQI of relay and feed the estimates to the following
compensation and identification processes. After some manipulations, the matrix representa-
tion of (4.3) can be given as
r = Hsg + n, (4.4)
where
Hs =
[
hSRhRDs | h∗SRhRDs∗
]
N×2
, (4.5)
g =
[
g1 g2
]T
. (4.6)
Using the LS estimator of [72, eq. 15], the corresponding LS estimation of the IQI param-
eter vector g can be written as
gˆLS = (HHs Hs)
−1HHs r
= g + (HHs Hs)
−1HHs n, (4.7)
where for the second equality we have substituted for r from (4.4) into the derivations. In the
analyses, this estimated IQI parameter vector gˆLS is used as the device fingerprint for identify-
ing the current AF relay.
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4.3 AF Relay IQI-based Device Fingerprinting Analysis
Since the IQI parameter plays an important role of device fingerprint in our identification sys-
tem, this section focuses on analyzing its features and impacts to our system.
4.3.1 Analysis for the received IQI distorted signals
From (4.3), it can be seen that the received signal is comprised of three components, the desired
signal (i.e., s), the image signal (i.e., s∗) and the inevitable noises.
Under an ideal IQI-free condition implying αtx = αrx = 0 and θtx = θrx = 0o, g1 = a
and g2 = 0 can be consequently obtained. It can be observed from (4.3) that, in fact, the IQI
parameter g2 contributes to the presence of image signal component in the received signal.
Based on (4.3), the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) can be com-
puted as
γ1 =
|g1hSRhRD|2P
|g2hSRhRD|2P + σ2RD + (|g1|2 + |g2|2)σ2SR|hRD|2
=
|g1|2γSRγRD
|g2|2γSRγRD + |g1 |2+|g2 |2P γRD + 1Pσ2SR
, (4.8)
where γSR = |hSR |
2
σ2SR
and γRD = |hRD |
2
σ2RD
.
4.3.2 Analysis for the IQI parameters
Since this study is based on differentiating IQI parameters g1 and g2, it is important to analyze
their ranges and relative relation. We first apply Euler’s formula to derive the complex expres-
sion of IQI parameters in terms of the Rx/Tx amplitude and phase-shift imbalances, which can
be given by (4.9)(4.10).
Without loss of generality, the ranges of amplitude and phase-shift imbalances are assumed
as |θtx| 6 θm1, |θrx| 6 θm2, |αtx| 6 αm1, |αrx| 6 αm2. Accordingly, the ranges of<{g1},={g1},<{g2}
and ={g2} can be determined as
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g1 =a
(1
4
(
1 + (1 + αtx)e jθtx
)(
1 + (1 + αrx)e− jθrx
)
+
1
4
(
1 − (1 + αtx)e jθtx)(1 − (1 + αrx)e− jθrx))
=
a
2
(
1 + (1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) cos(θtx − θrx)) + ja2(1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) sin(θtx − θrx), (4.9)
g2 =a
(1
4
(
1 + (1 + αtx)e jθtx
)(
1 − (1 + αrx)e jθrx) + 14(1 − (1 + αtx)e jθtx)(1 + (1 + αrx)e jθrx)
)
=
a
2
(
1 − (1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) cos(θtx + θrx)) − ja2(1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) sin(θtx + θrx). (4.10)
Table 4.1: Ranges of<{g1},={g1},<{g2} and ={g2}.
IQI Parameters <{g1} ={g1} <{g2} ={g2}
θm1 = θm2 = 10o,
αm1 = αm2 = 0.2
[0.801, 1.22] [-0.246, 0.246] [-0.22, 0.199] [-0.246, 0.246]
θm1 = θm2 = 5o,
αm1 = αm2 = 0.05
[0.924, 1.051] [-0.189, 0.189] [-0.051, 0.076] [-0.189, 0.189]
a
2
+
a
2
αmin cos θmax 6<{g1} 6 a2 +
a
2
αmax
−a
2
αmax sin θmax 6={g1} 6 a2αmax sin θmax
a
2
− a
2
αmax 6<{g2} 6 a2 −
a
2
αmin cos θmax
−a
2
αmax sin θmax 6={g2} 6 a2αmax sin θmax, (4.11)
where αmin = (1 − αm1)(1 − αm2), αmax = (1 + αm1)(1 + αm2) and θmax = θm1 + θm2. Referring
to the IQI settings in [72][73], a relatively large IQI case (θm1 = θm2 = 10o, αm1 = αm2 = 0.2)
and a small IQI case (θm1 = θm2 = 5o, αm1 = αm2 = 0.05) are considered as two examples. The
ranges of IQI parameters are calculated as shown in TABLE 4.1. It can be seen that the IQI
parameter range is an extremely small interval in practice.
To reveal the relative amount of g1 and g2, we here referring to the definition of signal-to-
IQI-distortion ratio as used in [70] and calculate this ratio for our AF relay system as given
in (4.12). From the representation of (4.12), it is found that the ideal IQI-free condition, i.e.,
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γ2 =
|g1|2
|g2|2 =
1 + (1 + αtx)2(1 + αrx)2 + 2(1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) cos(θtx − θrx)
1 + (1 + αtx)2(1 + αrx)2 − 2(1 + αtx)(1 + αrx) cos(θtx + θrx) . (4.12)
θm1 = θm2 = 0, αm1 = αm2 = 0, can result in a zero denominator and a real positive numerator.
In this case, the value of γ2 is positive infinity. We further derive the range of γ2, which is given
by
γ2 ∈
1 + 4max(Amax,Bmax)
cos θm1 cos θm2
+ 2 tan θm1 tan θm2 − 2
,∞
 , (4.13)
where Amax = (1 + αm1)(1 + αm2) + 1(1+αm1)(1+αm2) , Bmax = (1 − αm1)(1 − αm2) + 1(1−αm1)(1−αm2) .
The proof of equation (4.13) is presented as follows. The derivations for the minimum
value of γ2 can be summarized as an optimization problem, which is given by
arg min
α,θtx,θrx
(
1 + α2 + 2α cos(θtx − θrx)
1 + α2 − 2α cos(θtx + θrx)
)
, (4.14a)
s.t. α = (1 + αtx)(1 + αrx),
|θtx| 6 θm1, |θrx| 6 θm2,
|αtx| 6 αm1, |αrx| 6 αm2. (4.14b)
Using the constraints (4.14b), the range of α can be determined as
(1 − αm1)(1 − αm2) 6 α 6 (1 + αm1)(1 + αm2). (4.15)
After using addition and subtraction theorems of sine function, (4.14a) can be simplified as
1 +
4α cos θtx cos θrx
1 + α2 − 2α(cos θtx cos θrx − sin θtx sin θrx)
= 1 +
4
(α + 1
α
)(cos θtx cos θrx)−1 + 2 tan θtx tan θrx − 2
. (4.16)
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It is noteworthy that both numerator and denominator are divided by α cos θtx cos θrx in the
derivation of (4.16). However, it is reasonable in our case as the amplitude mismatch and phase
mismatch are usually small enough to ensure α > 0 and cos θtx cos θrx > 0 in real applications.
According to the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means [74], we can obtain
2 = 2
√
α · 1
α
6 α +
1
α
6 max(Amax, Bmax), (4.17)
where Amax = (1 + αm1)(1 + αm2) + 1(1+αm1)(1+αm2) , Bmax = (1 − αm1)(1 − αm2) + 1(1−αm1)(1−αm2) . It is
notable that the monotonicity of α + 1
α
in (4.17) is considered to find its upper bound.
Further, we can also refer to the monotonicity of cosine and tangent, and get
cos θm1 cos θm2 6 cos θtx cos θrx 6 1, (4.18)
− tan θm1 tan θm2 6 tan θtx tan θrx 6 tan θm1 tan θm2. (4.19)
Based on (4.17)-(4.19), the lower bound of (4.16) can be figured out as
1 +
4
(α + 1
α
)(cos θtx cos θrx)−1 + 2 tan θtx tan θrx − 2
> 1 +
4
max(Amax,Bmax)
cos θm1 cos θm2
+ 2 tan θm1 tan θm2 − 2
. (4.20)
Finally, the range of γ2 can be obtained as shown in (4.13).
The infinity in (4.13) denotes the IQI-free case. We also substitute for the aforementioned
large and small IQIs in (4.13) and compute its range in dB as 10 log10(γ2) ∈ [11.142 dB,∞)
and [14.854 dB,∞), respectively.
Based on the above analysis, the challenges of using IQI parameters in our relay identifi-
cation can be summarized as follows. First, although the actual AF relay device fingerprints
(i.e., g1 and g2) are stable, their values usually locate in a small interval especially under the
small IQI condition. Second, the useful information afforded from IQI parameters for identifi-
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cation is limited. Equation (4.11) shows that the image parts of g1 and g2 have exactly the same
range interval, which implies the two parts may provide very similar information. Besides, the
range analysis of γ2 reveals that g2 is extremely less than g1, which makes g2 hard to detect
and differentiate. Finally, the accurate estimation and detection of such a small IQI parameters
with presence of noises is also a challenge. It is noteworthy that the IQI analysis results of this
section can be not only benefit to our identification system design but also be useful in other
AF relay IQI estimation and compensation system designs.
4.4 Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) Based AF Re-
lay Differentiation
In this section, GLRT is applied to differentiate AF relays based on the estimated IQI parame-
ters.
In order to decide whether the estimated IQI parameters belong to a validated AF relay or
not, the offset between gˆLS and another pre-validated device fingerprint (gv) is first computed
as
goff = gˆLS − gv
= ∆g + (HHs Hs)
−1HHs n, (4.21)
where ∆g = g − gv. In practical use, the validated fingerprints can be obtained and pre-stored
when the corresponding legitimate relays are associated and authenticated in the networks. A
binary hypothesis testing can be modeled based on offset as

H0 : ∆g = 0
H1 : ∆g , 0
(4.22)
where hypothesisH0 represents the fingerprint of current relay is exactly the same with the pre-
validated relay’s fingerprint, which produces ∆g = 0; while hypothesis H1 represents the two
compared device fingerprints belong two different relays. Based on this hypothesis testing,
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the key point of relay identification is detecting ∆g with the presence of correlated complex
random variable (HHs Hs)−1HHs n. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) is used to detect ∆g. Since the
likelihood of goff is required in LRT, the mean and covariance of goff are derived as
E[goff] = E[∆g] + (HHs Hs)
−1HHs E[n] = ∆g, (4.23a)
E[(goff − ∆g)(goff − ∆g)H]
=(HHs Hs)
−1HHs E[nn
H]Hs(HHs Hs)
−1
=σ2(HHs Hs)
−1HHs IHs(H
H
s Hs)
−1
=σ2(HHs Hs)
−1. (4.23b)
According to (4.23a) (4.23b) and thanks to the property that any linear combination of Gaussian
random variables is still Gaussian distributed, it can be obtained that goff is complex normal
distributed as goff ∼ CN(∆g,Σ) in our case, where Σ is a 2 × 2 positive definite Hermitian
matrix [75] and defined as
Σ = σ2(HHs Hs)
−1
=
σ2
|hSRhRD|4(∑Ni=1 ∑Nj=1 |si|2|s j|2 − |∑Ni=1 si|2)
×
R1 R2R3 R4
 , (4.24)
where
R1 = |hSRhRD|2
N∑
i=1
|si|2, (4.25a)
R2 = −(h∗SR)2|hRD|2
N∑
i=1
s∗i
2, (4.25b)
R3 = R∗2, (4.25c)
R4 = R1. (4.25d)
It is notable that goff is zero mean complex normal distributed under H0; while it becomes
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non-zero mean under H1. Therefore, the likelihood function of goff under H0 and H1 can be,
respectively, given by [76]
p(goff|H0) = 1
pi2| det(Σ)|e
−gHoffΣ−1goff , (4.26)
p(goff|H1) = 1
pi2| det(Σ)|e
−(goff−∆g)HΣ−1(goff−∆g). (4.27)
Using (4.26) and (4.27), LRT can be performed to decideH1 if [33]
L(goff) =
p(goff|H1)
p(goff|H0) > η, (4.28)
where η is a real positive number.
Given that the vector ∆g may be unknown at destination, this LRT cannot outcome pro-
cessable results for further differentiation in this case. To improve the practicability of our
system, we consider this more challenging case and apply GLRT to overcome this problem. In
GLRT, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of ∆g is used to replace the unknown vector
in (4.28). The MLE of ∆g is defined as
∆gˆMLE = argmax
∆g
p(goff|∆g)
= argmax
∆g
e−(goff−∆g)
HΣ−1(goff−∆g)
pi2| det(Σ)| . (4.29)
Using (4.21) and (4.24), we can obtain
− (goff − ∆g)HΣ−1(goff − ∆g)
= − 1
σ2
N∑
i=1
n2i 6 0. (4.30)
Given that ex is a monotone increasing function, the range of e−
1
σ2
∑N
i=1 n
2
i can be determined
as (0, 1]. The likelihood can be maximized when − 1
σ2
∑N
i=1 n
2
i = 0, which is equivalent to
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∆g = goff. Consequently, ∆gˆMLE = goff. So that the logarithmic GLRT can be performed as
G(goff)
= ln
(
p(goff|∆gˆMLE,H1)
p(goff|H0)
)
= ln
 (pi2 det(Σ))−1e−(goff−∆gˆMLE)HΣ−1(goff−∆gˆMLE)
(pi2 det(Σ))−1e−g
H
offΣ
−1goff

= gHoffΣ
−1goff > T. (4.31)
The result of GLRT shows that if the metric A = gHoffΣ
−1goff is larger than the threshold T ,
the hypothesisH1 is claimed; otherwise,H0 is determined.
In the next step, the value of T should be carefully determined. In engineering practice, the
threshold is usually pre-determined according to a desired false alarm probability. Hence, it is
necessary to obtain the probability density functions (PDF) of A and compute T by solving the
following equation
∫ ∞
T
p(A|H0)dA = PFA, (4.32)
where p(A|H0) denotes the PDF of A underH0. We can derive the PDF of A under hypotheses
H0 andH1 as
p(A|H0) = Ae−A, A > 0 (4.33)
p(A|H1) =
√
2A
β
e−
2A+β
2 I1(
√
2βA), A > 0 (4.34)
where I1(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with order 1 and it is defined as
I1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(12 x)
2k+1
k!Γ(k + 2)
, (4.35)
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where Γ(·) is gamma function. The parameter β in (4.34) is defined as
β = 2(λ1|b1|2 + λ2|b2|2), (4.36)
where λ1 and λ2 are the eigenvalues of Σ−1; b1 and b2 are the elements of vector b which is
given by
b = Q∆g, (4.37)
where Q is 2 × 2 matrix whose ith column is the eigenvector of Σ−1 corresponding to the
eigenvalue λi, and QQH = I.
In the following, we derive the PDFs of A under H0 and H1 which are given in (4.33) and
(4.34). It can be observed that A is dependent on a correlated complex normally distributed
vector goff. Since Σ−1 is positive definite Hermitian matrix, all eigenvalues of Σ−1 are real
positive. The eigendecomposition of matrix Σ−1 can be performed as
Σ−1 = QHΛQ (4.38)
where Λ = diag(λ1, λ2) with its elements λi > 0, i = 1, 2 denoting the ith eigenvalue of Σ−1; Q
is 2× 2 matrix whose ith column is the eigenvector of Σ−1 corresponding to λi. Substituting for
(4.38) in metric A, we can obtain
A = gHoffΣ
−1goff
= gHoffQ
HΛQgoff
= dHΛd
= λ1|d1|2 + λ2|d2|2 (4.39)
where d = Qgoff = [d1, d2]T and d1, d2 are two independent random variables since cov(d1, d2) =
cov(d2, d1) = 0 as shown in (4.40). Given (4.21)(4.24)(4.37) and orthogonal matrix Q, the co-
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variance matrix of d can be computed as
cov(d) =E[(d − b)(d − b)H]
=Q(HHs Hs)
−1HHs E[nn
H]Hs(HHs Hs)
−1QH
=σ2Q(HHs Hs)
−1(HHs Hs)(H
H
s Hs)
−1QH
=QΣQH
=QQHΛ−1QQH
=diag
(
1
λ1
,
1
λ2
)
=
 cov(d1) cov(d1, d2)cov(d2, d1) cov(d2)
 . (4.40)
Therefore, it can be obtained that d1 ∼ CN(b1, 1λ1 ), d2 ∼ CN(b2, 1λ2 ), where bi is defined in
(4.37). Since bi = 0 under H0 and bi , 0 under H1, A follows scaled central/non-central chi-
squared distributions under H0 and H1, respectively. Therefore, the normalized K = 2A can
be expressed based on (4.39) as
K = k21 + k
2
2 + k
2
3 + k
2
4 (4.41)
where
k1 =
√
2λ1<{d1} ∼

H0 : N(0, 1)
H1 : N(
√
2λ1<{b1}, 1)
k2 =
√
2λ1={d1} ∼

H0 : N(0, 1)
H1 : N(
√
2λ1={b1}, 1)
k3 =
√
2λ2<{d2} ∼

H0 : N(0, 1)
H1 : N(
√
2λ2<{b2}, 1)
k4 =
√
2λ2={d2} ∼

H0 : N(0, 1)
H1 : N(
√
2λ2={b2}, 1)
. (4.42)
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In the case, the PDF of K under H0 can be given as a central chi-squared PDF with 4 degrees
of freedom as [69]
pK(K|H0) = 14Ke
− K2 ,K > 0. (4.43)
While underH1, K follows the standard non-central chi-squared distribution with 4 degrees
of freedom and non-centrality β1 and its PDF can be given as
pK(K|H1) = 12
√
K
β1
e−
K+β1
2 I1(
√
Kβ1),K > 0 (4.44)
where the non-centrality is defined as
β1 = (
√
2λ1<{b1})2 + (
√
2λ1={b1})2
+(
√
2λ2<{b2})2 + (
√
2λ2={b2})2. (4.45)
It can be seen that β1 equals to β in (4.36).
The PDF of A can be derived according to the PDF of K. In this case, pA(x) = 2pK(2x)
since A = 12 K. In light of this, the PDF of A underH0 andH1 can be obtained by first replacing
K with 2A in (4.43) and (4.44) and then multiply the two PDFs by 2, which produces (4.33)
and (4.34), respectively.
Substituting (4.33) into (4.32), we are able to give the representation of PFA as
PFA = QA|H0(T ) = (T + 1)e
−T , (4.46)
where QA|H0(·) denotes the rights tail probability of A under H0. Accordingly, the threshold T
can be calculated by inversing this function as
T = Q−1A|H0(PFA). (4.47)
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Using (4.47) and (4.34), the detection probability can be calculated as
PD = Prob(A > T |H1)
=
∫ ∞
Q−1A|H0 (PFA)
√
2A
β
e−
2A+β
2 I1(
√
2βA)dA
= Q2(
√
β,
√
2Q−1A|H0(PFA)), (4.48)
where Qν(a, b) represents the generalized Marcum Q-function with real order ν and positive
a, b.[77, pp.219-223].
As a result, relay differentiation can be completed by checking whether or not the current
AF relay has the same IQI device fingerprint with the compared one.
4.5 AF Relay Identification Algorithm
In practice, there can be more than one relay in a cooperative communication system and
therefore the relay identification process should be capable of identifying one relay among a
group of relays. Here, we present an identification algorithm based on the proposed GLRT-
based differentiation technique to handle this multi-relay scenario.
For presentation convenience, the AF relay RAF is considered as our identification target.
This identification algorithm is required to decide whether the identity of RAF is matched with
any of the U1 pre-identified relays or not. If not, an alarm should be given to report RAF as a
new AF relay. The detailed identification algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
After performing this algorithm, the identity of the target relay RAF can be determined. If
RAF is a new one, the variable alarm will be 1, and an alarm will be given; otherwise, RAF’s
identity can be obtained in variable ID.
4.6 Optimal Signal Design for Enhancing Device Identifica-
tion Performance
In real attacking scenario, the attackers are usually some fixed devices. They can launch im-
personation attacks again and again by spoofing the upper-layer identities, e.g., media access
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Algorithm 1 AF relay identification algorithm
!t
1: Φ← {id1, id2, · · · , idU1} %U1 pre-recorded identities
2: ID← gˆLS %RAF’s identity
3: l← 0
4: idx← {0} %U1 zeros
5: for i← 1 to U1 do
6: if ID , idi then %use GLRT-based differentiation
7: %to compare ID and idi
8: l← l + 1
9: idxl ← i
10: end if
11: end for
12: if l = 0 then
13: alarm← 1 %give an alarm
14: else if l = 1 then
15: alarm← 0
16: ID← idx1
17: else %find the minimum Euclidean distance between l relays and return the corresponding
index
18: alarm← 0
19: idxmin ← min(|Al − T |)
20: ID← idxmin
21: end if
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control address spoofing [78]. Since the attacker can easily mimic another legitimate identity
by changing upper-layer information once it is detected and any devices who possess the le-
gitimate upper-layer identity including attackers will be trusted again, this kind of attacks are
hard to be eradicated by upper-layer identity based identification method. Given the fact that
IQI is an inherently stable hardware imperfection, the fixed IQIs of device can be directly tar-
geted once this device is detected as an attacker. This feature can be exploited to enhance the
capability of detecting some specific attackers in our study.
It is assumed that one AF relay attacker has been detected by our IQI-based identification
and thereby its IQI parameter has been recorded. Since our objective is to prevent future im-
personation attacks from this attacker, we here focus on maximizing the detection probability
PD as shown in (4.48).
The three arguments of PD are positive
√
β,
√
2Q−1A|H0(PFA) and the real order 2. It can
been known that arguments
√
2Q−1A|H0(PFA) and 2 are fixed constants. Due to the results of
monotonicity investigation of the generalized Marcum Q-function in [79], our derived detection
probability is a strictly increasing function with respect to
√
β. Since the transmitted signals
s are the only controllable variables, the key point of maximizing PD is to find the maximal
value of β through adjusting s.
According to (4.24) (4.36) (4.37) and let Λ = diag(λ1, λ2), β can be rewritten as
β = 2bHΛb
= 2∆gHΣ−1∆g
=
2
σ2
∆gHHHs Hs∆g. (4.49)
For analysis convenience, Hs is decomposed as
Hs = SH, (4.50)
where
S = [s | s∗]N×2, (4.51)
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H = diag(h1, h2). (4.52)
Herein, h1 = hSRhRD and h2 = h∗SRhRD. Substituting (4.50) into (4.49), we can obtain
J =
1
2
σ2β
= ∆gHHHSHSH∆g
= h∗1∆g
∗
1h1∆g1s
Hs + h1∆g1h∗2∆g
∗
2s
T s
+ h∗1∆g
∗
1h2∆g2s
Hs∗ + h∗2∆g
∗
2h2∆g2s
T s∗
= (|h1∆g1|2 + |h2∆g2|2)
N∑
i=1
|si|2
+ 2<{h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1
N∑
i=1
s2i }. (4.53)
In this case, maximizing β is equivalent to maximizing J. Given that the value of s is subject
to specific constellation pattens, the square quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and cir-
cle phase-shift keying (PSK) as two basic modulation schemes are respectively considered to
derive the optimal s leading to the maximal J.
4.6.1 Square QAM Modulation Case
In QAM modulation, the signal is represented as si = ai + jbi. Let l = |h1∆g1|2 + |h2∆g2|2,
c = <{h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1} and d = ={h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1}, then J can be expressed as
J =
N∑
i=1
Ji
= (l + 2c)
N∑
i=1
a2i + (l − 2c)
N∑
i=1
b2i − 4d
N∑
i=1
aibi, (4.54)
where Ji is defined as
Ji = (l + 2c)a2i + (l − 2c)b2i − 4daibi. (4.55)
Thanks to that si are independent, we are able to separately design si to maximize Ji, and J
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will be maximized as a result. The rules of optimal signal design under square QAM modula-
tions are summarized as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If d < 0, the optimal si is the signal locates in the angles of the constellation
square in the first and third quadrants of I/Q coordinate plane.
If d > 0, the optimal si is the signal that locates in the angles of the constellation square in
the second and fourth quadrants of I/Q coordinate plane.
If d = 0, the optimal si is the signal that locates in any angles of the constellation square
of the I/Q coordinate plane.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given as follows. According to (4.55), Ji can be expressed as
a summation of two quadratic components, which is given by
Ji = (l + 2c)(ai − 2dl + 2cbi)
2︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
ζi
+
l2 − 4c2 − 4d2
l + 2c
b2i︸               ︷︷               ︸
κi
. (4.56)
Setting h1∆g1 = c1 + jd1 and h2∆g2 = c2 + jd2 to analyze the coefficients of quadratic
components ζi and κi. The l, c and d can be expressed as
l = c21 + c
2
2 + d
2
1 + d
2
2, (4.57a)
c = c1c2 + d1d2, (4.57b)
d = d1c2 − d2c1. (4.57c)
Accordingly, the representation of coefficient l + 2c can be given by
l + 2c = (c1 + c2)2 + (d1 + d2)2 > 0 (4.58)
and the second coefficient is
l2 − 4c2 − 4d2
l + 2c
=
(c21 + d
2
1 − c22 − d22)2
(c1 + c2)2 + (d1 + d2)2
> 0. (4.59)
Equations (4.58) and (4.59) show that the coefficients of both ζi and κi are positive. There-
fore, the maximum value of Ji can be achieved only if the the maximum values of (ai − 2dl+2cbi)2
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and b2i can be simultaneously achieved. Given that l + 2c > 0, it can be seen that the values of
(ai − 2dl+2cbi)2 and b2i depend upon the sign of d and the maximum modulus of ai, bi.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the maximum values of |ai| and |bi| are amax > 0
and bmax > 0, respectively, under the current QAM modulation. For the square constellation
case, amax = bmax.
If d = 0, (4.56) reduces to
Ji = (l + 2c)a2i +
l2 − 4c2 − 4d2
l + 2c
b2i . (4.60)
In this case, Ji can be maximized when |ai| = amax and |bi| = bmax, which implies the four angles
of the constellation square.
If d < 0, it results in − 2dl+2c > 0. Thus, the quadratic components (ai − 2dl+2cbi)2 and b2i can
be maximized when ai = amax, bi = bmax or ai = −amax, bi = −bmax, which corresponds to the
square angles in the first and third quadrants.
If d > 0, then − 2dl+2c < 0. In this case, ai and bi are required to have opposite signs and
satisfy ai = amax, bi = −bmax or ai = −amax, bi = bmax, which corresponds to the square angles
in the second and fourth quadrants.
Practical Implementation Discussion: Although the optimal design can maximize the at-
tacker detection ability, it may induce a potential risk in practical implementation. To be spe-
cific, the value of optimal signal has only two options when d > 0 or d < 0. This may
occasionally result in a singular matrix HHs Hs, and make this matrix’s inverting process suffer
from low accuracy problem, e.g., the calculation of covariance matrix Σ.
To avoid this theoretically possible risk, a simply suboptimal signal design is proposed as
an alternative. Instead of applying Proposition 1 to all signals, we can intentionally design a
small portion of the signals using the following rules.
If d > 0 or d < 0, the suboptimal signals are the two points locating in the same quadrant
with the optimal signal and being closest to the optimal signal. It is notable that this suboptimal
is not suitable for 4-QAM since 4-QAM only has one point in every quadrant.
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4.6.2 Circle PSK Modulation Case
In M-PSK modulation, the constellation diagram is a circle and the signal can be generally
represented as si = Ase jθi , where As denotes the constant signal amplitude and θi denotes the
phase-shift. Similarly, an optimal signal design under the PSK modulation is proposed as
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The optimal si is the signal that can satisfy θi = −φ2 or θi =
−φ
2 + pi, where
φ = ∠(h∗2∆g
∗
2h1∆g1)
= arctan
(={h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1}
<{h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1}
)
∈ (−pi, pi]. (4.61)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given as follows. Recall eq.(4.53), it can be obtained that the
first item (|h1∆g1|2 + |h2∆g2|2) ∑Ni=1 |si|2 is fixed and not controllable. Hence, the maximization
of J depends upon whether the second item 2R = 2<{h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1
∑N
i=1 s
2
i } can be maximized
by adjusting si.
For analysis convenience, we apply Euler’s formula and set
h∗2∆g
∗
2h1∆g1 = Ge
jφ, (4.62)
where φ is defined as
φ = arctan
(={h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1}
<{h∗2∆g∗2h1∆g1}
)
∈ (−pi, pi].
According to (4.62) and si = Ase jθi , we can obtain
R =<{Ge jφ
N∑
i=1
A2se
j2θi}
=A2sG
N∑
i=1
cos(2θi + φ). (4.63)
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Since θi is independent, θi can be separately adjusted to maximize every Ri, where Ri is defined
as
Ri = A2sG cos(2θi + φ). (4.64)
As a result, R will be maximized because R =
∑N
i=1 Ri.
Considering the (−pi, pi] range limit of θi and φ, it can be concluded that Ri can achieve its
maximum value when θi =
−φ
2 or θi =
−φ
2 + pi.
Practical Implementation Discussion: Since φ can be any degree whereas the values of
θi are subject to the number of points used in the PSK constellation diagram, the engineers
may have to consider the specific constellation and choose the M-PSK symbol with the closest
angle to θi.
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Figure 4.3: The suboptimal signal design for PSK modulation case.
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As with the QAM case, there is also a possibility of having a singular matrix, HHs Hs. A sub-
optimal design is also proposed to solve this problem. As shown in Fig.4.3, Pk denotes the point
corresponding to the square of the kth PSK constellation point (Pk), i.e., Pk = s2Pk = A
2
se
j2θk .
It is notable that Pk can correspond to multiple sPk since their squares may be overlapped, for
example, (Ase jθk)2 = (Ase j(θk+pi))2. As shown in this figure, the phase shift between two neigh-
boring points (e.g., Pk and Pk−1) is 4piM . The phase shifts of A1, A2, A3, and A4 are
pi
M , while the
phase shifts of A5 and A6 are 2piM . It is assumed that −φ is closer to Pk than Pk−1 and Pk+1, which
means that it falls in the red or gray sectors. We here take two signals (si, si+1) combination into
account to approach the desired phase −φ. The rules of our suboptimal approach is described
as follows.
1. If −φ falls in A1 or A2, we set si = sPk+n , si+1 = sPk−n , n = 0, 1, 2 · · · .
2. If −φ falls in A3, we set si = sPk+n , si+1 = sPk+1−n .
3. If −φ falls in A4, we set si = sPk+n , si+1 = sPk−1−n .
In practical implementation, we can first consider Proposition 2 for designing signals and
then flexibly replace a portion of these signals by applying this suboptimal approach according
to the application requirement. For example, if the total number of s is odd O1, Proposition
2 can be applied to the first O2 signals, where O2 is odd and O2 < O1. Then, the remaining
O1 − O2 signals can be designed using the suboptimal method.
4.7 Evaluation Results
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate our derived equations and evaluate
our proposed IQI-based AF relay identification system.
4.7.1 Numerical Results for IQI Device Fingerprint
The ranges of IQI device fingerprint and γ2, which are discussed in Section III, are first
simulated. Fig.4.4 shows the values of <{g1},={g1},<{g2} and ={g2} vs. α, where α =
(1 + αrx)(1 + αtx). The Rx/Tx IQIs are set as θrx = 5o, θtx = 10o, α = 0.64 − 1.44 and
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a = 1. It can be seen that<{g1} is much larger than the other three parameters, which reflects
the practical effects of small IQI values on eq. (4.9) (4.10). Besides, as predicted that the vary-
ing ranges of ={g1} and ={g2} are close and small leading to a more challenging differentiation.
In addition, the four simulated parameters also validate our analytical results derived in (4.11)
whose ranges are [0.8188, 1.2173], [0.0279, 0.0628], [-0.1955, 0.1909] and [-0.1863, -0.0828],
respectively.
Fig.4.5 reveals the log-scale γ2 defined as 10 log10 γ2. As expected, the maximal values of
three simulated 10 log10 γ2 appear at α = 1, implying the case of no amplitude imbalances given
the simulation setups. We also consider αm1 = αm2 = 0.2 corresponding to α = 0.64− 1.44 and
apply (4.13) to calculate the minimal values of 10 log10 γ2. The calculated results are 11.9032
dB, 12.5637 dB and 12.8595 dB in the order of red, blue and black curves, which can well
match the simulated values.
The two above simulations validate our analysis of IQI fingerprint in Section III. It is be-
lieved that this result can not only improve our identification system but also be useful in many
other IQI relevant works. For example, engineers can design more targeted IQI estimation and
compensation systems with a full consideration of our results of IQI ranges. Also, our results
about the achievable γ2 can be used as a practical criteria to make the IQI reduction goal and
evaluate the performance of IQI compensation system.
4.7.2 Evaluation Results for Proposed AF Relay Identification Technique
In this subsection, the performance of proposed IQI-based AF relay differentiation, identifi-
cation algorithm, optimal and suboptimal signal design are evaluated. Furthermore, our iden-
tification technique is compared with another two latest IQI-based identification techniques.
In the following simulations, the Rayleigh fading channel, amplification gain a = 1, 16-QAM
and 16-PSK modulations are used. To evaluate the identification performance with challenging
condition of minor IQIs, the amplitude imbalance and phase-shift imbalance in our simulations
are intentionally set within −0.05 − 0.05 and −5o − 5o compared to some relatively large IQIs
cases, such as a typical example in [26], the IQIs are −0.3 − 0.3 and −15o − 15o. The results
are based on 105 independent realizations of our system.
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Figure 4.4: IQI parameters vs. α under θrx = 5o, θtx = 10o.
In Fig.4.6, the analytical PD as derived in (4.48) is compared with the simulation results. It
shows that the analytical PD of both QAM and PSK cases can sufficiently approach the simu-
lated PD. As expected, a higher SNR results in higher PD mainly because the IQI estimates are
more accurate and thereby improves the following differentiation performance. The threshold
T decreases with PFA varying from 10−3 to 1 since T , as shown in (4.47), is produced by Q−1A|H0
which is a monotonically decreasing function. The detection performances between QAM and
PSK are compared in Fig.4.7. It is observed that with the increase of SNR and PFA, the PD is
also keeping increasing. The PD of all cases can almost achieve 100% when SNR approaching
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Figure 4.5: The range of γ2 vs. α under different θrx and θtx.
25 dB. In addition, it is also observed that the detection performance of QAM is always better
than PSK under the same simulation setup, which is mainly due to that QAM is more robust to
IQI than PSK.
We assess the enhancements of using the proposed optimal signal (i.e., Proposition 1 and 2)
and suboptimal designs in terms of PD as shown in Fig.4.8. To clearly reveal the enhancements,
more severe conditions are intentionally considered. To be specific, closer IQIs between current
relay and the validated relay, lower SNR=15 dB and a small number N = 14 are used. Besides,
due to the impractical problems in implementing optimal methods as discussed in Section VI,
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the theoretically achievable PD of optimal methods is used as upper bound and it is analytically
computed using (4.48) with a maximized β. The results show that our suboptimal solution
can be implemented at the expense of only a detection probability loss of averagely 2.59%
and 1.68% in QAM and PSK, respectively, compared to the optimal method. On the other
hand, this suboptimal method also shows an average 34.54% and 23.43% higher PD than the
methods without using any optimal designs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the suboptimal
solution is able to significantly improve the capability of detecting some specific attackers in
severe conditions and can be implemented more practically than the optimal solution with
minor optimality sacrifice.
To evaluate the identification performance, we consider multiple relays consisting of four
legitimate ones and one impersonation attacker and simulate this case using the identification
algorithm as proposed in Section V. The IQIs of these five relays are randomly chosen from the
aforementioned ranges −0.05−0.05 and −5o−5o. It is assumed that one relay, either legitimate
or illegitimate, will be randomly selected from these five relays each time. Compared to only
determiningH0 orH1, the task of this evaluation is more challenging since it is further required
to give the correct identity of the current relay from the four legitimate candidates or give an
alarm if an illegitimate relay with small and similar IQIs is selected. To show the advantages of
our proposed identification method, another two latest IQI-based device identification methods
are simulated and compared as shown in Fig.4.9. For presentation simplicity, we call the
methods in [8] and [26] as VF and DT since they are using Varying Fingerprint and Distance
Testing, respectively. The correct identification rate (CIR) is defined as the total number of
correct identity claims plus correct alarms divided by the total number of simulation iterations.
It is shown that our method is superior to VF and DT in terms of the CIR in all simulated
cases. The significant enhancement is gained because our fingerprint is more reliable than VF
and our identification technique is more accurate in small IQI case than DT. Another important
advantage is that our identification can achieve better performance and using less signals. It
can be seen that the CIR of our method with N = 32 is even higher than VF with N = 512.
Therefore, the number of training signals required in our method is much shorter.
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Figure 4.6: Analytical and simulated PD vs. PFA and corresponding T . The current AF relay
has (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (−0.03, 5o, 0.05, 4o), the validated AF relay owns (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) =
(0.02, 5o,−0.05,−4o) and N = 14.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, the AF relay device identification using IQI is investigated. Since the IQI
estimation and compensation are necessary techniques in most wireless receivers, we pro-
posed to directly use the LS estimated IQI parameters as device fingerprint and further give
a comprehensive analysis of this fingerprint in terms of several ranges and its challenges to
our identification system. It is worth noting that this general analysis is not only benefit to
improving our identification but also can be referred when designing most other LS estimator
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Figure 4.7: PD vs SNR under different PFA settings.
based IQI wireless systems. AF relay differentiation is accomplished using this IQI fingerprint
and derived detection probability and threshold. The optimal signal designs for QAM and
PSK modulations are further proposed for the sake of maximizing the capability of detecting
some specific attackers. To overcome the potential impractical problems of our optimal design,
two suboptimal solutions are proposed which can achieve sufficient close performance of the
optimal ones. Besides, a high accuracy identification algorithm is also proposed based on our
differentiation method. The simulation results show that our identification method outperforms
another two IQI-based device identification methods in terms of the correct identification rate
and the number of required signals. To be specific, our identification is able to achieve higher
4.8. Summary 81
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pfa
P D
 
 
non−optimal,QAM
suboptimal,QAM
upper bound,QAM (analytic)
non−optimal,PSK
suboptimal,PSK
upper bound,PSK(analytic)
Figure 4.8: Detection probabilities comparison between suboptimal and non-optimal signal
design and the corresponding upper bounds. The current AF relay has (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) =
(−0.03, 3o, 0.03, 3o), the validated AF relay owns (αrx, θrx, αtx, θtx) = (0.02, 5o,−0.05,−4o),
SNR=16 dB, N = 14.
correct identification rate with significantly lesser signal amount.
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Chapter 5
Enhanced Device Fingerprinting using
Multiple Physical-Layer Characteristics
Device fingerprinting directly affects the authentication performance so that its enhancement
technique is emerging as one of the useful paradigm for improving physical-layer authenti-
cation. This chapter emphasizes on the device fingerprinting enhancement techniques using
multiple physical-layer characteristics.
5.1 Introduction
Wireless communications devices can be authenticated by verifying their inherent physical-
layer characteristics. Specifically, such techniques exploit the specific characteristics of wire-
less link between the transmitter and receiver or radio-frequency (RF) front-end imperfections
of transmitters as device fingerprints [18]. Since these characteristics can automatically dis-
tort transmitted signals, which introduce device-dependent impacts to the received signals, the
identities of transmitters can be validated by the receiver.
Many authentication schemes are proposed by exploitation of the properties of communica-
tion links to detect spoofing transmitters, most of which are typically based on single physical-
layer variable/attribute. In [19, 80, 81], physical-layer authentication schemes based on con-
secutive channel frequency responses (CFRs) are investigated. The channel impulse response
(CIR) is analyzed to identify the transmitter in [82]. A continuous physical-layer authentica-
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tion based on an adaptive orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) is proposed in
[36]. In [83], an authentication scheme based on RSSI is investigated. However, this technique
requires the cooperation of additional reference nodes as the RSSI values from two transmitters
can be close even if they are located in different positions.
As a matter of fact, technical challenges still exist in applying the current single-variable
authentication techniques. On one hand, the selected physical-layer attributes are not always
accessible in particular platforms. In order to obtain the information of expected physical-layer
attributes, additional hardware level changes may be required, which significantly reduces the
application potential of authentication schemes. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that due
to the interference, noise and time variation inherited to wireless communications, physical-
layer attributes used for authentication typically fluctuates in a dynamic range, which further
leads to the low reliability of single-variable authentication. Therefore, it is valuable to consider
more robust device fingerprint consisted of more than one unique physical-layer characteristics.
This is chapter focuses on such device fingerprinting enhancement technique using multiple
physical-layer characteristics. A received signal strength indicator (RSSI) and packet error
rate (PER) dependent device fingerprint is first investigated to specifically authenticate IEEE
802.11 WiFi devices. Then, a more general multi-dimensional device fingerprinting scheme is
studied.
To be specific, an easily implementable authentication technique is presented to improve
the spoofing detection performance by using the PER and RSSI. Both of them are readily avail-
able in most of IEEE 802.11 platforms. RSSI can be obtained by simply converting the specific
received power reading at the IEEE 802.11 platform. On the other hand, PER is a statistical
quantity which can be obtained by analyzing the received packets. There are many remarkable
advantages by employing the two attributes together. Firstly, our proposed scheme can be sim-
ply realized at the receiver without requiring additional equipments which raises its application
potential. Secondly, the fingerprinting reliability is enhanced as it is nearly impossible for the
adversary to simultaneously emulate two environment as well as user-dependent attributes.
Since the channel-based authentication suffers from poor signal quality and channel vari-
ation in mobile and outdoor scenarios [4], the stable RF front-end imperfections have been
considered in some authentication researches. In [27] and [43], the authors propose to differen-
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tiate different transceivers based on in-phase/quadrature (I/Q) imbalance and carrier frequency
offset. However, completely relying on only one characteristic is not always reliable since the
selected characteristic may not have enough dynamic range for accurate differentiation. To
mitigate this problem, it is straightforward to consider more than one characteristics in order to
verify the claimed device identity in multiple aspects. In [23], several radiometric signatures
including frequency error, I/Q offset, magnitude error and phase error are reviewed. In [4], the
imperfect input/output characteristics of digital-to-analog converter and power amplifier are
studied for identifying wireless users. However, it is critical to investigate the effective utiliza-
tion of multiple device-specific characteristics for optimizing the authentication performance.
We are thereby motivated to provide a general approach of utilizing multiple device-specific
characteristics to enhance the performance of wireless device authentication. To be more spe-
cific, a weighted combination of a number of N characteristics is considered and the likelihood
ratio test is applied to process this combined device fingerprint. The optimal weight of each
selected characteristic is also determined for maximizing the detection probability.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the RSSI and PER based
authentication is presented in terms of authentication model, hypothesis decision rule, exper-
imental setup as well as the simulation results. Section 5.3 concentrates on introducing the
general authentication method using multiple device-specific characteristics. To be specific,
the observation model of multi-characteristics at the receiver is first presented. Then, the au-
thentication method and corresponding optimal weights are described. The numerical results
are also given to validate the proposed authentication system. Finally, this chapter is concluded
in Section 5.4.
5.2 An Enhanced Device Fingerprinting using PER and RSSI
5.2.1 Authentication Model
To elaborate the attack challenges that can be addressed by this authentication model, Alice,
Bob and Eve are introduced as three different entities according to the conventional terminolo-
gies in communication security related studies. Herein, Alice, Bob and Eve are three individual
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wireless nodes to construct a communication system. More specifically, the legitimate trans-
mitter (Alice) is able to send packets to the intended receiver (Bob), while the adversary (Eve)
attempts to impersonate Alice to communicate with Bob. In order to spoof Bob, Eve tries her
best to impersonate Alice by mimicking the one of Alice’s attributes which can be used in the
common single-variable-based authentication technique.
Herein, it is assumed that this communication system is utilizing the RSSI-based authen-
tication technique to identify transmitters. The RSSI from one wireless node is defined as
[84]
P(d)[dBm] = P(d0)[dBm] − 10α log10(
d
d0
) + S , (5.1)
where d is the distance between the wireless node and receiver, P(d0) represents the transmission
power of a reference node at the reference distance d0, α is path loss exponent, and S is the
zero-mean Gaussian noise. Therefore, Eve is able to manipulate its transmission power and
position to make her RSSI pattern close to Alice’s. Consequently, Eve can stand a good chance
of being undetected. Therefore, it is significant to consider the second attribute, such as PER
in this study, to enhance Bob’s capability in detecting illegitimate transmitters. The PER is
defined as
PER =
NRXErrors
NRXCorrect + NRXErrors
, (5.2)
where NRXErrors is the number of received error packets and NRXCorrect is the number of received
correct packets.
In fact, PER and RSSI are reflections of the current communication quality, and show nat-
ural randomicity. However, they are only partly related to each other as the PER and RSSI are
determined by different factors according to (5.1) and (5.2), and also related to some uncontrol-
lable channel-based factors such as the effect of multi-path. Additionally, they are not acquired
at the same time scale, which also reduces their correlation. In this case, the adversary is not
able to simply mimic PER and RSSI separately, as the procedure of mimicking one attribute
also leads to some unexpected variations of the other one. Hence, it is nearly impossible to
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imitate two highly random transmission attributes at the same time in order to spoof Bob.
In our proposed scheme, Bob is capable of differentiating either the received packets from
Alice or Eve. In particular, when the packets from Alice arriving at Bob, they are first analyzed
to obtain the unique valid PER and RSSI pattern profiles. Then the valid PER and RSSI profiles
are recorded by Bob for further comparisons. Herein, it is assumed that PER and RSSI are
interfered by different white Gaussian noises to properly reflect the impacts of interferences
to the communication system. Indeed, the determination of a Gaussian probability density
function (PDF) requires the accurate estimate of corresponding mean and variance. Therefore,
in order to obtain the valid PER and RSSI pattern profiles from Alice, the mean values (A) and
variances (σ2) of PER and RSSI are estimated at Bob by analyzing the packets transmitted by
Alice. Particularly, it is defined that A = [A0 A1]T , where A0 and A1 respectively represent
the mean values of PER and RSSI from Alice; while σ2 = [σ20 σ
2
1]
T , where σ20 and σ
2
1
respectively represent the variances of PER and RSSI from Alice. In our scheme, A and σ2
are recorded by Bob as the valid profiles of transmission attributes. After that, Bob constantly
samples N PER and RSSI profiles from the received packets. In addition, A′ = [A′0 A
′
1]
T is
defined to represent the mean values of PER and RSSI from the current sampled N packets
and σ′2 = [σ′20 σ
′2
1]
T is defined to represent the variances of PER and RSSI from the current
sampled N packets. Bob can compare this new attributes profiles with the recorded ones to see
whether they can match up. To be specific, if the current sampled N packets are transmitted by
Eve, the A and A′ cannot be exactly the same, which produces ∆A = A − A′ = [∆A0 ∆A1]T .
∆A, reflecting the discrepancy of Alice and Eve in terms of PER and RSSI, is used to detect
the illegitimate transmitter.
5.2.2 Hypothesis Testing and Decision Rule
The binary hypothesis testing model has been commonly used in various single-variable based
authentications. Given that this study simultaneously utilizes two distinct attributes, the con-
ventional single-variable hypothesis testing model is extended to two-variable format. The two
variables are defined to specifically represent PER and RSSI in this new two-variable hypoth-
esis testing model. The two-variable mean-shifted hypothesis testing model can be defined as
88Chapter 5. Enhanced Device Fingerprinting using Multiple Physical-Layer Characteristics
follows:

H0 : X = W
H1 : X = ∆A + W′
, (5.3)
where H0 represents the received packets are from legitimate Alice; H1 means the received
packets are transmitted by illegitimate Eve; X = Xˆ − A =
x[0][0] · · · x[0][N−1]x[1][0] · · · x[1][N−1]
, where Xˆ =xˆ[0][0] · · · xˆ[0][N−1]xˆ[1][0] · · · xˆ[1][N−1]
 represents the samples, the first and second row of X represent the N
mean-shifted samplings of PER and RSSI, respectively; W =
w[0][0] · · · w[0][N−1]w[1][0] · · · w[1][N−1]
 and W′ =w
′
[0][0] · · · w′[0][N−1]
w′[1][0] · · · w′[1][N−1]
 are two white Gaussian noises with zero mean values and variances σ2
and σ′2, respectively.
In this hypothesis testing model, the offset ∆A = 0 in H0, while ∆A , 0 under H1 as the
attributes profiles from Alice and Eve are not the same. However, in practice the authentication
attributes are inevitably affected by noises and in turn they are fluctuating in a certain range,
which leads to the received attributes profiles cannot exactly match up the valid attributes pro-
files even the received packets are actually come from the legitimate transmitter. Generally, a
threshold is introduced to solve this problem when using hypothesis testing. Precisely, if |∆A|
is less than a pre-determined threshold,H0 is accepted; otherwise,H1 is decided.
The generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is employed to fulfill the authentication. To
be specific, underH0, the joint PDF for PER or RSSI can be defined as
pm(X;H0) =
exp [− 12σ2m
∑N−1
i=0 x
2
[m][i]]
(2piσ2m)
N
2
, (5.4)
where m = 0 or 1 indicates the PER or RSSI. Similarly, under H1, the joint PDF for the mth
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variable is
pm(X; Θ1,H1) =
exp [− 12σ′2m
∑N−1
i=0 (x[m][i] − ∆Am)2]
(2piσ′2m)
N
2
, (5.5)
where Θ1 =
[
∆Am σ′2m
]
underH1.
Generally,H1 can be decided if
Lm(x) =
pm(X; Θˆ1,H1)
pm(X;H0) > γ, (5.6)
where γ is a threshold and its value is able to influence whether to accept H0 or accept H1.
Θˆ1 =
[
∆Aˆm σˆ′
2
m
]
is the estimation of Θ1. In practice, after sampling N packets the receiver
is able to calculate the mean and variance of PER/RSSI. σˆ′2m is set to equal to this variance.
Regarding the ∆Aˆm, it can be obtained by subtracting A from this mean.
The decision rule based on hypothesis testing is provided to accomplish the two-variable
authentication. At first, each variable (PER and RSSI) separately identifies the transmitter
based on the hypothesis testing in deciding whether to claim the transmitter as legitimate or
not. Subsequently, the decisions are combined for consideration in determining the final as-
sessment. The decision procedure can be summarized for each variable as follows.
According to (5.4), (5.5), and (5.6), the specific GLRT for the PER or RSSI can be executed
as
1
(2piσˆ′2m)
N
2
exp [− 1
2σˆ′2m
∑N−1
i=0 (x[m][i] − ∆Aˆm)2]
1
(2piσˆ2m)
N
2
exp [− 12σˆ2m
∑N−1
i=0 x
2
[m][i]]
> γ, (5.7)
where m =0 or 1 represents PER or RSSI. Substituting σˆ2m =
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 x
2
[m][i] and σˆ′
2
m =
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 (x[m][i]−
∆Aˆm)2 and taking the logarithms to produce
∆Aˆ2m > σˆ′
2
m(γ
2
N − 1). (5.8)
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As a result, the threshold can be set as
T[m] = σˆ′m
√
|γ 2N − 1|, (5.9)
where T[m],m = 0, 1 is the threshold for PER or RSSI. Specifically, the authentication of each
variable is executed by comparing |∆Aˆm| with T[m]. If |∆Aˆm| < T[m], this variable (PER or RSSI)
claims Alice as the legitimate transmitter; otherwise, this variable claims Eve.
Thus, the false alarm probability P f a[m],m = 0, 1 for PER or RSSI can be calculated based
on the corresponding threshold T[m] as
P f a[m] = P(|∆Aˆm| > T[m];H0)
= P(∆Aˆm > T[m];H0) + P(∆Aˆm < −T[m];H0). (5.10)
Given that ∆Aˆm ∼ N(0, σ2m/N) under H0, the equation (5.10) can be simply expressed by the
Q-function to produce
P f a[m] = 2 Q
T[m]√N
σˆm
 , (5.11)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
t2
2 dt. Therefore, the threshold T[m] can be determined from P f a[m] by
T[m] =
σˆm√
N
Q−1
(
P f a[m]
2
)
, (5.12)
where Q−1(x) is the inverse of Q-function. Furthermore, (5.12) implies that the threshold T[m]
can be artificially adjusted by changing the value of P f a[m] when σˆm and N is pre-determined.
Considering that ∆Aˆm ∼ N(∆Am, σ′2m/N) underH1, the probability of detection Pd[m],m = 0, 1
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for PER or RSSI is
Pd[m] = P(|∆Aˆm| > T[m];H1)
= Q
T[m] − ∆Aˆm√
σˆ′2m/N
 + Q
T[m] + ∆Aˆm√
σˆ′2m/N

= Q
 σˆmσˆ′m Q−1
(
P f a[m]
2
)
−
√
N∆Aˆ2m
σˆ′2m

+ Q
 σˆmσˆ′m Q−1
(
P f a[m]
2
)
+
√
N∆Aˆ2m
σˆ′2m
 . (5.13)
Consequently, the corresponding probability of miss detection Pm[m],m = 0, 1 underH1 can be
written as
Pm[m] = 1 − Pd[m]. (5.14)
Presently, the hypothesis testing theory is completed for each variable.
In the decision rule, the final decision is based on the majority variables’ decision. Given
that the two variables may claim different transmitters, the final decision rule should take this
case into consideration. Precisely, if one variable claims Alice while the other one claims
Eve, we consider that the received packets are actually transmitted by Eve. In this way, the
performance in detecting spoofing attacks can be enhanced since it is extremely hard to deceive
Bob in terms of both PER and RSSI. The probability of detection Pd can be expressed as
Pd = Pd[0]Pd[1] + (1 − Pd[0])Pd[1] + Pd[0](1 − Pd[1]), (5.15)
where Pd[0] and Pd[1] are probability of detection of PER and RSSI, respectively.
5.2.3 Experiment and Simulation Results
Experiment
Fig. 5.1 shows the IEEE 802.11g experimental setup. Three wireless nodes are located
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spatially in different positions in Room 338 of Thompson Engineering Building of the Univer-
sity of Western Ontario to set up the “Alice-Bob-Eve” communication system. All of the three
wireless devices are the same product model. In this communication system, Bob serves as
a receiver; while Alice and Eve serve as legitimate and illegitimate transmitters, respectively.
Additionally, a network analyzer is connected to Bob to expediently display the real-time sta-
tistical results of the PER and RSSI. In this simple network, the distance (D1) between Alice
and Bob is 6 meters, and data rate is 18 Mbit/s. In addition, the sample interval for Bob is 1
second and the number of measured samples is 839.
To identify different transmitters, the first step is to measure the valid attributes profiles of
Alice, and store these attributes’ profiles in Bob. For the RSSI, the attribute profiles (mean and
variance) are calculated based on the samples at Bob. For the PER, we first calculate the PER
during every sample interval to get 839 statistics. After that, the mean and variance can be
computed based on these statistics.
In order to thoroughly test the performance of our scheme in its ability in detecting an
attacker, the device settings of Eve are set as identical as possible with Alice which enables
Eve to better imitate the PER and RSSI of Alice. Precisely, the TX power of Eve is set to be
the same with Alice. Eve is close to the position of Alice, and the distance (D2) between Eve
and Bob is set to be 6 meters as well. After that, the similar experiment is done to obtain 836
samples and calculated the invalid PER and RSSI profiles from Eve.
Simulation
Three basic aspects are mainly concerned in assessing the proposed authentication perfor-
mances: the probability of detection Pd, the probability of false alarm P f a and the sample
number N. Among them, Pd implies the capability of detecting the adversary; P f a is a crite-
rion to evaluate the authentication in aspect of making an incorrect final decision; N is directly
related to the processing time and accuracy of authentication. It is noteworthy that all of the
data used in the simulations are derived from the experiment mentioned above.
In Fig. 5.2, the simulation curves perfectly match the expected theoretical curves in the
proposed decision rule, which validates our derivations.
In Fig. 5.3, in order to show the enhancement of our proposed authentication scheme, the
Pd of PER, RSSI and two different decision rules are compared. Specifically, rule #1 is the
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Figure 5.1: The experimental setup using IEEE 802.11g Atheros platform.
decision rule as mentioned in the previous section. It claims Eve when the two variables claim
different transmitters; while rule #2 considers the received packets are from Alice in this case.
To simplify the analysis, the P f a of PER and the P f a of RSSI are set to be the same, linearly
ranging from 0.01 to 0.3. As shown in the figure, with the increasing of P f a, all of the curves
show the expected ascendant trend, which implies a higher tolerance of the false alarm will
bring a better performance in detecting attacks. Additionally, it is clear that the Pd of rule #1 is
extremely higher than the Pd of single-variable. However, rule #2 does not show an acceptable
performance in detecting attacks since its effective miss detection is higher.
N is another factor that significantly impacts the authentication performance. Generally, on
one hand, a large number of samplings will positively improve the accuracy of the authentica-
tion results. On the other hand, excessive samplings will result in the procedure of processing
data to be time-consuming which will significantly reduce its utility value. In Fig. 5.4, the
curves of the proposed decision rule #1 for Pd vs P f a with N = 50, 100, 150 are provided
separately. Hence, the appropriate N should be selected carefully by considering the tradeoffs.
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results vs. theoretical results under N = 50 and 100, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Probability of detection vs. probability of false alarm under N = 100.
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Figure 5.4: Probability of detection using different number of samplings.
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5.3 A General Device Fingerprinting using Multiple Weighted
Device-Specific Characteristics
In this section, a general authentication method using multiple device-specific characteristics
is presented. The contents of this section is partially based on [85].
Notations: Bold uppercase and lowercase letters denote matrix and vector, respectively.
For matrix A, we use an to denote its nth row and ai j to denote its element of the ith row and
jth column.
5.3.1 Weighted Multi-Characteristics Device Authentication
The model of multiple device-specific characteristics is first presented. Similar to [86], in
which two channel-based attributes are modeled, we here assume N device-specific character-
istics (i.e., time-invariant RF front-end imperfections) and each characteristic has M observa-
tions at the receiver. The corresponding N×M matrix representation of observed characteristics
can be defined as
Y = Xr + W (5.16)
=

xr1 xr1 · · · xr1
xr2 xr2 · · · xr2
...
. . .
...
xrN xrN · · · xrN

+

w11 w12 · · · w1M
w21 w22 · · · w2M
...
. . .
...
wN1 wN2 · · · wNM

,
where Xr and W denote the actual values of time-invariant characteristics and additive white
Gaussian noises (AWGN) with known variances. In this case, the nth row of Y denote a number
of M noisy estimates of the nth attribute, which follows the distribution as yn ∼ N(xrn , σ2n).
After obtaining Y, the receiver is able to compare it with the validated characteristics Xv to
produce the offset as
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∆X = Xr − Xv + W, (5.17)
=

x1 x1 · · · x1
x2 x2 · · · x2
...
. . .
...
xN xN · · · xN

+ W,
where
Xv =

xv1 xv1 · · · xv1
xv2 xv2 · · · xv2
...
. . .
...
xvN xvN · · · xvN

(5.18)
Different weights are assigned to each characteristic and use the hypothesis testing based
detection theory to identify different wireless devices.
The mean of the nth attribute offset in (5.17) can be calculated as mn = 1M
∑M
i=1 ∆xni. Then,
mn is divided by σn√M producing
An =
√
Mmn
σn
∼ N( xn
√
M
σn
, 1). (5.19)
The weighted sum of the N selected attributes in (5.19) can be expressed as
S =
N∑
i=1
wiAi ∼ N(
√
M
N∑
i=1
wixi
σi
,
N∑
i=1
w2i ). (5.20)
The weights wi are assumed to be adjustable real constants satisfying wixi > 0.
As a result, a binary hypothesis testing can be utilized to analyze S as
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
H0 : xi = 0
H1 : xi , 0
, (5.21)
where the hypothesis H0 denotes that the current device has the same characteristics with the
validated device so that xi = 0; otherwise,H1 is decided to claim a different transmitter.
A logarithm of likelihood ratio test (LRT) can be performed to decide the hypothesisH1 if
the ratio is larger than a threshold r, which can be expressed as
ln
(
pH1(S )
pH0(S )
)
> r
ln

(
√
2pi
∑N
i=1 w
2
i )
−1 exp[−(S−
√
MB)2
2
∑N
i=1 w
2
i
]
(
√
2pi
∑N
i=1 w
2
i )−1 exp[
−S 2
2
∑N
i=1 w
2
i
]
 > r
S >
r
∑N
i=1 w
2
i√
MB
+
√
MB
2
= T, (5.22)
where pH0(S ) and pH1(S ) denote the likelihood functions of S underH0 andH1, respectively.
B =
∑N
i=1
wi xi
σi
, and T is the threshold for determining whether S belongs to H0 or H1. It is
noteworthy that the value of T is not available due to that xi is usually unknown in practice.
To overcome this problem, a given false alarm probability is set as usually employed in engi-
neering practice, and this probability is used to calculate the corresponding threshold T . In this
case, the false alarm rate can be computed as
PFA = P{S > T |H0}
=
∫ +∞
T
pH0(S )dS
= Q
 T√∑N
i=1 w
2
i
 , (5.23)
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where Q(·) is the Q-function and it is defined as
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2pi
e−
1
2 u
2
du.
By solving (6.48), the threshold T can be obtained as
T =
√
N∑
i=1
w2i Q
−1 (PFA) > 0, (5.24)
where Q−1(·) is the inverse of Q-function. Accordingly, the detection probability can be com-
puted using this T as
PD = P{S > T |H1}
=
∫ +∞
T
pH1(S )dS
= Q
Q−1 (PFA) −
√
M
∑N
i=1
wi xi
σi√∑N
i=1 w
2
i
 . (5.25)
5.3.2 Optimal Weights Derivation for Maximizing Detection Probability
This section focuses on the weights design since it is apparent that the weights can directly
affect the detection performance as revealed in eq.(5.25).
(5.25) is analyzed to derive the optimal weights to maximize the detection probability.
Given that Q-function is monotonically decreasing and Q−1(PFA) is a constant under the given
PFA, it is concluded that maximizing PD is equivalent to finding the maximum value of
f (w) =
√
M
∑N
i=1
wi xi
σi√∑N
i=1 w
2
i
.
To achieve this goal, we first find the w values that make the partial derivative of f (w) equal to
zero. Then, these values are compared with the boundary values of w to finally find the correct
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w. Therefore, the partial derivative of f (w) with respect to w is
∂ f (w)
∂wk
=
√
M∑N
i=1 w
2
i
 xkσk
√
N∑
i=1
w2i −
Bwk√∑N
i=1 w
2
i
 = 0. (5.26)
After some arrangements, the results can be obtained as
xk
σkwk
=
B∑N
i=1 w
2
i
= C, (5.27)
where C is a constant. Based on (5.27), f (w) can be rewritten as
f (w) =
√
M
N∑
i=1
x2i
σ2i
. (5.28)
Then, the boundary condition for f (w) can be examined as
lim
wk→∞
f (w) = lim
wk→∞
√
M
∑N
i=1
wi xi
σi√∑N
i=1 w
2
i
=
√
Mxk
σk
. (5.29)
The comparison of (5.28) and (5.29) is shown as
√
M
√
N∑
i=1
x2i
σ2i
=
√
M
√√
x2k
σ2k
+
N∑
i=1,i,k
x2i
σ2i
≥ √M
√
x2k
σ2k
. (5.30)
Therefore, the optimal weights can be expressed as
wk =
xk
σkC
. (5.31)
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Substituting for w from (5.31) in (5.25), the maximal detection probability can be expressed as
PDMAX = Q
(
Q−1(PFA) −
√
M · S NR
)
, (5.32)
where S NR =
∑N
i=1
x2i
σ2i
denotes the summation of signal to noise ratio of each characteristic,
where the signals here denote the actual characteristic offsets. However, since the xi are usually
unknown in practice, it is hard to obtain the optimal weights as derived in (5.31).
5.3.3 Simulation Results
Three MATLAB simulations are performed to evaluate the performance of our wireless device
authentication system. We mainly focus on the values of PD in different evaluation conditions
based on the required PFA.
The derived threshold and detection probability in equation (5.25) are verified. The setups
of this simulation are as follows. N = 3, the weights are [2,−2, 2]. The N estimates of charac-
teristics are represented in a randomly generated vector [21, 49.5, 72] (i.e., any column of Xr)
and the validated characteristics are set to be [20.6, 50, 71.6], which implies the delicate actual
characteristic offsets are within 2%. The simulation results vs. analytic results of (5.25) and
the corresponding threshold of (5.24) are shown in Fig.5.5. It can be seen that the simulation
and analytic results can match as expected, which validates the correctness of our derivations.
Also, the threshold keeps decreasing with the increase of PFA.
We also evaluate the authentication performance under different values of N = 1, 3, 5. In
this particular simulation, we set the estimated characteristics and validated characteristics are
[21, 49.5, 72, 50, 60] and [20.6, 50, 71.6, 49.7, 59.7], respectively. It is noteworthy that the first
N elements can be chosen from these two vectors, where N is set to be 1, 3, 5. The rest simula-
tion setups are the same with the previous one. The comparison results are shown in Fig.5.6. It
can be seen that the detection probabilities of using more than one characteristics (i.e., the red
and blue curves) are significantly improved comparing with using single characteristic (i.e.,
black curve). The PD of both N = 3 and N = 5 remain above 90% in this simulation, and
continue to rise to almost 100% simultaneously when PFA reaches 1.58%. Therefore, it can be
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predicted that the PD may not be remarkably increased by solely considering larger N in this
case.
In the third simulation, the system with optimal weights is evaluated. The same simulation
setups as described in the first simulation are utilized. Regarding the weights, we set the
optimal weights as derived in (5.31), which is wopt k = xkσk , k = 1, 2, · · · ,N. While, we utilize
another set of equal weights as wequ k =
∑N
k=1 |wopt k |
N and compare its authentication performance
with the optimal weights as shown in Fig.5.7. In this figure, it can be observed that the PD
of optimal weights maintains higher than the equal weights with the PFA varying from 10−3
to 10−1. It is noteworthy that different weight settings, e.g., all weights are 1, may lead to
different simulation results. However, the optimal must be always higher than any other weight
settings. In addition, this optimal weights are difficult to obtain in practice as aforementioned.
In fact, the designers can adjust the weight of different characteristic according to the practical
application requirements.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has two main parts. In the first part, an enhanced device fingerprinting technique
using PER and RSSI is proposed. The two-variable authentication method is proven to be
practical, as the variables of PER and RSSI are easily accessible at the receiver during the
communication processing. More precisely, by comparing the differences between Alice and
Eve in terms of PER and RSSI, each variable could draw a conclusion of whether the received
packets are from a legitimate transmitter or not. Consequently, the accuracy of the final de-
cision is significantly enhanced by considering PER and RSSI together. The effectiveness of
the proposed two-variable authentication is validated by simulation results. All data used in
the simulation are derived from IEEE 802.11g Atheros platform. Moreover, the authentication
results show a higher capability in detecting the spoofing attacks than the single-variable based
authentication schemes. As a matter of fact, the proposed scheme is not only applicable to
IEEE 802.11 but also can be employed in many other wireless communication scenarios.
In the second part, the device authentication enhancement technique using multiple charac-
teristics is studied. Through simultaneously considering more than one device-specific charac-
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Figure 5.5: Simulation vs. analytic results of PD, and the corresponding threshold.
teristics, a device fingerprint is generated by computing the weighted combination of multiple
device dependent characteristics. The LRT is applied to process the new device fingerprint in
assisting the wireless device authentication. In addition, the optimal weights are derived for
maximizing the detection probability. The numerical results of our authentication system can
validate the theoretical derivations and show expected enhancement in terms of the improved
detection probability.
The works of this chapter can be partially found in my published papers [85, 86]
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Figure 5.6: Authentication performance with different number of characteristics.
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weights.
Chapter 6
Physical-Layer Authentication
Enhancement by Exploiting Diversity
Techniques
The enhanced multi-characteristic based device fingerprinting technique is investigated in last
chapter as one effective method to mitigate the authentication performance limitations. While
following the device fingerprint generation, the step of fingerprint differentiation is straightfor-
wardly becoming another key point for improving the reliability performance of physical-layer
authentication. This chapter introduces diversity techniques to mitigate the negative factors in
fingerprint differentiation procedure.
6.1 Introduction
In practice, the RF-AFE imperfection distinction between different devices is usually a small
quantity, which means the fingerprint offset is small. Also, the fading and noise from wireless
transmission can further degenerate the detection of such small offset. This can dramatically
decrease the fingerprint-to-noise-ratio (FNR) and thereby lower performances of fingerprint
differentiation. Therefore, the low FNR problem is actually the main factor that limits the
performance of physical-layer authentication using RF-AFE imperfection-based device finger-
prints.
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Diversity technique can be used to solve the low FNR problem. Traditionally, the objective
of using diversity technique is increasing the transmission reliability in the form of achieving
larger diversity gain. In current wireless systems, the diversity techniques such as antenna di-
versity and cooperative diversity are widely adopted. For instances, today’s WiFi devices are
generally equipped with multiple antennas so that the multi-antenna diversity has significant
potential in authenticating this kind of devices. The cooperative diversity related techniques
can be conveniently applied to most communication networks since a network normally con-
sists of more than one wireless devices. Motivated by the considerable advantages of using
diversity technique, antenna and cooperative diversity techniques are applied in physical-layer
authentication in this chapter.
Antenna diversity, also known as space diversity, is an effective means to combat wireless
fading, and raise channel capacity through increasing the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). In the
perspective of device fingerprint, the estimated fingerprint, which consists of physical-layer
characteristics, can be treated as equivalent to the desired signal. Thus, it is straightforward that
this diversity technique can also be used to improve the device fingerprint estimation accuracy
and alleviate the low FNR problem as a benefit. Antenna diversity usually employs different
combining methods as a post processing to recover the desired signals. Typically, there are four
combining methods, the selection combining, threshold combining, maximal-ratio combining
(MRC) and equal-gain combining. For example, using MRC, the obtained fingerprint of every
antenna is multiplied by a specially designed weight. In doing so, the FNR can be maximized
at the combiner outputs.
In a wireless network, the source node usually covers multiple receivers. It is worth men-
tioning that the multiple receivers here can either play the role of relay in cooperative system
or general receivers in the case of conventional transmitter-receiver pairs. Let us take the co-
operative relaying system as an example to illustrate the potential benefit of using cooperative
diversity in physical-layer authentication performance improvement. In a cooperative system,
multiple relays can receive different signal versions. However, the RF-AFE imperfections
contained in these received signals are the same since these signals are emitted by the same
transmitter. This feature facilitates the covered relays in performing authentication using vari-
ous collaborative strategies. Besides, the selected optimal relay usually is experiencing the best
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communication link so that it is more likely having the highest FNR, which is of high value in
solving low FNR problem as well.
This chapter is divided into two parts in order to discuss the device-specific fingerprint-
based physical-layer authentication enhancement using two different diversity techniques.
In the first part, the collaboration of multiple wireless receivers is proposed to authenti-
cate the direct-conversion architecture-based wireless devices. The basic idea is to fully take
advantage of the more powerful processing capability of multiple receivers than only using
one receiver in order to achieve more accurate device-specific fingerprints differentiation per-
formance. Regarding the fingerprint selection, both frequency-dependent (FD) IQI [87] and
frequency-independent (FI) [88] IQI are considered. This is because that as one of the typical
I/Q signal processing architecture based implementations, direct conversion transceiver inher-
ently suffers more from IQI [89, 90]. The IQI feature of direct-conversion transceivers has been
well studied such as in [91, 92, 93, 94]. In practice, the presence of IQI draws wide attention in
most of the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) based wireless communica-
tion systems. This is because the direct conversion architecture is widely used in OFDM sys-
tems to achieve low-cost, low-power and small size, which simultaneously aggravates I/Q mis-
matches. Given the massive utilization of direct-conversion and OFDM techniques in current
wireless transceivers, IQIs are suitable for authenticating such general transceivers. Precisely,
the IQI of a direct-conversion architecture-based transmitter is first estimated by intended re-
ceiver as well as other trusted receivers locating within the effective transmitter’s communica-
tion coverage. Although the processing power of separate wireless node may be limited, the
multiple nodes can gain stronger processing capacity. The distributed and centralized methods
are thereby designed to improve the data process in the authentication procedure.
In the second part, the antenna diversity at the receiver side is considered to increase FNR.
Different from using multiple receivers, the antennas normally do not equip with separate pro-
cessor. Thereby, multiple antennas usually do not benefit the wireless system with significantly
increased processing capacity but the combining diversity. In this authentication scheme, the
maximal ratio combining (MRC) technique, a typical combining diversity, is considered as an
example to recover the desired device fingerprint. The simulation results show higher detection
probability by using our method.
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Figure 6.1: System model with FD and FI Tx IQI.
6.2 Enhanced Physical-Layer Authentication through Col-
laboration of Multiple Receivers
6.2.1 System Model
As shown in Fig.6.1, a direct conversion architecture-based OFDM system with FD and FI Tx
IQI is considered. One input OFDM signal first passes through a general direct conversion ar-
chitecture transmitter, and it is affected by FD and FI IQI in this procedure. Then the distorted
signal arrives at a number of NR receivers through wireless transmission. Finally, the received
signal at each receiver is processed for collaborative authentication. In this system model, Tx
is the current transmitter, while Rx1 is the intended receiver and the other NR − 1 Rxs are
collaborative receivers. A single transmitter single receiver scenario is considered in the afore-
mentioned propagation procedure. Then, this model is extended to multi-receiver collaborative
authentication.
Herein, x(t) = xi(t)+ jxq(t) represents one baseband OFDM signal, where xi(t) and xq(t) de-
note the input signal for I and Q branches, respectively. The impulse responses of LPFs of I and
Q branches are respectively given by hi(t) and hq(t). Therefore, the signal after experiencing
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FD IQI impact can be expressed as
xLPF(t) = xi(t) ⊗ hi(t) + jxq(t) ⊗ hq(t), (6.1)
where ⊗ denotes convolution. In addition, LO introduces gain mismatch α and phase mismatch
θ to xLPF f (t) when xLPF(t) passing through it. The output signal of LO is given by
xLO(t) = <{xLPF(t)} cos(2pi fct)
− ={xLPF(t)}(1 + α) sin(2pi fct + θ), (6.2)
where<{·} and ={·} respectively denote real and imaginary parts of a complex variable.
Based on (6.1) and (6.2), the equivalent discrete baseband expression of xLO can be written
as
xLO[n] =
1
2
((hi[n] + (µ − 1)hq[n]) ⊗ x[n]
+ (hi[n] − (µ − 1)hq[n]) ⊗ x∗[n]), (6.3)
where (·)∗ denotes complex conjugate; µ , 1 + (1 + α)e jθ is a complex parameter representing
the FI IQI. Similar to [22], the sampled analog quantities (e.g. hi) can be represented as vectors
of the length N to satisfy the N-point circular convolution in the discrete models. If the length
is not enough, it is expanded to N with padding zeros.
To further simplify the mathematical expression, a vector  is defined to satisfy hq[n] =
[n]hi[n]. Substituting [n], the expression of (6.3) can be simplified as
xLO[n] = γ[n]hi[n] ⊗ x[n] + (1 − γ[n])hi[n] ⊗ x∗[n], (6.4)
where γ[n] , 12 [1 + [n](µ − 1)] denotes the FD and FI IQI parameter. If I and Q branches are
perfectly balanced that indicating α = 0, θ = 0 and  = [1, 1, · · · , 1], the IQI parameter γ will
reduce to [1, 1, · · · , 1].
Then, the distorted signal is transmitted to receivers through wireless propagation. The
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received signal y can be modeled as
y[n] = xLO[n] ⊗ hc[n] + w[n], (6.5)
where hc[n] is channel impulse response; {w[n]} are modeled as independent and identical
distributed complex additive white Gaussian noises with zero mean and covariance σ2w, which
implies w[n] ∼ CN(0, σ2w).
After receiving signal, the receiver analyzes the received y[n] and estimates the IQI for
authentication. Since this study focuses on exploiting the estimates based authentication algo-
rithms, and IQI estimation techniques have been investigated in depth in many researches such
as [95] and [96], a perfect channel estimation is assumed to simplify the IQI estimation proce-
dure. Also, we consider the training signal and assume receivers have the knowledge of x[n].
This assumption does not weaken our authentication scheme as our scheme is independent of
the content of transmitted signal, but depends on the IQI impact on the transmitted signal. In
other words, this scheme still works even when attackers know the content of transmitted sig-
nals. In addition, it is supposed that the receiver IQI-free for simplicity. It is noteworthy that
different IQIs of multiple receivers can be further considered in the future work to study the
authentication performance difference under different receiving IQIs.
Substituting (6.4) into (6.5) and taking the N-point discrete Fourier transform of both sides
for (6.5), and after some rearrangements, we obtain
F[n](γhi) = Y[n] − Hi[n]F[n](x
∗)Hc[n]
(X[n] − F[n](x∗))Hc[n]
− W[n]
(X[n] − F[n](x∗))Hc[n] , (6.6)
where F (·) denotes discrete Fourier transform, and F[n](·) represents the nth element of F (·).
Also, F[n](x∗) is given by
F[n](x∗) =

X∗1, n = 1
X∗N+2−n, n = 2, 3, · · · ,N
. (6.7)
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In addition, Y , Hi, X, F (x∗), Hc and W denote the discrete Fourier transform of corresponding
y, hi, x, x∗, hc and w, respectively.
Then the N-point inverse discrete Fourier transformation of (6.6) is conducted to recover
γhi, and the result can be expressed as
β¯ = β + w¯, (6.8)
where β¯[n] = F −1[n]
(
Y−HiF (x∗)Hc
(X−F (x∗))Hc
)
is estimated value of Tx IQI at receiver, β[n] = γ[n]hi[n] repre-
sents its actual value, and w¯[n] = F −1[n]
(
W
(X−F (x∗))Hc
)
is random Gaussian variable. Here, F −1(·)
represents the inverse discrete Fourier transform. For further analysis, the vector expressions
of β¯, β and w¯ are given by
β¯ = [β¯[1], β¯[2], · · · , β¯[N1], · · · , β¯[N]]
β = [β[1], β[2], · · · , β[N1], 0, 0, · · · , 0]
w¯ = [w¯[1], w¯[2], · · · , w¯[N1], · · · , w¯[N]]
Given that only the first N1 elements in β are not zeros as well as <{β[n]} = 12 [1 + [n](1 +
α) cos θ]hi[n] does not lose any information of IQI, only the real parts of the first N1 elements
of β¯ are taken into consideration in the following, which produces a vector as
B = [<{β¯[1]},<{β¯[2]}, · · · ,<{β¯[N1]}]. (6.9)
In this case, B[k](k = 1, 2, · · · ,N1) follows Gaussian distribution, which is expressed as B[k] ∼
N(µ[k], σ2). Here, µ[k] = <{β[k]} and σ2 = 12N
∑N
n=1 C
2[n]σ2w where C[n] = F −1[n]
(
1
(X−F (x∗))Hc
)
.
The coefficient N in σ2 is introduced by the inverse discrete Fourier transformation.
In the following, the analysis is extended with considering the scenario of multiple re-
ceivers. Considering the estimates of NR receivers are affected by different hc and w, the es-
timated IQIs at NR receivers are distinct. Based on this, the offsets at the lth receiver can be
obtained by computing the subtractions as
∆Bl[k] = Bl[k] − B′[k], (6.10)
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where Bl represents the estimated B at the lth receiver, and B′ is the B of one validated trans-
mitter. Every receiver has stored the same B′. Now a NR × N1 offset matrix ∆B can be defined
by setting each row of it as ∆Bl, which is given by
∆B =

∆B11 · · · ∆B1N1
∆B21 · · · ∆B2N1
...
. . .
...
∆BNR1 · · · ∆BNRN1

. (6.11)
In (6.11), ∆Blk indicates the kth element in ∆Bl. Based on the aforementioned results, {∆Blk}
are Gaussian random variables with distribution N(µk, σ2l ), where µk = µ[k] − B′[k] and σ2l
denotes σ2 of the lth receiver. It is apparent that µk is only related to the offsets between the
actual IQI of current transmitter and the stored IQI of the validated transmitter. As a result, the
binary hypothesis testing can be modeled as

H0 : µk = 0
H1 : µk , 0
. (6.12)
If the current transmitter is the validated one, their device fingerprints should be exactly the
same, therefore it is H0 and µk = 0. Otherwise, the current transmitter is an attacker, their
fingerprints must be different. In this case,H1 is claimed.
6.2.2 Collaborative Authentication using Distributed and Centralized Meth-
ods
In this subsection, the authentication methods are introduced to decide whether H0 or H1 is
correct by analyzing ∆B. The challenge of this procedure is that µk is corrupted by the zero-
mean Gaussian noise, and thereby it is not directly available at the receiver in practice. This
situation will dramatically degenerate the authentication performance. To achieve satisfactory
authentication accuracy, two multi-receiver collaborative authentication methods are proposed.
It is noteworthy that our authentication scheme still works with only one receiver (Rx1) by
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setting NR = 1.
Distributed Method
In this authentication method, all NR receivers first separately makes a decision about
whether or not the current transmitter is the validated one based on their own estimated Tx
IQI information. After that, the intended receiver, Rx1, can make the final decision by com-
bining all of NR decisions.
∆Blk is first normalized by dividing σl to acquire Alk = ∆Blkσl ∼ N(
µk
σl
, 1). Then the offset
matrix in this method becomes
A =

A11 · · · A1N1
A21 · · · A2N1
...
. . .
...
ANR1 · · · ANRN1

. (6.13)
At the l-th receiver, the data are processed as
S l =
N1∑
k=1
A2lk. (6.14)
Under H0, S l follows central chi-squared distribution with N1 degrees of freedom, which can
be represented as S l ∼ χ2N1 . While under H1, S l follows non-central chi-squared distribution
with N1 degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ =
∑N1
k=1(
µk
σl
)2, which can be denoted
as S l ∼ χ2N1(λ).
At the lth receiver, the authentication procedure is performed by comparing the metric S l
with a false alarm rate dependent threshold Tl. To be specific, if S l is less than Tl, H0 is
decided; otherwise, H1 is claimed. Under H0, the probability density function (PDF) of S l is
given by
pH0(S l) =
S
N1−2
2
l e
− 12 S l
2
N1
2 Γ( N12 )
, (6.15)
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where Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
ux−1e−udu is the Gamma function. The PDF of S l underH1 is given by
pH1(S l) =
1
2
(S l
λ
) N1−2
4
e−
1
2 (S l+λ)I N1−2
2
(
√
λS l), (6.16)
where Ir(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and order r. It has the series repre-
sentation defined as
Ir(x) =
∞∑
i=0
(
x
2
)2i+r
i!Γ(r + i + 1)
. (6.17)
Based on (6.14) and (6.15), the false alarm rate of the lth receiver, can be computed by
PFAl = P{S l > Tl|H0}
=
∫ +∞
Tl
pH0(S l)dS l = Qχ2N1
(Tl), (6.18)
where Qχ2N1
(·) is right-tail probability for a χ2N1 random variable, and it has different mathemat-
ical expression depending on the parity of N1. For an odd N1, it has the expression as
Qχ2N1
(Tl) =

2Q(
√
Tl) N1 = 1
2Q(
√
Tl) + e
− Tl2√
pi
N1−1
2∑
i=1
(i−1)!(2Tl)i−
1
2
(2i−1)! N1> 3
(6.19)
and for an even N1, it is given by
Qχ2N1
(Tl) = e−
Tl
2
N1
2 −1∑
i=0
T il
2ii!
. (6.20)
In (6.19), Q(·) denotes the Q-function, which is defined as
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
1√
2pi
e−
1
2 u
2
du. (6.21)
In practical implementation, T can be determined by inverting (6.18) to achieve a specified
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false alarm rate as
Tl = Q−1χ2N1
(PFAl). (6.22)
Using the threshold Tl, the lth receiver is able to make its own decision about either to claim
H0 orH1. Also, the detection rate of the lth receiver can be calculated as
PDl = P{S l > Tl|H1} =
∫ +∞
Tl
pH1(S l)dS l. (6.23)
Then, Rx1 should combine all of these decisions and make the final decision. To enhance
the detection capability, a stringent decision rule is chosen in this distributed method. To be
precise, Rx1 considers the current Tx is legitimate only under the condition of no collaborative
receiver claimsH1. Accordingly, the final effective false alarm rate becomes
PEFA = 1 −
NR∏
l=1
(1 − PFAl). (6.24)
Similarly, the final effective detection rate can be calculated by
PED = 1 −
NR∏
l=1
(1 − PDl). (6.25)
Centralized Method
Besides the distributed method, another centralized data processing authentication method
is proposed. In this centralized method, Rx1 first collects the estimated IQIs from other NR − 1
receivers to obtain ∆B, then authenticates the current transmitter based on ∆B. In brief, all data
processing and decision are made by Rx1 instead of a total number of NR receivers.
After obtaining ∆B, Rx1 processes data as
S l =
1
N1
N1∑
k=1
∆Blk. (6.26)
UnderH0, S l ∼ N(0, σ2S l) with PDF pH0(S l); while underH1, S l ∼ N(A, σ2S l) with PDF pH1(S l).
Here, A = 1N1
∑N1
k=1 µk is a constant, and σ
2
S l
=
σ2l
N1
.
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To maximize the detection rate underH1, Neyman-Pearson test is performed as
NR∏
l=1
pH1(S l)
NR∏
l=1
pH0(S l)
> T, (6.27)
which produces
1
NR
NR∑
l=1
S l
σ2S l
>
ln T
NRA
+
A
2NR
NR∑
l=1
1
σ2S l
= T ′+ > 0, A > 0
1
NR
NR∑
l=1
S l
σ2S l
<
ln T
NRA
+
A
2NR
NR∑
l=1
1
σ2S l
= T ′− < 0, A < 0. (6.28)
Since T ′+ = −T ′−, (6.28) can be simplified as
|D| > T ′+, (6.29)
where D = 1NR
∑NR
l=1
S l
σ2S l
. In this case, D ∼ N(0, 1N2R
∑NR
l=1
1
σ2S l
) with PDF pH0(D) under H0; while
D ∼ N( ANR
∑NR
l=1
1
σ2S l
, 1N2R
∑NR
l=1
1
σ2S l
) with PDF pH1(D) under H1. As a result, the authentication
procedure becomes a comparison between the metric |D| and threshold T ′+. More specifically,
if |D| > T ′+ is satisfied, H1 will be decided; otherwise, H0 will be decided. Based on this
decision rule, the false alarm rate can be computed by
PFA = P{|D| > T ′+|H0}
=
∫ +∞
T ′+
pH0(D)dD +
∫ T ′−
−∞
pH0(D)dD
= 2Q

NRT ′+√∑NR
l=1
1
σ2S l
 (6.30)
Based on (6.30), threshold T ′+ can be determined according to a specified PFA as
T ′+ =
1
NR
√
NR∑
l=1
1
σ2S l
Q−1
(PFA
2
)
, (6.31)
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where Q−1(·) denotes the inverse Q-function. In comparison with the threshold obtained in
(6.22), T ′+ is an adaptive threshold as it depends on NR and σS l as well. With this adaptive T
′
+,
the detection rate PD can be calculated by
PD = P{|D| > T ′+|H1}
=
∫ +∞
T ′+
pH1(D)dD +
∫ T ′−
−∞
pH1(D)dD
= Q
Q−1 (PFA2
)
−
√
A2
NR∑
l=1
1
σ2S l

+ Q
Q−1 (PFA2
)
+
√
A2
NR∑
l=1
1
σ2S l
 . (6.32)
It is noteworthy that the specified PFA is final effective false alarm rate, and PD is final effective
detection rate in this centralized method, which indicates PEFA = PFA and PED = PD.
6.2.3 Simulation Results
The performance of proposed authentication schemes are evaluated. An OFDM system is con-
sidered, in which the number of sub-carriers is 256, the length of cyclic prefix is 32, and the
modulation is 4-QAM. Also, the Rayleigh fading channel is employed. For the IQI, simulation
setups similar to [22] are considered, in which (α, θ, , hi) = (0.244, 5◦, [1, 1, 20], [0.01, 1, 0.01]).
In our simulation, the validated transmitter is set to own the IQI parameter as (α, θ, , hi)H0 =
(0.05, 1◦, [1, 1, 20], [0.01, 1, 0.01]). As mentioned earlier, this parameter is stored in NR re-
ceivers as validated device fingerprint. Under H0, the current transmitter is set to own exactly
the same IQI parameter with the validated transmitter; while underH1, the current transmitter
is assigned to have IQI parameter as (α, θ, , hi)H1 = (−0.05, 3◦, [0.9, 0.9, 18], [0.0095, 0.98, 0.0098]).
As shown, the validated and current transmitter are intentionally set to have close IQI parame-
ters in order to increase the challenge of authentication. (α, θ, , hi)H0 and (α, θ, , hi)H1 are used
to evaluate PEFA and PED, respectively, by comparing them with the validated IQI parameter.
Fig.6.2 presents the threshold versus false alarm rate for two methods, and compares the
simulated PED and PEFA with corresponding analytical values. In this figure, PFA denotes PFAl
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and threshold refers to Tl in the distributed method. Furthermore, PFAl are set to be the same
under different l. It is shown that the thresholds of two methods from (6.22) and (6.31) are
decreasing with the growth of PFA, which also results in the increase trends of PED and PEFA.
Fig.6.3 assesses the PEFA of two proposed authentication methods in terms of SNR. In dis-
tributed method, PEFA increases with the growth of PFA and NR. As shown, PEFA is independent
of NR in centralized method. In addition, PEFA of both methods are independent of the SNR,
which approximately shows steady horizontal lines in this figure.
Moreover, the PED vs. PFA and PED vs. SNR are simulated to present the detection capabil-
ity enhancement of our authentication scheme in Fig.6.4 and Fig.6.5, respectively. As it can be
seen, PED of both two methods increase with NR varies from 1 to 5. It means the authentication
performance is effectively enhanced by collaborative receivers. Additionally, Fig.6.5 shows
that the PED of centralized method exceeds the PED of distributed method when NR > 1. It
is due to the fact that the collaboration of receivers leads to more enhancement in centralized
method than the distributed method with the growth of NR.
To evaluate the detection capability of our authentication scheme, a ratio parameter is de-
fined as Rk = 10 log10
(∣∣∣∣ µkB′[k] ∣∣∣∣) dB, k = 1, 2, · · · ,N1. In fact, Rk shows the minor IQI differences
between current and validated transmitters. In Fig.6.6, the PED under different Rk is given, and
the values of Rk are set to be the same under different k. As it can be observed, our scheme is
able to show a satisfactory authentication performance even under the small value of Rk.
Simulation results demonstrate that with the assistance of the additional collaborative re-
ceivers, the detection capabilities of both methods are dramatically enhanced. However, the
disadvantage of the distributed method is that the PEFA also increases in the meanwhile. On the
contrary, the PEFA of the centralized method is totally independent of the number of collabo-
rative receivers. In practice, the centralized method requires more processing and computing
capabilities of Rx1. It is because Rx1 should process all estimated IQI data itself in the cen-
tralized method, but this procedure is implemented by multiple collaborative receivers in the
distributed method. In addition, our simulation only considers one validated transmitter. It is
easy to extent it to multiple validated transmitters by storing more validated device fingerprints
in receivers.
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Figure 6.2: Threshold, PEFD and PEFA under SNR = 14 dB and NR = 8. DM = Distributed
Method, CM = Centralized Method.
6.3 Enhanced Physical-Layer Authentication through Com-
bining Diversity
6.3.1 Device Fingerprint Estimation using MRC
In wireless communications, the channel fading and noise corruption are inevitable, and unfor-
tunately this can result in worse effect on the RF-AFE imperfection-based device fingerprint
estimation. Antenna diversity can be used to overcome this problem. Specifically, we propose
adopting maximal-ratio combining, which is one the most commonly used combining diversity,
to increase the FNR and further improve the fingerprint estimation accuracy.
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Figure 6.3: PEFA vs. SNR under different PFA and NR.
Fig.6.7 shows the physical-layer authentication model using MRC technique. In this model,
a receiver equipping with a number of M antennas is considered. The spatial distance between
these antennas are assumed to be large enough to guarantee that each antenna is experiencing
independent channel, i.e., no correlations between channels are taken into the consideration.
Each antenna can receive the signals sent by a transmitter, which is also the authentication
target. It is noteworthy that all received signals can be tagged with the identical device-specific
fingerprint due to the stability of hardware level RF-AFE imperfections. The initial device
fingerprint for each antenna, li, is first estimated according to the specific fingerprint generation
schemes such as proposed in previous chapters. The MRC is then utilized to process all l
to obtain one metric, f , with maximized FNR. This f is then used in the following process
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Figure 6.4: PED vs. PFA under SNR = 18 dB and NR = 1, 3, 5.
components for transmitter authentication.
At the kth antenna, we define the obtained lk as
lk = fhk + nk, (6.33)
where f denotes the desired device-specific device fingerprint, hk is the wireless channel related
gain and nk denotes the noise with variance σ2r in this estimate.
Similar to SNR, the corresponding FNR at the kth antenna can be defined as
γF,k =
||hkf||2
||nk||2 =
P f |hk|2
σ2r
, (6.34)
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Figure 6.5: PED vs. SNR under PFA = 0.01 and NR = 1, 3, 5.
where P f denotes the average power of f.
In the MRC processing component, as depicted in Fig.6.7, each estimated lk is multiplied
by a weight w∗k. After that, all of the weighted signals are added together to obtain the output
of the combiner, which can be given by
M∑
k=1
w∗klk = f
M∑
k=1
w∗khk +
M∑
k=1
w∗knk. (6.35)
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Figure 6.6: PED vs. SNR under Rk = −13, -10, -7dB, NR = 5 and PFA = 0.01.
Using (6.34) and (6.35), the FNR of the combiner’s output can be computed as
γ3 =
P f |∑Mk=1 w∗khk|2
σ2r
∑M
k=1 |w∗k|2
. (6.36)
Based on Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, γ3 can reach to the maximal value when
wk = hk. (6.37)
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Figure 6.7: Authentication model using MRC technique.
Substituting for wk = hk in (6.36), γ3 can be maximized as
γ3 6
P f (
∑M
k=1 h
∗
khk)
2
σ2r (
∑M
k=1 h
∗
khk)
=
P f
∑M
k=1 |hk|2
σ2r
=
M∑
k=1
γF,k. (6.38)
From the result of (6.38), it can be seen that the value of γ3 can maximally reach to∑M
k=1 γF,k. This means that, using MRC, the FNR can increase to the sum of FNRs corre-
sponding to all M antennas. Substituting (6.37) in (6.35), the outputs of the combiner with
maximized FNR can be given by
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fMRC = f
M∑
k=1
|hk|2 +
M∑
k=1
h∗knk. (6.39)
After obtaining fMRC, the MRC improved device fingerprint is applied to the hypothesis
testing model for fingerprint differentiation.
For representation simplicity, (6.39) is rewritten as
fMRC = c + nc + j(d + nd), (6.40)
where c + jd = f
∑M
k=1 |hk|2, nc + jnd =
∑M
k=1 h
∗
knk.
A validated fingerprint set [fv,1 fv,2 · · · fv,p]T is assumed in which the ith element can be
expressed as fv,i = cv,i + jdv,i. Then, the offset between fMRC and fv,i can be calculated as
∆f = fMRC − fv,i = ∆c + nc + j(∆d + nd)
= ∆fI + j∆fQ, (6.41)
where ∆c = c − cv,i and ∆d = d − dv,i.
Therefore, a hypothesis testing can be modeled based on (6.41) as

H0 : ||∆c|| = ||∆d|| = 0
H1 : ||∆c|| + ||∆d|| , 0
, (6.42)
whereH0 andH1, respectively, represent that the fingerprints fMRC and fv,i belong to the same
transmitter or not. More specifically, different wireless transmitter must generate some differ-
ence in offsets, ∆f, implying that at least one of ∆c and ∆d are non-zero underH1.
From (6.41), it can be seen that, within the time of authentication, ∆ fI,i and ∆ fQ,i fol-
low the identical distribution N(0, σ2) under hypothesis H0, where σ2 =
∑M
k=1 |hk |2σ2r
2 ; while,
∆ fI,i ∼ N(∆ci, σ2) and ∆ fQ,i ∼ N(∆di, σ2) underH1. Consequently, we are able to separate the
fingerprint into two parts and make use of them to build the two-parameter hypothesis testing.
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6.3.2 Authentication Methods
Regarding the authentication processing, we consider applying the method used in Chapter
3 and briefly present the main results. GLRT is used to deal with the hypothesis decision
problem. First, three 2N × 1 vectors are composed as
a = [∆ fI,1 ∆ fQ,1 ∆ fI,2 ∆ fQ,2 · · · ∆ fI,N ∆ fQ,N]T
b = [∆c1 ∆d1 ∆c2 ∆d2 · · ·∆cN ∆dN]T
w = [nc,1 nd,1 nc,2 nd,2 · · · nc,N nd,N]T.
Accordingly, we can obtain
a = b + w. (6.43)
In this case, the hypothesis testing model is equivalent to

H0 : b = 0
H1 : b , 0
. (6.44)
The the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of b is used to perform the likelihood ratio
test as
G(a; bˆ) =
p(a; bˆH1)
p(a; bˆH0)
> T, (6.45)
where bˆH0 and bˆH1 denote the MLE of b underH0 andH1, respectively.
After taking the logarithm of both sides of (6.45) and multiply the result by 2, the likelihood
ratio test becomes
2 ln G(a; bˆ) =
aTa
σ2
> 2 ln T = Th. (6.46)
Given that the sum of squares of normal random variables follows different chi-squared
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distributions, it can be concluded that
zh =
aTa
σ2
∼

χ22N , under H0
χ22N(ρ), under H1
, (6.47)
where χ22N is the central chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom; while χ
2
2N(ρ)
denotes the non-central chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom and non-centrality
parameter ρ which is defined as
ρ =
bTH1bH1
σ2
.
The false alarm rate can be calculated as
PFA = P{zh > Th|H0}
=
∫ +∞
Th
zN−1h e
− 12 zh
2NΓ(N)
dzh = Qχ2N (Th), (6.48)
where Qχ22N (·) can be expressed as
Qχ22N (Th) = e
− Th2
N−1∑
i=0
(Th
2
)i 1
i!
. (6.49)
In practice, Th is obtained by solving (6.49) according to the required PFA as Th = Q−1χ22N
(PFA).
Eventually, we are able to compute PD analytically as
PD =
∫ +∞
Th
1
2
(
zh
ρ
)
N−1
2 e−
1
2 (zh+ρ)IN−1(
√
zhρ)dzh. (6.50)
Accordingly, the probability of miss detection can be calculated as
PMD = 1 − PD. (6.51)
6.3.3 Simulation Results
This physical-layer authentication system is simulated using our combining diversity enhance-
ment technique. Regarding the device-specific fingerprint, IQI is still selected in this simula-
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Figure 6.8: Detection probability comparison between non-MRC and MRC with different M.
tion. It is noteworthy that only FI IQI of the transmitter is considered. The amplitude and phase
imbalances are randomly chosen from −0.05 ∼ 0.05 and −5o ∼ 5o, respectively. Different M is
assumed in the receiver in order to compare the detection probability of using different number
of antennas. Fig. 6.8 shows the detection probability enhancement using the proposed authen-
tication system. It can be seen that the detection probabilities of using MRC (dash line) are
significantly increased compared with the probability without using MRC (solid line). Besides,
the curve of 10 antennas is higher than the curve of 5 antennas as expected. This implies that
more diversity gain can be obtained by using more antennas since higher FNR is achieved as
shown in (6.38).
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, diversity techniques are exploited for the sake of improving physical-layer au-
thentication performance. Specifically, the cooperative diversity and space diversity are applied
in the authentication system design. For the former one, the collaboration of multiple receivers
is proposed to increase the FNR. In this scheme, the estimated FI and FD IQI of one transmit-
ter is compared with validated device fingerprints by using a binary hypothesis testing. Also,
the distributed and centralized authentication methods are proposed to perform this hypoth-
esis testing. Since the data processing capability is enhanced by involving multiple receiver
in authentication procedure, the authentication accuracy is improved. On the other hand, the
commonly used MRC technique is considered at the receiver side to increase the FNR. It is
proved that the FNR under more antennas can achieve higher value, which can significantly
enlarge the detection probability.
The works of this chapter can be partially found in my published papers [27]
Chapter 7
Cross-Layer Authentication Design in
Wireless Networks
7.1 Introduction
Physical-layer authentication is emerging as indispensably complementary security technique
to guarantee the authenticity of wireless devices. Conventionally, wireless authentication is
handled above the physical-layer using key-based cryptography. Although the effectiveness
of authentication techniques using pairwise key confirmation has been proven, such as shown
in cryptosystem, its implementation in dynamic wireless communication networks still suffers
from many problems in key management. The safe and timely symmetric key sharing in highly
standardized networks comprised of a large number of mobile and heterogeneous devices is a
challenging task. The high computational cost of asymmetric key algorithms generally results
in severe latency in large-scale networks which may become intolerable for delay-sensitive
communications. More importantly, it is still mathematically unproven that to crack the digital
key is computationally infeasible by any devices [3]. In practice, equipping with more powerful
processor, the devices are able to crack a digital security key in a shortened time, for example
using exhaustive-search attack. However, such attacks are extremely hard to be detected mainly
due to the fact that user identifications and access rights in wireless networks are approved to
any devices who possess the digital keys including attackers.
Contrary to upper-layer security schemes, wireless transmitters can also be identified at
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physical-layer by verifying the unique characteristics of physical communication links and
devices, i.e., physical-layer authentication. Compared to digital key based authentication, the
possession of specific physical-layer characteristics is directly associated with the communicat-
ing devices and the corresponding environment, which are extremely difficult to impersonate.
Specifically, the channel between the legitimate transmitter and receiver is only determined
by the signal propagation environment between them. The RF-AFE imperfection is a kind
of inherent hardware feature, which differs from device to device. Since the communication
channel and device can automatically distort transmitted signals, these physical layer attributes,
which represents the identity of the current transmitter, are readily available at the receiver side
for transmitter authentication. Also, the channel and device imperfection estimation and com-
pensation techniques are basic functions of most present communications receivers. Benefited
from this, physical-layer authentication can be accomplished at the receiver without introduc-
ing additional security related interaction overhead or throughput reduction to the communica-
tion link.
Although physical-layer authentication draws extensive research efforts, it is still far from
practical deployment and application due to several challenges. Firstly, the integration of
physical-layer authentication techniques with existing upper-layer authentication protocols and
standard wireless infrastructure is one significant obstacle of applying such new authentication
techniques. Secondly, the fast emerging 5th generation (5G) related techniques, such as the
novel millimeter wave (mmWave) transmission, massive deployed small cells and vast hetero-
geneous devices, are potentially pose urgent technical problems to current physical-layer au-
thentication schemes. Therefore, it is important to explore cross-layer authentication method
with full consideration of these challenges.
This chapter is motivated to investigate cross-layer authentication for the future wireless
communications. To achieve this goal, we first identify the detailed technical challenges of
cross-layer assisted authentication design and 5G communications. Then, two promising di-
rections to overcome these challenges are proposed. Specifically, the inherent physical-layer
characteristics are explored for securing encryption key. This key is also used to extend the au-
thentication from device-to-device case to end-to-end case, which is the common requirement
in a communication network. In doing so, the physical-layer authentication can be effectively
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integrated with existing cryptography-based infrastructures and protocols. In addition, the au-
thentication procedure in 5G heterogeneous network is simplified and enhanced by prediction,
pre-sharing and reuse of the physical layer security context.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, the problems of cross-layer
authentication implementation are described, in which the seamless integration and complexity
reduction are mainly considered. In Section 7.3, the proposed solutions to the two problems
are given. In Section 7.4, the proposed methods are applied into specific case studies in order
to evaluate the cross-layer authentication performance. Finally, this chapter is summarized in
Section 7.5.
7.2 Problem Formulation
7.2.1 Integration with Existing Cryptographic Infrastructures and Pro-
tocols
Nowadays, a considerable portion of existing communication infrastructures are dealing with
the authentication above physical-layer. Since the significant advantages of physical-layer au-
thentication, it is well-accepted that physical-layer authentication can work as an important
complement to improve the cryptographic approaches.
In cryptographic system, the encryption algorithm and key distribution (e.g., Diffe-Helman
key exchange protocol) are usually used to guarantee these systems are computationally infea-
sible to break. Nonetheless, this authentication is always accomplished at the expense of rising
the computational load and communication delay in wireless systems. Since physical-layer
process is inherently faster and some existing physical-layer characteristics are device-specific,
the physical-layer technique is expected to be used in the cross-layer authentication design in
order to alleviate problems such as delay and high computational load of using cryptography.
However, in practical cross-layer authentication implementations, one of the most chal-
lenging tasks is to integrate the physical-layer authentication with existing infrastructures and
protocols without occurring conflicts. In [18], the authors mentioned a general framework of
cross-layer authentication as the future work of their research. Some of the proposed cross-
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layer schemes are based on quantizing the unique physical-layer characteristics to generate a
digital signature and forwarding this signature to the upper-layer for match-up verification such
as used in [23]. Although the authentication is realized at upper-layer, the principle of this kind
of methods and cryptography are divergent so that using it in a cryptosystem will pose addi-
tional cost and be likely to produce serious errors. In addition, since this signature is no longer
associated with the physical devices, it has no difference from using regularly random numbers
so that it no superior to traditional authentication methods. Thus, the seamless integration with
authentication performance enhancement is highly demanded.
Another potential obstacle of the practical integration development is the end-to-end au-
thentication extension. In large-scale wireless networks, the authentication and key exchange
are always demanded devices who are not directly linked. But most of the current physical-
layer authentications are confined to device-to-device authentication as they rely on the char-
acteristics obtained from the direct communication links between the transmitter and receiver.
We here take the authentication technique using channel reciprocity as an example. Due to
the fast variation, the channel randomness is only temporally available in a specific pair of
transmitter and receiver who are currently experiencing this channel. Also, it is extremely dif-
ficult to timely share the fast varying channel information in a vast network. As a result, this
method is hard to be used in network-wide end-to-end authentication. The crux of accomplish-
ing cross-layer end-to-end authentication is first finding proper physical-layer identities, i.e.,
shared secret. It is also valuable to find some proper means for upper-layers to extract and
process the unique physical-layer identities to ensure that these processed physical-layer infor-
mation can be used in existing cryptographic schemes. In doing so, the authentication process
is not restricted at physical-layers of two direct communicating devices but could be extended
to end-to-end authentication with efficient routing and management techniques.
As a summary, two key issues should be ponded to achieve effective integration. Firstly,
the physical-layer characteristics selection. Since the upper-layer process as well as end-to-end
communication are involved, the time of authentication procedure may be prolonged. Thus, the
stable characteristics which at least keep invariant during the authentication procedure should
be exploited. Secondly, the way of processing these selected characteristics is another critical
concern. For example, the symmetric/asymmetric key generation algorithms using physical-
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layer characteristics can be two options.
7.2.2 Increasing Authentication Complexity in Complicated Heteroge-
neous Networks
It is unquestionable that the communication is going forward to 5G phase. Along with exten-
sive 5G technique revolutions, the communication environment is inevitably becoming more
complicated. Specifically, the networks of 5G will become more heterogeneous since more
diverse types of devices are expected to be served. Another feature of 5G is that the global mo-
bile data traffic will experience a time of explosive growth from 2.5 exabytes/month of 2014 to
24.3 exabytes/month of 2019 as predicted in [97]. To meet the demand of the explosive growth
of mobile data traffic, the mmWave transmission and ultra-densification techniques will be a
natural choice. As a result, massive smaller cells consisting of femtocells and picocells will be
employed. It is predictable that many timely challenges will emerge.
In 5G, some functions of layers may be redefined, e.g., the handoffs may not exist in layer
3 anymore [51]. Hence, to correctly determine the authenticity of various devices operating
in diverse upper-layer protocols will be more difficult. Since physical-layer is essential to
any devices, it is vital to consider more robust and compatible physical-layer authentication
schemes with ever less dependence on particular protocols.
As the cell size is shrinking as well as the number of cells is increasing, the users, es-
pecially mobile users, have to oftentimes transfer from different BS/AP covered cells, which
results in frequent authentication handover processes in such complex cellular networks. The
authentication handover is traditionally based on specially designed cryptographic key and
multiple handshakes such as proposed by 3GPP committee in [98]. To transfer the context,
the handover has to involve multiple entities including users, APs, BSs and servers. Also, the
backhaul processing and multiple handshakes for information or pairwise key exchanges be-
tween these entities are generally required. Moreover, additional encryption should be applied
to insure that the important exchange is not leaked to unauthorized eavesdroppers. In practice,
all of them contribute to the unwelcome latency. It is reported that this procedure takes up to
hundreds of milliseconds which goes beyond the tolerance of 5G services [99].
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In brief, these new authentication related problems are primarily resulted from the gradually
complex communication conditions of 5G. It is believed that making use of the physical-layer
characteristics can become the key point to simplify the authentication procedures in the future.
7.3 Proposed Solutions
7.3.1 Seamless Integration with Existing Protocols using Physical-Layer
Security Key
This subsection aims at addressing the problems in seamless integration of the physical-layer
and existing upper-layer authentication schemes. It is assumed that the Device B needs to
authenticate the claimed identity of Device A, while Device A and B are in end-to-end com-
munication scenario as shown in Fig.7.1. Device C, which can be an access point in practice, is
a trusted third party of Device B that shares the direct link with A. For explanation convenience,
the open systems interconnection (OSI) layer model is illustrated in this figure.
The physical layer of our design, which is at the bottom of the OSI protocol stack, plays the
critical role of providing characteristics including IQI, CFO, and even antenna-specific charac-
teristics to the upper layers. According to existing security protocols, the data link layer authen-
tication and network layer authentication are based on the medium access control (MAC) and
Internet protocol (IP) addresses verification with corresponding encryption transformation, re-
spectively; the transport layer authentication relies on the transport layer security (TLS) adopt-
ing cryptography such as message authentication code; the most user-defined programmable
authentication applications can be implemented at the application layer.
The proposed authentication framework is summarized as follows. As a benefit of direct
communication with Device A, Device C becomes capable of evaluating physical-layer char-
acteristics of A. Therefore, the Device A-specific characteristics, such as its IQI and CFO,
can be quantized and hashed at Device C for generating specific digital numbers, which are
suitable for further upper-layer authentication-related processing. Specifically, these physical-
layer characteristic-related numbers of Device A can then be used to generate an asymmetric
key for authentication purpose. It is worth noting that security key generation exploiting the
138 Chapter 7. Cross-Layer Authentication Design in Wireless Networks
Physical layer
(IQI, CFO etc.)
Network layer
(Routing)
Transport layer
(end‐to‐end)
Data link layer
(MAC, point‐to‐point)
Application layer
(authentication algorithm)
.
.
.
Authentication and 
Control Data Flow
Device C Device B
Device A
PH
Y C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s E
xt
ra
ct
io
n
OSI Model
Physical layer
(IQI, CFO etc.)
Network layer
(Routing)
Transport layer
(end‐to‐end)
Data link layer
(MAC, point‐to‐point)
Application layer
(authentication algorithm)
.
.
.
OSI Model
Figure 7.1: Cross-layer design for end-to-end authentication.
hardware-imperfection related attributes are usually more stable than those gleaned from the
wireless channels such as argued in [100]. However, the physical-layer characteristics pro-
cessing techniques - including both the quantization and key reconciliation exploited in these
studies can also be considered for enhancing the performance of our authentication technique.
These numbers related to Device A can be used as part of the initial input of a function for
obtaining the existing public-key by Device C. Please note that, in this step, we can con-
struct a unique mapping relation between these physical-layer characteristics-based numbers
and public-key. Also, this mapping relation can be publicly known by any devices. The public-
key can be shared with B with the aid of existing encryption algorithms, while the associated
private key is only stored in Device A without being shared with any other devices. Basically,
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Device A uses its private key to encrypt a plaintext and generate the corresponding ciphertext.
Device B attempts to decrypt the ciphertext using the public key, while the authenticity of A
is verified only if B is capable of decrypting readable digest, since only A owns the private
key. We refer to this method as PHY-key for simplicity. Regarding the PHY-key generation,
the physical-layer characteristics can be further combined with existing security key gener-
ation mechanisms for the sake of producing a composite security key, which is capable of
significantly enhancing the level of wireless security by the introduction of both situation- and
device-dependent factors into the key generation process.
There are two main benefits of using the PHY-key. On the one hand, the proposed method
could be more efficient. Existing approaches, which directly use these physical-layer charac-
teristics as an authentication tag, will pose additional payload at each layer’s data encapsulation
and cost additional bandwidth and power in delivering them to Device B. Comparatively, us-
ing these characteristics as securing key can eliminate this overhead. On the other hand, the
robustness of authentication process is enhanced. Similar to the two-factor authentication strat-
egy in which the physical possession factor and virtual password factor are checked together
as a double insurance, the PHY-key are also secured by the intrinsically unforgeable feature of
physical-layer characteristics and the computational intractability of asymmetric encryptions.
In practice, sophisticated attacker always tries repeatedly to seek for the correct digital key,
i.e., using exhaustive/brute-force search attack. However, seeking the key through frequent
variation of physical-layer attributes, especially the stable hardware features, is extremely hard
in practice. It is worth noting that the PHY-key based authentication could consume more time
than typical physical-layer authentication since the encryption processing is inherently more
time-consuming than solely physical-layer processing. However, with the utilization of PHY-
key, the authentication time in handover procedure can be reduced. The details are summarized
in the following subsection.
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7.3.2 Authentication Procedure Simplification using Physical-Layer Se-
curity Information
In this subsection, we focus on simplifying the authentication complexity in the cellular com-
munications. As illustrated in Fig.7.2, it is assumed that a user is moving between cells. To
obtain the communication access and be served in the next cell, the user authentication should
be first performed again which takes too much time if the handover is very frequent. We here
propose the prediction, reuse and pre-sharing of the physical-layer characteristics to simplify
this procedure.
While the communication environment is time-varying, the variation trend of physical-
layer attributes such as direction of arrival (DOA), RSS, packet round-trip time (RTT) and CSI
can be predicted based on their previous observations. This feature is able to play an important
role in simplifying authentication preparation session. For example, with the predicted DOA,
the authentication-oriented beams of BS or AP can accurately point to the antenna array of the
intended user, which actively prevents the impersonation attacker from the highly directional
communication link between the user and BS/AP. Besides, these attributes can also be used
to monitor and track the real-time moving direction and position of the user. The next cell
that the user will enter can be consequently predicted. The authentication server thereby is
able to prepare the authentication related information (e.g., the PHY-key information) and send
them to the serving AP of the next cell in advance. Once the user enters the new cell, the
authentication and association request can be responded immediately by the serving AP.
Although the communication environment complexity is rising, more device-specific phys-
ical characteristics are meanwhile conceived, and many of them remain stable and/or pre-
dictable. Moreover, the authentication handover may not happen in a completely new context,
implying many of the already known information of the stable and/or predictable characteris-
tics can be reused. For example, the PHY-key has high potential to work as an unforgeable key
because we involved the physical-layer factor into the key generation. In this case, some repet-
itive steps such as the frequently repeated pairwise key generation in the solely cryptographic
authentication schemes may be reduced. Since PHY-key is also featured as unforgeable, the
traditional key exchange protections using multiple handshakes and additional encryptions may
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Figure 7.2: The authentication simplification with prediction and reuse of physical-layer char-
acteristics.
even become unnecessary.
In conclusion, the prediction and pre-sharing saves the time of passive response to the
authentication request and make the authentication highly directional to the intended user. With
the efficient reuse strategy, the authentication can be mainly simplified in terms of the repetitive
key generation and time-consuming key exchange.
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7.4 Case Study and Evaluation
In this case study, our proposed cross-layer authentication is evaluated in terms of correct
authentication probability and delay reduction performance.
The proposed PHY-key generation is first applied into the existing one-way hash digital
signature scheme, whose block digram is shown in Fig.7.3. There are three entities in this
system. One is the source node (S), which is also the authentication target at the same time.
One is the destination node (D) who expects to verify the source’s authenticity. In this system,
S and D are the two ends in the end-to-end authentication implying not direct link is assumed
in S and D. The third one is a trusted third party (T), which can directly communicate with
S. In this authentication system, we use a pair of keys, one private-key and one public-key,
i.e., asymmetric key cryptography. The generation of this key pair is carried out by existing
asymmetric key algorithm, e.g., RSA. However, the public-key can also be obtained at T using
a function with the device-specific fingerprint of S since T can collect the physical-layer infor-
mation of S. The secrecy of this private-key can be guaranteed by asymmetric key theory. The
public-key can be requested by any authorized entities, while the private-key is only kept in S.
The authentication procedure can be presented in the following.
T, who is experiencing the directly link with S, first estimates the device-specific fingerprint,
f , from the received signals. This procedure can be represented as
S → T : f (7.1)
Then, it processes the quantized estimates with hash function H2 and uses the results of hash
function in RSA to generate the private key K1 and public-key K2.
S → T : (K1( f ),K2( f )) (7.2)
Different from traditional public-key, our K2 is protected by both physical-layer and encryption
factors. This public-key can be used to decrypt the signature for getting y2 in D in the future.
At the side of S, S first uses one-way hash function H1 to generate digest y1 and signs y1
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Figure 7.3: One-way hash digital signature using PHY-key generation.
with its own private key K1. This procedure can be expressed as
S :y1(x,H1) (7.3)
S g(y1,K1), (7.4)
where S g is the signature of S.
The original data and signature are added in a message and this message is then sent to D
using the existing routing protocol. This routing is assumed to be secure, i.e., the integrity of
this message is guaranteed.
After receiving, D first request public-key K2 from T. Then, D uses K2 to decrypt the sig-
nature and get digest y2. In the meanwhile, D also processes the received x with H1 to obtain
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digest y1.
S → D :y1(x,H1) (7.5)
y2(S g,K2) (7.6)
If D can correctly decrypt the readable digest and the content of y1 and y2 can exactly match,
the authenticity of S as well as the integrity of data can be verified. This is because only S
owns the private-key which can uniquely create the validated S g. In this case, the hypothesis
testing can be given by

H0 : y1 = y2
H1 : y1 , y2
. (7.7)
This authentication system is then simulated as depicted in Fig. 7.3. The commonly used
MD5 and RSA algorithms are used to implement the hash function and asymmetric key algo-
rithms, respectively. The MD5 message-digest algorithm is a widely used cryptographic hash
function producing a 128-bit (16-byte) hash value. RSA is one of the first practical public-
key cryptosystems and is widely used for secure data transmission. Besides, the MRC is also
considered in this system to improve the device-specific fingerprint estimation.
Fig. 7.4 shows the simulated correct authentication probability (CAP) vs. SNR. It can be
seen that the CAP without using MRC can reach to more than 95% when SNR is larger than
15 dB. It implies a growth of about 20% in CAP compared to those physical-layer authenti-
cation method without using any enhancement techniques as shown in the figure. This result
shows that, since we make use of both physical-layer and upper-layer encryption methods in
the our cross-layer authentication, the higher authentication accuracy is achieved than only au-
thenticating devices in physical layer. It is also observed that our proposed MRC technique
can work well in the cross-layer system and raise the CAP. Hence, the space diversity based
enhancement technique proposed in Chapter 6 is also applicable in our cross-layer design for
additional performance improvement.
We also simulated the proposed authentication simplification in a handover scenario using
the PHY-key, and compare its delay performance with traditional handover method. For de-
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Figure 7.4: Authentication using PHY-key generation.
scription simplicity, it is assumed that a user U moves to a new cell covered by B from the cell
covered by A, while A and B are severed by sever S. The identity of U has been authenticated
by A, i.e., A has the information of U’s identity either as a legitimate user or an impersonation
attacker. We also assume a list of authorized devices (AUT H) and a list of attackers (ATT K),
which are kept at A, B and S as (AUT H, ATT K)A, (AUT H, ATT K)B and (AUT H, ATT K)S , re-
spectively. The lists contain the information of identity, PHY-key and some predicted directions
and positions of different users. Our authentication handover procedure with the prediction and
reuse of these lists is presented in Algorithm 2.
The simulation results of handover delay using Algorithm 2 and traditional method are
shown in Fig.7.5. It can be seen that the delay time is increasing when network utilization rate
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Algorithm 2 PHY-key based authentication handover
1) Start of the authentication handover procedure.
2) A shares the (AUT H, ATT K)A about U to B directly or via S. B updates (AUT H, ATT K)B.
3) U sends B the association request with claimed identity and signature using the above-
mentioned one-way hash digital signature method.
4) B first checks AUT HB. If U is in AUT HB, B uses the corresponding public-key to decrypt
the received signature. If it can decrypt correctly, go to step 7); if it is incorrect, go to step
5). If U is not in AUT HB, go to step 5).
5) B generates PHY-key of U and checks (ATT K)B. If U is in (ATT K)B, go to step 7). If U
is not in (AUT H, ATT K)B, B sends S the PHY-key of U, then go to step 6).
6) If S decides to grant U the access, go to 7); otherwise, go to 8).
7) B grants U the access in the response, and go to 9).
8) B rejects U in the response.
9) B shares the updated (AUT H, ATT K)B about U to the next possible cell based the predic-
tion.
10) End of authentication handover.
(NUR) becomes higher, where NUR is defined as the ratio of total packet rate and processing
rate. It is also observed that the handover delay of both methods stays low if NUR is below
60%. Once the network does not have enough processing capability remaining, our simplifi-
cation method shows its superiority in reducing the delay time, which is of high significance
to meet the requirements of fast 5G services. Compared to the traditional method, the time is
reduced as the (AUT H, ATT K) of user is pre-shared using prediction at step 2) and reuse the
shared information at step 4) in the proposed algorithm. Additionally, since our PHY-key is
immune to mimicking, the commonly used complicated key exchange protection, e.g., multiple
handshakes, may also be saved with proper design in the future.
7.5 Summary
This chapter focused on the study of wireless cross-layer authentication in which the physical-
layer techniques and upper-layer key-based authentication are considered. We first summa-
rized the main challenges of cross-layer authentication development in terms of the seamless
integration with existing upper-layer authentication protocols and the increased authentication
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complexity problem in complex large-scale networks. Two applicable solutions are then pro-
posed to deal with these problems. Specifically, the cross-layer aided architecture as well as
PHY-key are proposed to achieve 1) the seamless integration of physical-layer authentication
and cryptography schemes and 2) the simplification of authentication handover procedure. It is
noteworthy that the brute-force search attack, which is the fatal weakness of traditional cryp-
tography, can be effectively alleviated by using our PHY-key. Finally, we gave a case study
and the corresponding evaluation results showed that the proposed cross-layer authentication
system outperforms the traditional authentication in increasing the correct authentication prob-
ability and reducing authentication latency.
Honestly speaking, the development of applicable cross-layer design and the network-wide
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end-to-end authentication based on layered OSI protocol are still in their infancy. Again, the
key point is how to make use of the abundant physical-layer characteristics to complement
and enhance the existing upper-layer authentication schemes. Besides, the overwhelming new
5G techniques will bring sharp impacts to current physical-layer authentication, but simultane-
ously provide more new characteristics for enhancing and simplifying authentication in such a
complex communication environment.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Works
8.1 Conclusions
Since impersonation is a critical attacking method for illegally gaining the access to wire-
less communication network, wireless device authentication becomes an indispensable secu-
rity technique to prevent such sophisticated impersonation attackers. Traditional authentication
is accomplished above the physical layer. It is vulnerable to identity-based attacks, suffering
from high computational complexity and many key management related problems. In light
of this, physical-layer authentication, as an effective complement to the upper-layer scheme,
is emerging to combat against impersonation attackers for securing wireless communications.
This dissertation carries out a comprehensive study on physical-layer authentication related
techniques with emphasis on 1) exploring applicable physical-layer authentication method for
a special case where the existing upper-layer methods are ineffective, 2) enhancing physical-
layer authentication performance, 3) designing cross-layer authentication system.
The contributions of this dissertation in terms of these three aspects are summarized as
follows.
Physical-layer amplify-and-forward relay identification
In Chapter 3, it is pointed out that the major technical challenge in authenticating AF relay
nodes is that all well-defined upper-layer authentication protocol are useless. Therefore, ef-
fective physical-layer authentication solutions are are urgently demanded in AF relay scenario.
After analyzing the specific working principle of AF relay, it is found that IQI characteristic is a
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suitable choice for identifying AF relay nodes. The device fingerprint of AF relay is generated
using IQI and wireless channel attributes. Using this device fingerprint, two AF relays can be
differentiated with satisfactory accuracy under relatively high SNR condition.
Chapter 4 focuses on investigating optimal AF relay identification scheme. Given the fact
that IQI estimation and compensation techniques are basics at most present wireless receivers
for improving signal reception, we propose directly using the results of IQI estimation in AF
relay identification to avoid the additional fingerprint generation procedure. Benefiting from
this method, the authentication performance, especially in low SNR regime, is significantly
improved mainly because the unstable factor of wireless link is reduced compared with the
method of Chapter 3. Considering that a cooperative system usually consists of multiple re-
lays, the corresponding identification algorithm is proposed to identify multiple AF relays with
small IQI values. In addition, the optimal training signal is designed for QAM and PSK modu-
lations to maximize the capability of detecting and tracing the attackers with fixed IQI values.
Two more robust suboptimal methods are further proposed and their performances are suffi-
ciently close to the optimal signals. The simulation results validate our comprehensive AF
relay identification system and show high correct identification rate even in the case of low
SNR and minor IQI.
Physical-layer authentication enhancement techniques
Physical-layer authentication is improved in two aspects in this dissertation. First, the de-
vice fingerprinting can be enhanced by involving multiple unique physical-layer characteristics.
Second, the fingerprint differentiation accuracy can be enhanced using diversity techniques of
wireless communications.
In Chapter 5, the multiple wireless channel related attributes and device-specific charac-
teristics are considered in fingerprinting wireless transmitters. Firstly, the IEEE 802.11 WiFi
devices are authenticated through verifying PER and RSS. Since both attributes are conve-
niently accessible in most WiFi platforms without complicated processing, e.g., additional es-
timation, our authentication system is easy to implement. Besides, more general authentication
method using multiple RF-AFE imperfection related characteristics is studied in this chapter.
Without loss of generality, a number of N characteristics are considered in the authentication
model. A weighted combination of these N characteristics is used in order to achieve higher
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authentication accuracy. The optimal weights for each selected characteristics are derived.
The theoretical and simulation results are provided to validate the authentication enhancement
using multi-characteristics.
Diversity technique is exploited in Chapter 6 as the second method to enhance the relia-
bility of physical-layer authentication. Specifically, the cooperative diversity in the form of
using the collaboration of multiple receivers is proposed in an authenticate system. The basic
idea is fully making use of the more powerful computation capacity of multiple receivers and
gaining better performance in authentication processing. Two processing methods, which are
distributed and centralized methods, are proposed in this study. The simulation results show
that, by involving in multi-receivers collaboration, the detection probability is increased. In
addition, the combining diversity is considered in a receiver with multiple antennas for device
authentication. This method aims at increasing the fingerprint-to-noise-ratio through optimal
signal combining. The effectiveness of using maximal-ratio combining, which is one of the
most commonly used combining strategies, is validated. It is worth noting that the enhance-
ment techniques proposed in Chapter 5 and 6 can also be applied in AF relay authentications
which are proposed in Chapter 3 and 4.
Cross-layer authentication system design in wireless networks
Chapter 7 mainly focuses on solving the problems in cross-layer authentication implemen-
tations. The integration with existing cryptographic infrastructures and protocols as well as the
gradually increasing authentication complexity are pointed out as two emerging problems at
first. To be specific, as the physical-layer and upper-layer processing are different, the seamless
integration of two layers’ techniques without any conflict occurring is the first concern. An-
other concern is the end-to-end authentication extension. Different from the physical-layer au-
thentication, the direct link related characteristics between two authentication ends are usually
unavailable in a large-scale network. It is pointed out that the proper physical-layer fingerprint
selection and key generation methods play the key role in solving this problem. In addition,
due to the more complex 5G communication environment, the authentication processing is be-
coming more frequent and complicated which will result in intolerable communication latency.
Two effective solutions are then proposed in this chapter. First, the physical-layer key
(PHY-key) is proposed, which is suitable for the end-to-end authentication scenario. Using this
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PHY-key, the exhaustive-search attack can be effectively mitigated. Second, authentication
simplification based on the prediction, pre-sharing and reuse of the physical-layer characteris-
tics is proposed. The two proposed techniques are applied in the case of one-way hash digital
signature case and the case of authentication handover in cellular communications, respec-
tively, to evaluate the cross-layer authentication performance. The simulation results show
higher correct authentication probability and reduced handover delay as the advantages of us-
ing the proposed methods.
8.2 Future Works
The contributions presented in this dissertation can be extended and explored to some new
related topics as follows.
• In the proposed AF relay identification system, the IQI is considered as the device-
specific fingerprint. As discussed in the working principle of AF relaying, the down/up
conversions are necessary in the signal relaying. This procedure can inevitably produce
some other errors, such as frequency offset, which can be used together with IQI to iden-
tify AF relays in physical layer. Furthermore, since the signal distortion from RF-AFE
imperfections of AF relays can be accumulated in multiple hops in practice. This feature
may be used to identify multiple AF relays in one authentication processing instead of
only identifying one AF relay as studied in this dissertation. It is believed that the iden-
tification time can be reduced as there is no need to identify the AF relay nodes one by
one.
• The multi-characteristics device fingerprinting and diversity techniques are considered
as two effective methods to enhance the physical-layer authentication in two separate
aspects. In this case, the comprehensive physical-layer authentication system with the
consideration of all these enhancement techniques can be further designed. For exam-
ples, the optimal characteristics selection and combination in fingerprint generation and
the combining diversity enhanced fingerprint differentiation can be used together.
• The authentication simplification is studied in this dissertation to reduce the gradually
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increasing authentication complexity in 5G communication networks. However, the
5G related techniques can have some other impacts to existing authentication. For in-
stance, current impacts of RF-AFE imperfections will become severe due to the higher
frequency transmission. Since massive MIMO technique will be employed in 5G, the
current device-specific characteristic is supposed to become even antenna-specific/RF
chain-specific. This new feature can be exploited to identify devices in the future, espe-
cially in 5G.
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